Back to the Drawing Board: A Critique of Offensive Realism

AuthorArash Heydarian Pashakhanlou
DOI10.1177/0047117812455353
Published date01 June 2013
Date01 June 2013
Subject MatterArticles
International Relations
27(2) 202 –225
© The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/0047117812455353
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Back to the Drawing Board: A
Critique of Offensive Realism
Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou
University of Bath
Abstract
Offensive realism argues that states committed to survive are nevertheless condemned to
participate in a relentless struggle for power, and it holds the structure of the international system
as the cause of this tragic outcome. This article subjects the logic behind this tragic worldview
and the explanatory power of offensive realism to a careful and comprehensive scrutiny. This
in-depth analysis of offensive realism amounts to a substantial critique of the theory as it fails to
logically generate the brutish world it presupposes and is plagued by significant shortcomings in its
explanatory model. These findings suggest that offensive realism cannot provide useful theoretical
lenses for explaining and understanding international politics, even when it is assessed on its own
terms.
Keywords
Hegemony, John Mearsheimer, offensive realism, status quo bias, security dilemma, United States
Introduction
Realist theories of international politics regard the international arena as a competitive
stage where power is the main currency. Although this idea is shared by all realist theo-
ries, substantial differences do exist within this paradigm as evidenced by the prolifera-
tion of labels within the realist school of thought, such as classical realism,1 neoclassical
realism,2 defensive realism3 and offensive realism.4 This article focuses on the latter
brand of realism, offensive realism, which provides a systemic account of why intense
and dangerous security competition is an inherent part of international life and why
attempts to prevent conflicts through engagement remain utopian.5
Unsurprisingly, the worldview of offensive realism has provoked a great deal of reac-
tion within the field of international relations.6 What distinguishes this article from
Corresponding author:
Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, University of Bath, PoLIS, Claverton Down, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK.
Email: arash.h.pashakhanlou@gmail.com
Article
Pashakhanlou 203
previous engagements with offensive realism is its systematic treatment of the internal
logic and explanatory model of this theory. These two aspects of this thesis are privileged
since the leading proponent of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer, himself maintains
that these are the most important components of a sound theory, and the purpose of this
article is to challenge offensive realism on its own terms.7 This article also clarifies the
confusions that have arisen in the literature on offensive realism with regards to the logi-
cal underpinnings of the theory and the concepts of security dilemma and hegemony in
offensive realism. Finally, this article also adds to the existing literature on offensive
realism by providing new insights on the issues mentioned above and on the methodo-
logical and empirical underpinnings of offensive realism. By doing so, this survey sheds
new light on central aspects of one of the main brands of realism, arguably the leading
approach in the study of international politics. This assessment has only become possible
with the publications of leading offensive realists in the past few years,8 which were not
available when previous systematic theoretical analysis on offensive realism was
conducted.9 In this present examination, it is argued that the story of relentless power
struggle and security competition by offensive realism is ultimately unconvincing as this
state of affairs cannot be logically deduced from the theory and that offensive realism has
far less explanatory power than its advocates want us to believe.
These arguments proceed through three main sections. The first section is dedicated
to a comprehensive scrutiny of the internal logic of offensive realism. In its interrelated
subsections, I argue that the brutish world of offensive realism does not logically follow
from the theory’s assumptions, fear or the security dilemma and draw out the implica-
tions of offensive realism’s status quo bias. The subsequent section examines the explan-
atory power of offensive realism. In its four subsections, I demonstrate why offensive
realism cannot explain interstate relations in the presence of a hegemon, and reveal
Mearsheimer’s severe selection bias, impaired treatment of data and inconsistencies in
offensive realism’s explanatory model. In this regard, three ad hoc additions and expla-
nations are identified that Mearsheimer uses to salvage offensive realism from various
empirical shortcomings: (1) the stopping power of nationalism, (2) the distinction
between continental and insular powers and (3) the conflation between continental and
insular states to account for Imperial Japan’s aggressive behaviour. These issues will,
however, be dealt with in the second part of this article as the first part is dedicated to the
internal logic of offensive realism.
The internal logic of offensive realism
The examination of the internal logic of offensive realism is essential for the purpose of
assessing the validity of this theory. As Mearsheimer points out, a good theory must be
based upon a sound logic.10 Moreover, he maintains that since the predicted behaviour of
states is derived from the theories’ assumptions, offensive realism will be ‘crippled’ if it
can be demonstrated that this behaviour does not follow logically from its underlying
premises.11 That is why the first main section is reserved for this important task.
This comprehensive scrutiny of internal logic also challenges the conventional
wisdom within the literature. So far, critics of offensive realism have maintained that it
offers an explanation for the behaviour of revisionist states.12 Some have even gone as

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