Attorney General v Hitchcock
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 10 June 1847 |
| Date | 10 June 1847 |
| Court | Exchequer |
English Reports Citation: 154 E.R. 38
IN THE COURTS OF EXCHEQUER AND EXCHEQUER CHAMBER
S C 16 L J Ex 259, 11 Jur 478 Explained, R v Cargill, [1913] 2 K B 271
[91] the attorney-general v hitchcock June 8 and 10,1847-Inauinforma-B iu- ^otl UI1der the revenue laws, a witness, who had given material evidence as to the fact in issue, was asked, on cross-examination, whether he had not said that the officers of the Crown had offered him a bribe to give that evidence He denied that he had ever said so -Held, that evidence was inadmissible to shew that he had made such a statement -Qutre, as to the extent to which evidence 13 admissible, since 6 & 7 Viet c 85, for the puipose of affecting the credit of a witness [S C 16 L J Ex 259, 11 Jui 478 Explained, E v Caigill, [1913] 2 K B 271 ] This was an information at the suit of the Attoiney-Geneial, which charged the defendant, a maltster, with having used j certain cibtein for making malt, without having previously entered it, aa required by the statute 4 & 5 Will 4, c 51, s 6 (c) Pollock, C B., Alderson, B 1EX.92. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL V. HITCHCOCK 39 At the trial, before Pollock, C. B., at the sittings after last Easter Term, a witness of: the name of Spooner, who deposed to the fact of the cistern having been used by the defendant, was asked, on cross-examination by the defendant's counsel, whether ha had not said that the officers of the Crown had offered him £20 to say that the cistern had been used. Spoorier denied having said so, and thereupon the defendant's coiunsel proposed to ask another witness of the name of Cook, whether Spooner had not said so. The Attorney-General objected to this question and the Lord Chief Baron, being of opinion that the question was irrelevant to the issue, and that it also tended to raise a collateral issue, held the objection good, and ruled that it could not be put. Bovill obtained a rule for a new trial, on the ground that this evidence was improperly rejected, and cited Meayoe v. Simmons (3 C. & P. 75), and Yeivin's case (2 Campb. 638, (w)). The Attorney-General (J. Wilde with him) shewed cause. This is a very important question, and one which is not directly affected by any decided cases; for such as are applicable to it, which are mere Nisi Prius decisions, cannot be said to lay down any definite principle or h'xed rule by which this case can be governed. The principle upon which it must depend is correctly laid down in Phillipps on Evidence, where it is stated that " it is a general [92] rule that a witness cannot be cross-examined as to any fact, which, if admitted, would be wholly collateral, and wholly irrelevant to the matters in issue, for the purpose of contradicting him by other evidence, and in this manner to discredit his testimony. And if the witness answer such an irrelevant question before it is disallowed or withdrawn, evidence cannot afterwards 1)6 admitted to contradict his testimony on the collateral matter. The point for consideration therefore is, what question, or what matter is wholly irrelevant?" (2 Phill. on Evid., 9th ed., p. 398). This is the correct rule, and the criterion of relevancy depends, as it is submitted, upon this,-Could the defendant substantially have proved, as a;part of his own case, that the witness had said what was imputed to him by the question] In the consideration of this question, it may be convenient to divide the subject into the three following heads :-First, could the defendant substantially have proved that the witness had been bribed'! Secondly, that the witness had beeti offered a;bribe? ami thirdly, that he had said he had been offered a bribe 1-admitting that the use of the cistern, upon which the offer is dependent, is material evidence. If the first or second of these questions be answered in the negative, the answer to the last must necessarily be so likewise, although the decision of the last only is required. It Will, however, be perhaps advantageous, as a preliminary step, to consider the first of these three divisions of the subject, as the reasons connected with it may dispose uf the question before the Court. Could then the defendant substantially have proved that the witness had been bribed] Now the reasons upon which one of the questions in. The Queen'n case was answered by the judges, form a distinct authority to shew, that as between the Crown and the defendant, there can be no rule to make such evidence admissible for the purpose of disparaging the prosecution (2 iJrod. & B. : 05). Theife cannot be any person upon whom such '[93] conduct can operate, as (his is not p, civil case, in which the acts of the individual party are binding on that party. On^ of the questions put by the House of Lords to the judges in The Queen's iase, wag as [follows : " If, in a trial on an indiotment for a capital offence or any crime, Evidence hold been given, upon the cross-examination of a witness examined in chief in support thereof, from which it appeared that A. B., not examined as a witness, had been employed by the party preferring the indictment, as an agent to procure and examine evidence and witnesses in support of the indictment, and the party indicted should propose in the course of the defence, to examine C. D. as u witness to prove that A. B. had offered a bribe to E. F. in order to induce him to give testimony touching the matter in the indictment (E. F. not being a witness examined in support of the indictment, or examined before it was proposed to examine C, D.), would the Court below, according to their usage and practice, allow C. D. to be examined for the purpose aforesaid, and could sucih witness, according to law, be so examined, if the counsel employed in support of the prosecution objected to such examination?" (ii Brad. & B. 302). And it was held, that the question could not be put for the; purpose of disparaging the prosecution, by ultimately implicating any of the parties -'conducting it by the misconduct of the agent tendering the bribe. , Again, the proof of a witness having been bribed stands upon the same principle ha the commission of a crime by him on some previous occasion, and if such a question 40 THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL V HITCHCOCK 1 EX 94 is put to him on cross-examination, his answer must be taken for better or for worse [Parke, B. The reason in such case is a sound one we cannot enter into a collateral question as to the man's having committed a crime on some former occasion, one reason being, that it would lead to complicated issues and long inquiries, and another, that a party cannot be ex-[94]-pected to be pi epared to defend the whole of the actions of his life Neither of those cases applies to the case of receiving a bube, nor to a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
R v Mendy
...one of the parties and to show that he is prejudiced so far as the case being tried is concerned. 11 Chief Baron Pollick in Attorney-General v. Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exchequer Reports 91) puts the matter thus at p. 101: 'It is no disparagement to a man that a bribe is offered to him; it may be......
- Public Prosecutor v Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim (No. 3)
-
Caldwell v Mahon and Others
...decision of the Supreme Court in Browne v. Tribune Newspapers Plc. [2001] 1 I.R. 521 and to the words of Rolfe B. in A.G. v. Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch. 91 where he says in relation to cross-examination as to collateral matters:- "If we lived for a thousand years instead of about sixty or seve......
-
Nicholls v the Queen
...matters 40 There are two tests for determining whether a matter is collateral. The first test, articulated by Pollock CB in Attorney-General v Hitchcock13, defines collateral matter by reference to the issues upon which evidence may not be tendered by a party as part of its case during exam......