Artificial persons and attributed actions: How to interpret action-sentences about states
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066116679244 |
| Published date | 01 December 2017 |
| Date | 01 December 2017 |
| Author | Sean Fleming |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
E
JR
I
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066116679244
European Journal of
International Relations
2017, Vol. 23(4) 930 –950
© The Author(s) 2016
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1354066116679244
journals.sagepub.com/home/ejt
Artificial persons and
attributed actions: How to
interpret action-sentences
about states
Sean Fleming
University of Cambridge, UK
Abstract
Action-sentences about states, such as ‘North Korea conducted a nuclear test’, are
ubiquitous in discourse about international relations. Although there has been a great
deal of debate in International Relations about whether states are agents or actors,
the question of how to interpret action-sentences about states has been treated as
secondary or epiphenomenal. This article focuses on our practices of speaking and
writing about the state rather than the ontology of the state. It uses Hobbes’ theory
of attributed action to develop a typology of action-sentences and to analyse action-
sentences about states. These sentences are not shorthand for action-sentences
about individuals, as proponents of the metaphorical interpretation suggest. Nor do
they describe the actions of singular agents, as proponents of the literal interpretation
suggest. The central argument is that action-sentences about states are ‘attributive’,
much like sentences about principals who act vicariously through agents: they identify
the ‘owners’ of actions — the entities that are responsible for them — rather than the
agents that perform the actions. Our practice of ascribing actions to states is not merely
figurative, but nor does it presuppose that states are corporate agents.
Keywords
Agent–structure problem, corporate agency, Hobbes, metaphor, ontology, state
personhood
Introduction
Action-sentences about states are ubiquitous in discourse about international relations.
Journalists report that ‘North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test’ and that ‘India has
launched an unmanned model space shuttle’ (BBC, 2016; Reuters, 2016). Waltz (1979:
Corresponding author:
Sean Fleming, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, Alison Richard
Building, 7 West Road, Cambridge, CB3 9DT, UK.
Email: srf44@cam.ac.uk
679244EJT0010.1177/1354066116679244European Journal of International RelationsFleming
research-article2016
Article
Fleming 931
109) declares that ‘states have to do whatever they think necessary for their own preser-
vation’, and Finnemore (2003: 2) observes that ‘[s]tates now intervene for reasons and in
ways that were unimaginable one hundred or two hundred years ago’. We all use action-
sentences about states, and, as Carr (1946: 149) suggested, ‘[i]t does not seem possible
to discuss international relations in other terms’. Yet, what exactly do we mean when we
say that a state is acting, has acted or will act?
Although everyone intuitively understands sentences such as ‘North Korea conducted a
nuclear test’ and ‘India launched a space shuttle’, these sentences remain deeply ambigu-
ous. Are they literal or metaphorical? Do they describe the actions of corporate agents, or
are they shorthand descriptions of the actions of human agents? What is their logical form?
It is peculiar that the discipline of International Relations (IR) has devoted so little attention
to one of its most common turns of phrase. The question of how to interpret action-sen-
tences about states has been addressed only as an aside in the debate about whether states
are agents or actors.1 With few exceptions (Copp, 2006; Ludwig, 2007, 2014), even phi-
losophers of action have neglected action-sentences about corporate entities.
The status of our discourse is of great importance. If action-sentences about states are
metaphorical (e.g. Gilpin, 1984; Gould, 2009; Lomas, 2005, 2014; Marks, 2011), then
they are dispensable. We would lose no explanatory power, and gain clarity and precision,
by eliminating action-sentences about states in favour of action-sentences about human
beings. ‘North Korea conducted a nuclear test’ is only figurative shorthand for ‘some
North Koreans conducted a nuclear test’. However, if action-sentences about states are
literal (e.g. Erskine, 2001; Wendt, 1999, 2004, 2005), then they are indispensable. We
would lose explanatory power but gain nothing if we eliminated them. ‘North Korea con-
ducted a nuclear test’ can be expressed in terms of individuals no more than ‘Beethoven
conducted the Ninth Symphony’ can be expressed in terms of cells; ‘North Korea’, like
‘Beethoven’, is a singular subject that performs a singular action. At stake is whether our
common descriptions and explanations are necessary or whether they are merely place-
holders that could be supplanted by more precise descriptions and explanations.
Behind the semantic disagreement about how to interpret action-sentences about
states lies an ontological disagreement about the nature of collective action. While the
metaphorical interpretation follows from the ontological position that only individuals
are capable of acting, the literal interpretation follows from the ontological position that
states are agents in their own right. Proponents of each interpretation employ the same
structure of argument: they use ontological claims about collective action to justify
semantic claims about what our common language means. The existing debate about
how to interpret action-sentences about states is entirely parasitic on the debate about the
ontological status of the state.
I propose both a different approach and a different answer to the question of how to
interpret action-sentences about states. First, on pragmatic grounds, I give priority to
language over ontology. Instead of developing an ontology of the state and then using it
to determine how to interpret action-sentences about states, I begin with our practice of
ascribing actions to states and ask which ontological commitments this practice entails.
Second, following this methodological prescription, I use Hobbes’ theory of attributed
action to develop an alternative to the metaphorical and literal interpretations. According
to this ‘attributive’ interpretation, action-sentences about states are more like sentences
To continue reading
Request your trial