Approximation of criminal sanctions in the European Union: A wild goose chase?
| Author | Konstantinos Zoumpoulakis |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/20322844221119732 |
| Published date | 01 September 2022 |
| Date | 01 September 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Article
New Journal of European Criminal Law
2022, Vol. 13(3) 333–345
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/20322844221119732
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Approximation of criminal
sanctions in the European
Union: A wild goose chase?
Konstantinos Zoumpoulakis
Leiden Law School, Leiden, Netherlands
Abstract
The era when criminal law was solely a matter of national legislation is long gone. In the European
Union, the approximation of substantive criminal norms and procedural rights has not escaped the
attention of the European legislator. Inevitably, the move towards supranational criminal law has
affected the field of sentencing and criminal sanctions. This paper seeks to discuss the changes that
the development of EU criminal law brings on sentencing. The focus lies on the approximation of
criminal sanctions within the EU, in an attempt to understand the scope and the added value of the
EU’s approach in the field. First, the legal basis of article 83 TFEU is presented and analyzed, in order
to define the limits of the Union’s competence in the field of sentencing. Subsequently, the approach
of the European legislator when adopting minimum rules on the approximation of criminal
sanctions is unravelled, and the relationship between functional approximation and mutual rec-
ognition is discussed. Finally, this paper concludes with some critical reflections upon the ap-
proximation of criminal sanctions in the EU, with an eye towards the future of Europe’s Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ).
Keywords
EU criminal law, criminal sanctions, article 83 TFEU, substantive criminal law, minimum
harmonization, approximation, mutual recognition
Introduction
The power to inflict criminal sanctions upon individuals –the ius puniendi –has been traditionally
considered a state privilege, intricately linked to the nation state’s monopoly of power and the
Corresponding author:
Konstantinos Zoumpoulakis, Leiden Law School, Steenschuur 25, Leiden 2311 ES, Netherlands.
Email: k.zoumpoulakis@law.leidenuniv.nl
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