A Balkan Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone: Viability of the Regime and Implications for Crisis Management
| Published date | 01 June 1987 |
| Date | 01 June 1987 |
| Author | Donna J. Klick |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234338702400202 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
A
Balkan
Nuclear
Weapon-Free
Zone:
Viability
of
the
Regime
and
Implications
for
Crisis
Management*
DONNA
J.
KLICK
New
York
University
ISSN
0022-3433
Journal
of
Peace
Research,
vol.
24,
no.
2,
1987
1.
Introduction
Proposals
to
manage
superpower
crises
and
to
raise
the
nuclear
threshold
are
usually
based
upon
arms
control
agreements
which
focus
on
the
deployment,
or
non-deploy-
ment,
of
specific
weapons.
Non-deployment
in this
context
is
often
discussed
either
in
terms
of
its
utility
as
a
bargaining
chip
or
as
a
by-product
of
build-down
formulae.
When
used
as
a
bargaining
chip,
non-deployment
is
rarely
the
intended
outcome;
in
a
build-
down
context,
any
advantage
resulting
from
even
the
dismantling
of
weapons
is
often
outweighed
by
the
disadvantage
of
technical
upgrading,
or
by
the
deployment
of
other
categories
of
weapons.
There
is,
however,
another
approach
to
non-deployment
which
receives
little
attention
in
the
United
States;
namely,
the
nuclear
weapon-free
zone
(NWFZ).
Nuclear
weapon-free
zones
serve
several
purposes
of
arms
control
which
are
often
overlooked:
in
addition
to
reducing
the
actual
numbers
of
weapons
deployed,
nuclear
weapon-free
zones
can
contribute
to
effective
crisis
prevention
and
crisis
man-
agement,
and
they
can
make
it
possible
to
limit
destruction
in
the
event
of
actual
hostilities.
If
a
conflict
which
threatened
to
draw
in
both
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
were
to
occur
in
or
near
a
nuclear
weapon-
free
zone,
the incentive
to
launch
a
first-
strike
in
order
to
secure
offensive
advantages
would
be
reduced,
since
neither
country
would
have
battlefield
or
theater
nuclear
weapons
deployed
in
the
area.
If
neither
side
felt
it
had
the
conventional
edge
required
for
*
The
author
has
benefited
from
comments
by
Mr
James
Hurd
and
Dr
Miroslav
Nincic.
a
successful
offensive
attack
and
the
ability
to
limit
the
cost to
itself,
then
even
acute
tensions
might
be
dealt
with
diplomatically
or,
at
worst,
played
out
in
proxy
skirmishes
(thus.
buying
time
to
seek
a
diplomatic
solution).
Were
hostilities
which
directly
involved
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
actu-
ally
to
occur
in
or
near
a
nuclear
weapon-
free
zone,
immediate
escalation
to
the
nuclear
level
could
also
be
prevented.
The
only
immediate
escalatory
options
would
be
long-range
theater
or
strategic
nuclear
weapons,
whose
use
would
unambiguously
breach
the
nuclear
threshold.
It
is
unlikely
in
the
first
few
hours
of
a
confrontation
that
either
side
would
resort
to
central
strategic
weapons,
because
of
the
magnitude
of
the
anticipated
retaliation.
Containing
a
conflict
at
the
conventional
level-even
if
only
for
a
few
days-could
also
provide
time
for
a
diplomatic
solution.
In
addition
to
contributing
to
effective
crisis
prevention
and
management,
the
nuclear
weapon-free
zone
concept
fits
into
the
larger
context
of
promoting
global
nuclear
disarmament.
By
institutionalizing
a
geographical
area
as
free
of nuclear
weapons,
it
might
be
expected
that
a
’spread
effect’
would
obtain.
On
the
one
hand,
more
initiatives
to
rid
other
geographical
areas
of
nuclear
weapons
might
be
forthcoming.
On
the
other
hand,
it
may
become
more
possible
to
freeze
zones
where
no
nuclear
weapons
existed.
It
is
important,
in
this
context,
to
view
the
establishing
of
nuclear
weapon-free
zones
as
a
process,
rather
than
as
a
complete
end
in
itself.
If
global
nuclear
disarmament
is
the
professed
goal,
it
can
be
realistically
achieved
only
in
stages.
Because
nuclear
weapon-free
zones
focus
both
on
the
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