Aristotle and the problem of oligarchic harm: Insights for democracy
| Date | 01 July 2019 |
| Published date | 01 July 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885116663837 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
2019, Vol. 18(3) 393–414
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885116663837
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Article
Aristotle and the problem
of oligarchic harm:
Insights for democracy
Gordon Arlen
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago,
Chicago, IL, USA
Abstract
This essay identifies ‘oligarchic harm’ as a dire threat confronting contemporary democ-
racies. I provide a formal standard for classifying oligarchs: those who use personal
access to concentrated wealth to pursue harmful forms of discretionary influence.
I then use Aristotle to think through both the moral and the epistemic dilemmas of
oligarchic harm, highlighting Aristotle’s concerns about the difficulties of using wealth as
a ‘proxy’ for virtue. While Aristotle’s thought provides great resources for diagnosing
oligarchic threats, it proves less useful as a guide to democratic institutional design.
Aristotle raises a deep-seated objection to democratic forms of ‘rule by the poor.’
A successful response to oligarchy must move beyond Aristotle’s objection and affirm
the demos’ tripartite status as many, free, and poor. I briefly outline the terms of this
‘new’ mixed regime: one that seeks to tame oligarchy through a mixture of aggregative,
deliberative, and plebeian institutions.
Keywords
Aristotle, oligarchy, democracy, plebeianism, inequality, harm
Who are the oligarchs and what sort of harm do they cause? Oligarchy is conven-
tionally understood as a constitutional rival to democracy – ‘rule by the rich’ vs.
‘rule by the poor.’ Greek democracies like Athens were perennially threatened by
wealthy elites who plotted to overthrow popular institutions. By contrast, most
modern democracies have abolished wealth qualifications for office and no longer
exhibit direct, formal rule by oligarchs. However, this article argues that oligarchic
threats persist within broadly participatory and inclusive democratic regimes. In
responding to these threats, political philosophers can draw insights from the
Corresponding author:
Gordon Arlen, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, USA.
Email: arlen@uchicago.edu
classical critique of oligarchy advanced by Aristotle, even as they move beyond its
limitations.
Oligarchs, on my account, are agents who (1) retain personal access to massive
concentrated wealth and (2) deploy their wealth to achieve discretionary influence
in the public domain, broadly understood. This definition – in the context of the
United States – encompasses a range of actors: from direct office-seekers
like Trump and Bloomberg to Super-PAC donors like Soros and Koch to mega-
philanthropists like Gates. Certain oligarchs may prove altruistic and
civically inclined. However, because they enjoy the advantages of outsized
wealth, oligarchs are positioned to evade institutional controls and exert influence
in harmful ways.
The problem of ‘oligarchic harm’ has an ancient pedigree. In the Politics,
Aristotle invokes the Greek concept of pleonexia – roughly translated as a covetous
desire for excess wealth and power. Aristotle associates pleonexia with a range of
oppressive behaviours by rich oligarchs. Why is an Aristotelian analysis of oligar-
chy relevant today?
Aristotle’s stature within democratic theory has expanded significantly in recent
years. Deliberative democrats see Aristotle’s ‘endoxic’ method as a framework for
reconciling individual life with collective life (Frank, 2005; Salkever, 1990;
Waldron, 1995; Wilson, 2011). Aristotle’s account of the polis is said to strike a
productive balance between citizenship and statesmanship, unity and diversity,
civic friendship and agonistic competition (Garsten, 2013; Nichols, 1992;
Schwartzberg, 2016; Yack, 1993). His principles of distributive justice, alongside
his perfectionist virtue ethics, have been deployed within theories of social democ-
racy (Nussbaum, 1990).
Adding to existing literatures, I argue that Aristotle helps us think through two
dimensions of the oligarchic threat to democratic citizenries, which I refer to as
moral and epistemic. First, Aristotle exposes the moral pathologies which incline
elites to appetitive behaviour. He recognises that pleonexia can spread like a para-
site, infecting the entire life of a city-state: the greedy ambitions of a wealthy
oligarch are never far removed from the vulgar craftsman obsessed with acquiring
new money, or the master who abuses slaves for excess gain, or even the soldier
who engages in unjust conquest. Aristotle laments the oligarchic dispositions which
seep into civic culture and destroy political friendship (Aristotle, Politics 1295b15-
25; henceforth Pol.). He cautions that democracies can develop oligarchic customs
and behaviours over time (Pol. 1292b11-21). Unlike some commentators, I am not
arguing that liberal democracies should aspire to Aristotelian virtue in a thick
sense. I do though maintain that Aristotle’s moral critique of oligarchy remains
relevant in ‘non-ideal’ contexts where citizens have good reason to remain alert to
the threat of proliferating pleonexia.
Aristotle encounters, however, an epistemic dilemma. He insists that wealth
often tracks virtue because it enables necessary leisure time. He recognises, how-
ever, that wealth is never a perfect proxy for virtue. The epistemic dilemma lies in
distinguishing virtuous uses of wealth from deviant ones. Aristotle worries that
people fail to make these judgments successfully, for virtue, as an internal quality
394 European Journal of Political Theory 18(3)
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