Bad character evidence as evidence of identity
| Author | Emma Smith,Michael Stockdale |
| Published date | 01 February 2015 |
| Date | 01 February 2015 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022018314563892b |
| Subject Matter | Court of Appeal |
imposed by s. 114(1)(d). In Walker (at [30]), the Court of Appeal indicated that, under s. 121(1)(c),
where the value of the multiple hearsay must be ‘so high that the interests of justice require the earlier
hearsay statement ...to be admissible’, the court believed that ‘value’, for this purpose, probably
meant ‘probative value’ and recognised that s. 121 ‘requires the judge to consider the issue of how
reliable the statements appear to be’. Applying this approach in the context of Williams, the reliability
of the statements made by S, certainly if admitted as second-hand hearsay, would not appear to be such
as to justify the conclusion that the probative value of the hearsay evidence was sufficiently high that
the interests of justice required its admission.
Emma Piasecki and Michael Stockdale
Bad character evidence as evidence of identity
RvRichardson [2014] EWCA Crim 1785
Keywords
Evidence, bad character, identification, admissibility
Facts
On 14 November 2013 the appellant, Simon Peter Richardson, was convicted of wounding with intent
and intimidation at Nottingham Crown Court. The salient facts of the offence were as follows: On 29
June 2013, a taxi picked up a male passenger from the appellant’s address and set off with a view to
taking that passenger to Longbow Public House. This taxi, whilst en route to the public house,
mounted a kerb, prompting the complainant, Mr Dixon, to shout at the vehicle. The taxi moved off,
turnedandparkedinalay-by,atwhichpointthepassenger (wearing sunglasses and a ‘distinctive
shirt’ at [4]) then vacated the taxi and racially abused the complainant, threat ening to ‘take him and
his family out’ (at [4]). The passenger also attempted to punch the complainant, held him in a headlock
and bit a 2 cm section from the complainant’s left ear. When this was over, the taxi resumed its journey
towards the Longbow Public House, the complainant having taken its registration number. It is also
worthy of note that a number of days after the offence, a friend of the appellant threatened the com-
plainant and his family at his home address with violence if the prosecution were not abandoned.
The most probative evidence for the prosecution was listed as follows: The appellant lived alone at
the address from which a sole male was collected by the taxi. Further, the appellant matched a descrip-
tion provided by the complainant, who also picked out the appellant during an identification proce-
dure. The complainant also picked out another male, identifying both as potentially having been his
attacker. The attacker also wore a polo shirt and sunglasses that were identical to those found at the
appellant’s home.
Cell site evidence put the carrier of phones associated with the appellant at the relevant address, and
showed the carrier move towards the scene of the crime, and then away from it in the direction of the
public house. The most significant evidential category for the present commentary was a previous con-
viction for Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm, contrary to s. 47 of the Offences Against the
Person Act 1861 (OAPA 1861), which was admitted as evidence of bad character, capable of support-
ing identification of the appellant as the assailant on the night of 14 November 2013. The conviction,
for an offence under s. 47 OAPA 1861, was held to demonstrate a disposition towards violence and a
similarity in the geographical area in which both offences were carried out. The court heard that the
appellant, ‘assaulted a traffic warden, who had told his partner to move from a disabled parking bay, in
the same street as the instant offence, by punching, head-butting and pushing him into a shop window’
(at [8]). It is the submission of this conviction that formed the ground for appeal.
12 The Journal of Criminal Law 79(1)
12
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