Backlash against the procedural consensus
| Date | 01 November 2020 |
| Author | Claudia Landwehr |
| Published date | 01 November 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148120946981 |
| Subject Matter | Symposium on Backlash Politics in Comparison |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120946981
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2020, Vol. 22(4) 598 –608
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148120946981
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Backlash against the
procedural consensus
Claudia Landwehr
Abstract
While the politics of backlash is typically described as a reaction to policy decisions in favour of
minority rights, immigration or globalisation, this essay focuses on the fact that backlash typically
also involves a reaction against the procedural consensus liberal democracy is based upon. This
challenge to democratic procedures and institutions may be even more dangerous in its effects
than the substantial objectives of backlash. I use the composite definition of backlash suggested
by Alter and Zürn to assess in how far the attacks on the institutions of liberal democracy have
retrograde objectives in themselves or in how far they are merely instrumental to the pursuit of
other retrograde objectives. The conclusion reflects on possible outcomes of backlash politics for
democratic institutions and argues that in the best case, the present contestation of rules, norms
and institutions could also lead to a democratic renewal of the procedural consensus.
Keywords
backlash, contestation, democratic institutions, meta-deliberation, populism, procedural
consensus
Introduction
Before he won the 2016 presidential elections, Donald Trump made it clear that he would
accept the election result only if he won, not if Hillary Clinton were successful. In view
of the upcoming presidential elections, it seems far from certain that he would respect a
defeat – he is thus questioning the very rules of the democratic game (Zittel, 2018). In the
United Kingdom, the leader of the new Brexit party, Nigel Farage, openly declares that
the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union (EU) is only the first step towards
his goal of destroying and completely rebuilding the British political system (Farage,
2019). The right-wing populist ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (Alternative for Germany,
AfD) writes in its manifesto: ‘The secret sovereign is a small, powerful political elite
within the parties . . . Only the people of Germany can end this illegitimate state’ and
demands the establishment of a different, direct form of democracy (AfD, 2016, my
translation). Wherever populist parties and candidates have won influence and power,
Department of Political Science, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Mainz, Germany
Corresponding author:
Claudia Landwehr, Department of Political Science, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Jakob-Welder-
Weg 12, 55099 Mainz, Germany.
Email: landwehr@politik.uni-mainz.de
946981BPI0010.1177/1369148120946981The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsLandwehr
research-article2020
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