Are smart sanctions smart enough? An inquiry into when leaders oppress civilians under UN targeted sanctions
| Date | 01 June 2022 |
| Published date | 01 June 2022 |
| Author | Hyun Jin Choi,Jiyoun Park |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512120931957 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120931957
International Political Science Review
2022, Vol. 43(3) 433 –449
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512120931957
journals.sagepub.com/home/ips
1003789IPS0010.1177/0192512120931957International Political Science ReviewMartill and Sus
research-article2020
Article
Are smart sanctions smart
enough? An inquiry into when
leaders oppress civilians under
UN targeted sanctions
Jiyoun Park
Jeonbuk National University, Republic of Korea
Hyun Jin Choi
Kyung Hee University, Republic of Korea
Abstract
Why do some UN targeted sanctions (or ‘smart’ sanctions) cause collateral damage to the
general population, while others minimize it? We suggest the scope and the effectiveness of
smart sanctions, as well as the political institutions of target countries, are critical determinants
of sanctions’ adverse effects on human rights. Leaders targeted by sanctions with a broad scope
will have a greater incentive to oppress people to ward off potential support for challengers. The
degree to which they can carry out successful oppression, however, hinges upon the effectiveness
of the implementation of sanctions. Furthermore, we expect that authoritarian systems are more
likely to encourage oppression than other ones. We conduct a quantitative analysis of 56 UN-
imposed smart sanction episodes. Our study reveals sanctions with a broad scope that are less
effective result in deteriorated human rights conditions, especially in authoritarian countries.
However, we find when sanctions with a narrow scope work effectively, they do not hurt inno-
cent citizens.
Keywords
Smart sanctions, human rights, political oppression, UN targeted sanctions, sanction effectiveness
Corresponding author:
Hyun Jin Choi, Kyung Hee University, 26 Kyungheedae-ro, Hoegi-dong, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea.
Email: choihj@khu.ac.kr
434 International Political Science Review 43(3)
Introduction
United Nations (UN) ‘smart sanctions’ are coercive economic measures against a target
state—such as arms embargoes, asset freezes, and travel bans—that are designed to mini-
mize harm to the general population who have no connections to those in power (Brzoska
and Lopez, 2016: 60–78). The UN made a shift from ‘comprehensive sanctions’ to ‘smart
sanctions’ after the UN sanctions on Iraq were found to have functioned as a lethal weapon
against the civilian population (Lopez and Cortright, 1997: 14–18). Since then, the UN has
made efforts to design economic sanctions so that they minimize the damage incurred by the
general mass public but, at the same time, increase sanction effectiveness by causing direct
damage to specifically identified individuals, entities, and/or regions (Biersteker et al., 2016:
1–2). For the UN, the modified sanctions framework seemed like a much smarter policy tool
than previous sanctions. Also, for human rights activists, smart sanctions appeared to be the
best way to enforce norms in the global system without imposing unnecessary costs on the
powerless in target countries (Drezner, 2011: 100).
However, even cleverly designed smart sanctions aiming at political elites can sometimes
hurt those with less power. Consider the example of smart sanctions against the Ivory Coast
during 2005 through 2016. In 2005, the UN imposed a series of sanctions on the Ivory Coast
through Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1572, 1584, 1632, and 1633. The primary
goals of the sanctions were to enforce the implementation of the peace agreement signed in
2003 and to constrain all stakeholders in the conflict—the Ivorian government and rebel
leaders—with an arms embargo. These sanctions, which included an arms imports embargo,
asset freeze, and travel ban, were clearly aimed at the political elites who posed a threat to
the ongoing peace process and engaged in serious human rights abuse. However, they were
largely ineffective in constraining the elites (Biersteker et al., 2016: 282). Instead, they led to
the consolidation of authoritarian rule and greater corruption in the state-controlled econ-
omy (Biersteker et al., 2016). The arms embargo did not improve the political situation.
Alongside growing tension over the presidential and legislative elections, the amount of
violence against civilians increased sharply between 2010 and 2012. The Armed Conflict
Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded 164 violent events targeting civilians
during this period, resulting in 748 reported deaths. More than half of these violent acts
were perpetrated by the Ivorian military force and pro-government militias (Raleigh
et al., 2010).
Why do some smart sanctions cause collateral damage to the general population, while
others minimize it? There has been surprisingly little research on this question, despite its
practical and theoretical importance. In this article, we argue that the scope and the effec-
tiveness of smart sanctions, as well as the political institutions of target countries, are critical
determinants of adverse effects on human rights. Leaders who are targeted by sanctions with
a broad scope will have a greater incentive to oppress people to cut off potential support for
challengers. The degree to which they can carry out successful oppression, however, hinges
upon the effectiveness of the implementation of sanctions. Furthermore, we expect that
authoritarian systems with a small winning coalition, when targeted by sanctions, are
more likely to encourage oppression than large-coalition systems.
1
In the following section, we briefly examine the relevant literature on economic sanctions
and develop a theoretical argument about the effects of smart sanctions on human rights in
greater detail. Then, we discuss our data, methods, and the operational definitions of
explanatory variables used for analysis. In the results section, we present and discuss
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