Assessing Accountability in Practice: The Asian Development Bank's Accountability Mechanism
Date | 01 November 2015 |
Published date | 01 November 2015 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12276 |
Author | Susan Park |
Assessing Accountability in Practice: The
Asian Development Bank’s Accountability
Mechanism
Susan Park
University of Sydney
Abstract
Intergovernmental Organizations (IOs) such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) were created by and for states. The
ADB was established to further economic growth and cooperation in the Asia Pacific. At the behest of its powerful
member states the ADB created an accountability mechanism (AM) in 1995. This mechanism was created to provide
recourse to people that might be or are ‘directly materially and adversely affected’by a development project financed
by the ADB. As with the other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), the creation of such an ‘external accountability
mechanism’recognized a legally relevant relationship between an IO and private persons. This article investigates the
operations of the ADB’s AM. Arguably, the ADB’s AM has brought some improvement to affected people through its
mediation, compliance investigations and monitoring. Yet analysis of the mechanism also demonstrates that progress
is hampered by a lack of access, transparency, Developing Member Country (DMC) resistance, staff obstruction and a
lack of independence in the mechanism itself.
Policy Implications
•Continued state support of the external AMs of the MDBs must rest on recognising the ability of these mechanisms
to improve the plight of project affected people, while continuing to address their limitations.
•Any support of the accountability mechanism of the ADB must come with assurances regarding DMCs’right to
retain state sovereignty without overriding the outcomes of the mechanism. Upholding the integrity of the mecha-
nism is vital for its ability to operate effectively.
•Prospective claimants must identify whether making a claim to the AM will advance their interests or whether
other avenues of recourse and redress are necessary.
•The ADB should prioritise its efforts to mainstream the accountability process within the bank to ensure staff sup-
port. This is crucial to the mechanism’s role in improving the ADB’s development effectiveness in the region.
•Periodic evidence based reviews of the mechanism are vital to the functioning of the mechanism, and to retaining
its legitimacy. This should be based on both internal and independent assessments of the mechanism.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) was created by
states to further economic growth and cooperation in
the Asia Pacific. In 1995 the ADB created an accountabil-
ity mechanism (AM) in response to demands from its
shareholders, principally powerful member states. This
‘Inspection Function’aimed to provide recourse to peo-
ple affected by a development project financed by the
ADB (ADB, 1995, p. 9, unpublished paper). The creation
of such an ‘external accountability mechanism’recog-
nized a noncontractual relationship between an IO and
private persons similar to mechanisms established by the
other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).
1
This arti-
cle investigates the history and practices of the ADB’s
AM and argues that it has brought some improvement
to affected people through its mediation, compliance
investigations and monitoring. However analysis of the
mechanism also demonstrates that progress is hampered
by a lack of access, transparency, Developing Member
Country (DMC) resistance, staff obstruction and a lack of
independence in the mechanism itself.
Section one provides a brief history of the ADB AM:
beginning with the demand for such a mechanism;
through to its first iteration as the Inspection Function
from 1995 to 2002; to its current reformulated AM. In
doing so the paper analyses the cases brought to the
external AM and their outcomes for Project Affected
People (PAP). Reformulated as the AM in 2003, the AM
adopted a bifurcated process comprised of both a
Global Policy (2015) 6:4 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12276 ©2015 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Global Policy Volume 6 . Issue 4 . November 2015 455
Special Section Article
To continue reading
Request your trial