Are Property Rights Ever Basic Human Rights?
| Author | Rowan Cruft |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2009.00398.x |
| Published date | 01 February 2010 |
| Date | 01 February 2010 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Are Property Rights Ever Basic
Human Rights?bjpi_398142..154
Rowan Cruft
Stealing from someone is not as bad as torturing, killing or raping them. But is the difference
between theft and these fundamental violations simply a difference in degree (of severity)? I begin
this article by outlining several ways in which the moral grounds for property rights differ in kind
from those for basic human rights, differences that underpin and explain the difference in severity.
I go on to ask whether, despite these differences, there might be some property rights that we should
still classify as basic human rights.
Keywords: property rights; human rights; individualism
I.
Stealing from someone is not as bad as torturing, killing or raping them. But is the
difference between theft and these fundamental violations simply a difference in
degree (of severity)? I begin this article by outlining several ways in which the moral
grounds for property rights differ in kind from those for basic human rights,
differences that underpin and explain the difference in severity. I go on in Sections
II, III and IV to ask whether, despite these differences, there might be some property
rights that we should still classify as basic human rights.1
First, I have argued elsewhere that most property rights in wealthy societies cannot
be individualistically justified. I defined individualistic justification thus:
A person P’s right R is individualistically justified if and only if:
(1) Some genuine feature F of P is of sufficient intrinsic importance on its
own to constitute a powerful pro tanto reason in favour of P’s holding a
right that will protect, serve or in some other way ensure respect for
F—and R is such a right.
(2) This pro tanto reason is undefeated and hence R is justified ...
The intuitive idea is that an individualistically justified right is justified
ultimately by the great intrinsic importance of certain features of its
holder, considered independently of their effect on other people (Cruft
2006, 154–155).
It is attractive to maintain that my basic human rights are individualistically
justified—for example that my right not to be tortured is justified by the intrinsic
importance of my not being tortured, considered independently of the value to
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2009.00398.x BJPIR: 2010 VOL 12, 142–154
© 2010 The Author.Journal compilation © 2010 Political Studies Association
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