Argument, institutional process, and human rights sanctions in democratic foreign policy
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066109344015 |
| Date | 01 December 2010 |
| Published date | 01 December 2010 |
| Author | C. William Walldorf |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
European Journal of
Argument, institutional process,
International Relations
16(4) 639–662
and human rights sanctions in
© The Author(s) 2010
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democratic foreign policy
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066109344015
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C. William Walldorf, Jr
Wake Forest University, USA
Abstract
When do humanitarian norms lead great powers, especial y democracies, to impose sanctions
against strategic partners and al ies? I argue that answering more specific questions like this
in space and time requires constructivists to focus greater attention on institutional and
ideational process. Agents are central to policy change. But the ideational and institutional
context in which agents build arguments determines when this change is more or less likely.
In this vein, I argue that three factors in liberal states — legislatures, the nature of activist
pressure, and strategic ideas — explain when humanitarian norms produce sanctions.
I demonstrate the argument through a study of US Cold War relations with South Africa,
Turkey, and Greece. Among other contributions, this article demonstrates how attention
to process can extend the constructivist agenda into a series of new empirical domains and
open avenues for contributions to important policy debates.
Keywords
agents, constructivism, Greece, human rights, process, sanctions, South Africa, structures,
Turkey
Introduction
When do humanitarian norms lead great powers, especially democracies, to impose
sanctions against strategic partners and allies? Constructivists usually answer questions
like this with attention to either creative agents or dense norms that socialize political
actors over time (Berger, 1996; Checkel, 1997; Finnemore, 1996, 2003; Herman, 1996;
Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Klotz, 1995; Legro, 2005; Price and Tannenwald, 1996; Risse-
Kappen, 1994; Schimmelfennig, 1998/99). The problem with these arguments is that robust
norms often exist for decades and activists frequently press their agenda for years before
Corresponding author:
C. William Walldorf, Jr, Department of Political Science, Wake Forest University, P.O. Box 7568, Winston-
Salem, N.C. 27109, USA.
Email: walldocw@wfu.edu
640
European Journal of International Relations 16(4)
policy change finally comes. Agent-centric and structure-centric explanations fail, thus, to
account for when norms generate specific policy outcomes at specific points in time.
Norms appear to matter at random. This problem is important. Without systematic, idea-
tionally based answers to when norms matter, realists in particular will contend that norms
depend upon power, gaining influence only when geopolitical changes allow (Dessler and
Owen, 2005).1
This article offers a framework for addressing problems like this. It does so by devot-
ing greater attention to ideational and institutional process. Creative agents, normative
structures, and process converge to determine when norms matter (Crawford, 1993, 2002;
Jackson and Nexon, 1999; Kowert and Legro, 1996; Schennik, 1988). In turning to pro-
cess, I focus specific attention on the arguments of moral entrepreneurs and, especially,
the context that makes those arguments more (or less) persuasive. Human rights activists
are vital to policy change, but they make their appeals and argue within specific — and
restrictive — confines. How and with what activists argue within these institutional con-
fines often determines when humanitarian values shape policy outcomes. Process analy-
sis, then, allows us to press the constructivist agenda into new and important empirical
domains (Jackson and Nexon, 1999).
I explore the importance of process in a case familiar to constructivists: the US deci-
sion to sanction South Africa in the mid-1980s (Crawford and Klotz, 1999; Klotz, 1995).
The case demonstrates the conventional problem well. Activists in the US had been argu-
ing for sanctions against South Africa since the 1940s (Nesbitt, 2004: 27–137). Anti-
apartheid norms — in fact, South Africa’s pariah status in the international system — had
been around just as long (Klotz, 1999: 195). Why did it take nearly 40 years for truly
punitive sanctions to come? The answer can be found with the process surrounding
human rights policies in liberal democratic states.
In liberal states, the interplay between three factors — legislatures, the nature of
activist pressure, and strategic ideas — helps explain when humanitarian norms matter.
More specifically, I expect the legislative branch of government to impose sanctions
when a partner demonstrates a pattern of illiberal behavior and activists argue for policy
change using enough pressure given the strategic value that policy-makers attach to the
partner. Legislatures are generally the main repository of humanitarian norms at the
state level in liberal countries. Across history, this has frequently led to legislative
expectations that strategic partners and allies demonstrate certain forms of humanitarian
behavior. The US Congress institutionalized a set of political rights (for instance the
rights to life and due process as well as prohibitions against torture, summary execution,
and cruel punishment) in the US policy process by the early 1970s. Specific to South
Africa, these values reinforced a norm of racial equality that emerged globally in the
prior decade (Klotz, 1995: 6).
Legislatures, then, represent the main institutional venue where human rights groups
argue for policy change. Activists use emotional appeals to frame, interpret, and assign
meaning to events (Crawford, 2002: 11–37; Snow and Benford, 1988: 198–199; Tarrow,
1994: 122–130). The success of these arguments, though, depends upon factors unique to
the legislative venue in which they are made. For starters, activist appeals gain more
salience and resonate with policy-makers when political opportunities expand in the leg-
islative process.2 This occurs when partners demonstrate a pattern of illiberal behavior,
which I define as repeated and sustained human rights abuses within its borders (torture
Walldorf, Jr
641
or summary execution, for instance, in the US context). These political opportunities contract
(reducing the chances for activist success) when partner governments take liberalizing
steps, which consist of one or more initiatives to end abuses or the conditions that contrib-
uted to past abuses.
Political opportunities and good arguments do not comprise the entire story, however.
Especially with human rights debates in democratic polities, activists must also possess
the right tools to convince policy-makers to act. In the legislative context, the right tools
depend upon policy-maker beliefs about the strategic ranking of partner states as either
vital or important. When political opportunities expand due to partner illiberalism and
policy-makers believe partners to be vital, activists usually need high pressure in the
form of public opinion support to succeed in bringing human rights sanctions. Legislatures
generally defer to executive branch leadership on foreign policy issues. In cases per-
ceived to be vital, this institutional tendency becomes especially strong as legislators
worry most about strategic losses. Public opinion support, created by activist networking
and argumentation, enhances the humanitarian appeals that activists make.
In cases involving partners believed to be important, rather than vital, the same institu-
tional roadblocks to legislative foreign policy leadership exist. But, activists usually need
only lower-end pressure to make their arguments more convincing when political oppor-
tunities expand. In the domain of human rights, low-end pressure consists of reports that
detail case-by-case accounts of inhumanity within a partner’s borders. These reports
sharpen activist arguments by bringing the distance between extant humanitarian norms
and the behavior of partners into sharp relief. They also embolden legislatures to over-
come institutional hurdles to challenge executive authority. Activist failure results, ceteris
paribus, for one of two reasons: either political opportunities contract due to liberalizing
steps by partners, or activists apply the wrong form of pressure given policy-maker per-
ceptions about the value of a partner.
For reasons of space, this article focuses only on vital cases.3 On this score, the US
Congress sanctioned Pretoria in 1985 and 1986 after South Africa violated US expecta-
tions of humane behavior and activists used persuasive arguments to build a social move-
ment that it grafted into its sanctions appeals to Congress. The failure of activists in the
earlier stages of the South Africa case came largely because groups, like Amnesty
International (AI), argued for sanctions on the basis of information pressure alone.
Liberalizing steps by the government in Pretoria also closed political opportunities at
various points, off setting activist appeals. As I demonstrate, the argument accounts for
patterns in the flow of US military aid to two other vital allies, Greece (no sanctions) and
Turkey (sanctions), during the 1970s.
In the following, I turn first to alternative ideational explanations of when norms mat-
ter. Building upon strengths in this literature, I then detail my argument. From there
I assess several decision points in the US–South Africa case, followed by a discussion
of Greece and Turkey. I conclude with implications for International Relations and
...
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