Autocracies and the international sources of cooperation
| Author | Soumyajit Mazumder |
| Date | 01 May 2017 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343316687018 |
| Published date | 01 May 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Autocracies and the international sources
of cooperation
Soumyajit Mazumder
Department of Political Science, Harvard University
Abstract
Under what conditions do autocracies peacefully settle disputes? Existing studies tend to focus on the domestic
factors that shape conflict initiation. In this article, I show how domestic institutions interact with international
institutions to produce more cooperative outcomes. Particularly, this study argues that as autocracies become more
central in the network of liberal institutions such as preferential trade agreements (PTAs), they are less likely to
initiate a militarized interstate dispute (MID). As a state becomes more democratic, the effect of centrality within the
PTA network on the peaceful dispute settlement dissipates. This is because greater embeddedness in the PTA regime
is associated with enhanced transparency for autocracies, which allows autocracies to mitigate ex ante informational
problems in dispute resolution. Using a dataset of MID initiation from 1965 to 1999, this study finds robust
empirical support for the aforementioned hypothesis. Moreover, the results are substantively significant. Further
analysis into the causal mechanisms at work provides evidence in favor of the information mechanism. Autocrats who
are more embedded in the PTA network tend to have higher levels of economic transparency and economic
transparency itself is associated with lower rates of conflict initiation. The results suggest that an autocrat’s structural
position within the international system can help to peacefully settle its disputes.
Keywords
international conflict, international institutions, networks, PTA, transparency
Under what conditions do autocratic polities peacefully
settle international disputes? The evidence accumulated
under the Democratic Peace literature would suggest
that the conditions are slim (Maoz & Russett, 1993;
Oneal et al., 1996; Russett & Oneal, 2001). Recent
work, however, shows that the relationship between
domestic institutions and international conflict is much
more nuanced (Weeks, 2008, 2012; Colgan & Weeks,
2015; Mattes & Rodriguez, 2014). Domestic institu-
tional variation within autocracies can explain how some
autocracies are no more conflict-prone than democracies.
In addition to domestic institutional variation, autocra-
cies also vary in their involvement with international
institutions. I argue that this component – which has
been overlooked by most scholars – can help to explain
why some autocracies are less war-prone than others.
How does the embeddedness of a state within liberal
international institutions interact with domestic regime
type to pacify foreign relations? I argue that as autocracies
become more central or embedded within the network of
liberal institutions such as preferential trade agreements
(PTAs), they are less likely to initiate militarized interstate
disputes (MIDs). For democracies, the effect of centrality
within the PTA network on the propensity of a state to
initiate a MID is relatively smaller. Moreover, I argue that
these results can be explained via an Information Revela-
tion mechanism. Given uncertainty over capabilities,
enhanced transparency resultant from greater embedded-
ness in the PTA regime allows states tosettle on a peaceful
bargain equilibrium rather than the less efficient militar-
ized dispute equilibrium. Since the scope of transparency
improvements is higher in autocracies than in democra-
cies, the benefits of PTA centrality for international coop-
eration shouldbe greater for autocracies than democracies.
Corresponding author:
smazumder@g.harvard.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2017, Vol. 54(3) 412–426
ªThe Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343316687018
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