Arms imports in the wake of embargoes
| Author | Tobias Böhmelt,Vincenzo Bove |
| DOI | 10.1177/13540661211037394 |
| Published date | 01 December 2021 |
| Date | 01 December 2021 |
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https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661211037394
European Journal of
International Relations
2021, Vol. 27(4) 1114 –1135
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/13540661211037394
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Arms imports in the wake
of embargoes
Vincenzo Bove
University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
Tobias Böhmelt
University of Essex, Wivenhoe, UK
Abstract
Do states circumvent embargoes by supplying weapons across borders to sanctioned
countries? We report evidence that arms imports systematically increase in the
neighborhood of conflict states under an embargo. Using several alternative research-
design specifications, we contend that this pattern is consistent with arms exporters
shifting the arms trade to neighbors of conflict states under sanctions, where it is easier
to move arms clandestinely across the border. Despite the lack of direct evidence
of clandestine cross-border trafficking, this research contributes to the development
of more sophisticated screening tools to identify potential non-compliers with arms
embargoes for direct follow-up investigations.
Keywords
Arms trade, conflict, counterfactual, differences-in-difference design, embargoes
Introduction
Arms imports can encourage more conflictual foreign policies or protract existing hostili-
ties, intensify combat engagements, and are related to the outbreak of new conflicts (see
e.g., Kinsella, 1994, 1998; Blanton, 1999; Craft and Smaldone, 2002; Pamp et al., 2018b;
Mehrl and Thurner, 2020). Not surprisingly, in the recently launched Agenda for
Disarmament, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres highlights a
direct relation between disarmament and attaining the Sustainable Development Goals
Corresponding author:
Vincenzo Bove, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK.
Email: v.bove@warwick.ac.uk
1037394EJT0010.1177/13540661211037394European Journal of International RelationsBove and Böhmelt
research-article2021
Article
Bove and Böhmelt 1115
(SDGs), which explicitly aim at reducing illicit arm flows (Guterres, 2018; SIPRI, 2019).
Against this background, the international community and international organizations like
the UN frequently impose embargoes (Brzoska, 1991, 2008; Krause, 1995), that is, restric-
tive measures sanctioning the supply to or receipt of specified items from a designated
party to signal disapproval or to modify the behavior of the target (SIPRI, 2019). For exam-
ple, one of the most recent UN embargoes was imposed on South Sudan in July 2018,
prohibiting all UN members from the “direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the ter-
ritory of South Sudan from or through their territories [. . .] of arms and related materiel of
all types” (United Nations Security Council, 2018: 2).
Do states comply with arms embargoes? Several major arms exporters are among the
most vocal supporters of multilateral humanitarian export controls. Although it may
seem that there are economic incentives to do otherwise (Erickson, 2013, 2015), comply-
ing with arms embargoes does also provide material and non-material benefits. Consider,
for instance, opportunities for new multilateral cooperation as well as the possibility to
improve international reputation, legitimacy, and influence, which in turn likely increase
compliers’ military power or economic gains (Erickson, 2015; Mercer, 2010). At the
same time, violations may mobilize the international community leading to “naming and
shaming” which triggers a loss of legitimacy and governments’ reputation in the eyes of
their constituents, which is all coupled with further, potentially severe sanctions (Burgoon
et al., 2015; Cortell and Davis, 2000; Erickson, 2015, 2020). Although official violations
of arms embargoes are rare, and only few states are involved when violations are reported,
arms control “represent[s] the quintessential collective action problem” as a large num-
ber of heterogeneous participants with difference agendas need to act (Sandler, 2000:
542). Using open-source information on official state-to-state weapon transfers, Moore
(2010) documents here that arms exporting states can indeed publicly violate arms
embargoes at times.
In addition to the direct supply of weapons to embargoed states, which is likely to be
detected, states can also clandestinely circumvent arms restrictions by supplying arms to
neighbors where the goods can then be moved more easily across the border to the sanc-
tioned targets. For example, South Sudan’s long and porous borders make it particularly
difficult to control arms flows and the UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan does claim
that neighboring states “likely” violated the embargo (Gibb et al., 2019).1 This case mir-
rors 2005, when the UN explicitly accused Rwanda and Uganda to routinely violate a
2003 arms embargo imposed on the DRC.2 Partially because of the scattered evidence,
both Uganda and Rwanda have denied the allegations, as usually do countries that are
accused of illegally supplying arms to embargoed targets. Are the DRC and South Sudan
isolated cases? Existing reports are scant, only focusing on a handful of emblematic and
often disputed episodes given the inherent difficulties in detecting countries breaching
the terms of embargoes, thus accounting for a small fraction of the illegal arms trade
(Bondi, 2004; DellaVigna and La Ferrara, 2010; Stohl, 2005).
This research addresses these difficulties by proposing a way to identify changes in
arm trades that points toward evidence of illegal arms flows circumventing embargoes.
Specifically, we focus on arms imports into countries neighboring a conflict state with an
embargo. Weapons are often transferred to countries embroiled in civil conflict via third-
party transit points (Hiscock, 2007; UNIDIR, 2006). Porous land borders, common in
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