Are human rights western—And why does it matter? A perspective from international political theory
| Date | 01 February 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1755088219832992 |
| Published date | 01 February 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1755088219832992
Journal of International Political Theory
2021, Vol. 17(1) 38 –57
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1755088219832992
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Are human rights
western—And why does it
matter? A perspective from
international political theory
Janne Mende
Justus Liebig University Giessen, Germany
Abstract
A widespread assumption alleges that human rights are not universal, as they claim to
be, but are instead Western oriented. Yet a growing body of research provides evidence
that human rights are not just Western. Both perspectives are critical of repressive
dimensions in the human rights regime, though they recommend different approaches
to addressing them. This article explores both viewpoints from an International Political
Theory perspective. Examining the pluralist idea, institutionalization, and application
of human rights, the first section argues that human rights are not just Western. The
second section investigates why it nevertheless matters to ask whether human rights are
Western. This article develops four interrelated criteria: dynamic pluralism, awareness
of power and inequalities, contextual universalism, and open normativity. These criteria
help determine whether human rights are (not just) Western, and, more importantly,
they provide the basis for an emancipatory human rights regime.
Keywords
Global inequalities, human rights, normativity, particularism, post-colonialism, power,
universalism
Introduction
There is a widespread assumption that human rights1 are not universal, as they claim to
be, but rather that their origin, institutionalization, and application are Western. This
assumption is based on three perspectives with differing intentions, implications, and
Corresponding author:
Janne Mende, Department of International Relations, Institute of Political Science, Justus Liebig University
Giessen, Karl-Glöckner Str. 21 E, D-35394 Gießen, Germany.
Email: janne.mende@sowi.uni-giessen.de
832992IPT0010.1177/1755088219832992Journal of International Political TheoryMende
research-article2019
Article
Mende 39
effects. The first rejects the project of universal human rights in order to legitimate and
reproduce (own) human rights violations.2 The second perspective takes into account
only Western contributions to human rights in order to prove the alleged superiority of
Western values. The third is fueled by the critical intention to address inequalities, colo-
nial legacies, power relations, and repressive mechanisms that are exacerbated by human
rights and their very claim to universality. This article focuses primarily on the third
perspective, and to a lesser extent the second. All three perspectives have differing foci
(e.g. on so-called Asian, Muslim or African values) and concepts (e.g. the post-colonial
notions of Global South/Global North substituting for East/West). This article refers to
these distinctions where applicable. Otherwise, it refers to their commonalities. One rea-
son for this is that the three perspectives share an image of a dichotomously divided
world (Huntington, 2002) that does not allow for universal values or a reconciliation of
different values. Thus, the third perspective fuels an assumption of which it is simultane-
ously critical, albeit to some extent unwillingly.
This article invokes the growing body of research in Political Philosophy, and in con-
structivist and neo-institutionalist International Relations, which puts forward the coun-
ter-thesis that human rights are not just Western. This counter-thesis does not neglect
Western contributions to human rights, or ignores the repressive dimensions and misuse
of human rights. Rather, it underlines their pluralist and heterogeneous character. It is
also sensitive to the possible repressive effects of the assumption that human rights are
Western.
While the critical assumption that human rights are Western implies that the current
human rights regime is unequal, Eurocentric and power fueled, the counter-thesis that
human rights are not just Western envisions a universal human rights regime that includes
everyone equally. Therefore, both perspectives can be said to be critical of repressive
dimensions of human rights, though they imply differing assumptions regarding how to
address them.
This article combines these accounts into an International Political Theory perspec-
tive that is situated simultaneously within and beyond the fields of Political Philosophy
and International Relations. It is based on the two disciplines, but it does not simply
blend the concepts that are common to both disciplines. Rather, it combines the two dis-
ciplines to generate independent perspectives that cannot simply be traced back to either
(cf. Mende, 2015a: 208).
Against this backdrop, the article addresses two questions. Section “Are human rights
western?” explores whether human rights are Western, in more depth than a simple yes
/no dichotomy. Focusing on the idea (“The idea of human rights”), the institutionaliza-
tion (“The institutionalization of human rights”), and the application (“The application
of human rights”) of human rights, it argues that human rights are broader than a Western
construction: they are pluralist.
Section “Why does the question matter?” addresses the question of why it is impor-
tant to ask whether human rights are Western. This question, along with its counter-the-
sis, can contribute to an emancipatory human rights regime. Section “Why does the
question matter?” proceeds from this common endeavor by developing the criteria of
dynamic pluralism (“Dynamic pluralism”), awareness of power and inequalities
(“Awareness of power and inequalities”), contextual universalism (“Contextual
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