Assessment of Act of Self-Defence
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002201839906300507 |
| Published date | 01 October 1999 |
| Date | 01 October 1999 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The Journal of Criminal Law
a garage after a service,
the
garage 'supplies'
him
with
it. That, it is
thought, would
not
be
the
term
used either by
the
owner
or
the
garage,
on
any
inquiry as to
whether
it was ready for collection. Although,
perhaps, whatever
had
been
put
into the car was being supplied,
there
had
merely been abailment of the car itself. That was still true,
even
though
the prosecution was undoubtedly right in saying
that
it should,
after the service, have been in a different condition. The court, following
the analogy of drugs
handed
over to
another
for safe keeping,
which
are
said to be 'supplied'
when
handed
back (see RvMaginnis [1987] AC
303), held that a car
when
handed
over temporarily to
another
is
similarly 'supplied' to the
owner
when
returned to him. The analogy
would, with respect, appear to highlight, rather than, minimise the
strain on the use of the term. In the Misuseof Drugs Act 1971,
the
term.
has the peculiar meaning of describing a particular criminal offence.
Assessment of Act of Self-Defence
DPP v Armstrong-Braun [1999] 163 JP 271
There was a habitat of great-crested newts on a site for
which
planning
permission had been granted for certain works to which objection was
taken by those
who
wished to protect
the
newts, as they were a species
protected by English
and
European law: see HabitatsDirective 1992, the
Wildlife
and
Countryside Act 1984, s 9
and
Sched 5,
and
the
Conserva-
tion (Natural Habitat) Regulations 1994. Alicence was given to a person
under
s 6 of the 1984 Act to translocate the newts.
It
was to translocate
the newts
that
the land was being prepared,
but
the defendant in the
present case, having tried to
jam
the controls of a mechanical digger, fell
into an
argument
with its operator,
whom
he struck on
the
arm
with
astake. On being charged with assault
and
battery, he pleaded
that
he
had
acted
in
self-defence,
but
the justices found as a fact
that
his
use of force in self-defence
went
beyond
what
was reasonable in
the
circumstances.
The defendant was a county councillor who, it was conceded, was
acting in a way which he sincerely believed would serve to protect
the
newts. He asserted
that
he
had
attacked
the
mechanical digger
and
its
operator because he
thought
that the operation was a crime
and
because
he
thought
he was about to be hurt. He
had
genuinely
thought
that
his
actions were
the
only way to prevent the crime
and
to protect himself.
The justices found
not
only that the force was unreasonable,
but
also
that, as a county councillor, he must have
known
of
the
licence to
relocate
the
newts
and
that, in consequence, no crime was being com-
mitted. He was convicted
and
on appeal from that convicdon
the
issue
was
whether
the
test of
what
force is reasonable,
when
claimed to have
been used in self-defence, is largely subjective or largely objective. The
defendant's argument was that
when
it 'comes to a consideration of
the proportionality of the force, the justices should adopt asubjective
approach, because the degree of force which the law allows a person to
402
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