Bargaining in the European Union and Shifts in Actors’ Policy Positions
| Author | Frans Stokman,Robert Thomson,Javier Arregui |
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116504040445 |
| Published date | 01 March 2004 |
| Date | 01 March 2004 |
| Subject Matter | Journal Article |
Bargaining in the European
Union and Shifts in Actors’
Policy Positions
Javier Arregui
University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Frans Stokman
University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Robert Thomson
The RAND Corporation, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Although shifts in policy positions are a fundamental feature
of the European Union (EU) bargaining process they have
not yet been studied systematically. This article provides
evidence on the extent to which position shifts occur and
tests alternative models of the bargaining process that
predict such shifts. We examine a subset of the DEU data
set that contains information on shifts in actors’ positions
on issues raised by 28 Commission proposals. The three
bargaining models presented here posit alternative mechan-
isms that drive actors’ position shifts during the EU bargain-
ing process. Our research shows that position shifts occur
frequently during the EU bargaining process and these shifts
in actors’ policy positions are best understood in terms of
compromise and exchange among actors.
47
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116504040445
Volume 5 (1): 47–72
Copyright© 2004
SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks CA,
New Delhi
KEY WORDS
bargaining models
Council of Ministers
decision-making
legislative politics
policy positions
03 040445 (to/d) 9/1/04 11:26 am Page 47
Introduction
Scharpf (1988) observes that EU decision-making has a distinct bargaining
style, and Peterson and Bomberg (1999) point out that ‘most EU decisions are
preceded by bargaining’. We agree that bargaining is central to reaching
agreement in the EU. The explanatory models of decision-making applied in
this article are based on conceptions of political bargaining. Interactions
between stakeholders during the course of bargaining result in shifts in their
positions on controversial issues. During the bargaining process, stake-
holders change their initial positions into the positions they endorse in the
final voting stage.
In this article we examine the shifts of EU stakeholders’ policy positions
before the adoption of legislation. We investigate the extent to which these
shifts can be forecasted by a class of bargaining models.1The models contain
alternative propositions concerning the mechanisms that produce shifts in the
actors’ policy positions. Given this focus, our analyses can best be described
as actor- or micro-level analyses. The interactions we model take place before
the formal adoption of the proposal, which may consist of a formal vote in
the Council, or the final outcome in which the Commission, Council and
European Parliament (EP) are involved. This final stage involves the aggre-
gation of the final bargaining positions into a collective decision (see Figure
1). On the basis of the accuracy of the models’ forecasts of position shifts, we
intend to make inferences about the type of bargaining that takes place during
the stage of negotiation preceding that formal adoption.
Figure 1 shows the two main stages that come about during decision-
making processes in general and in the EU in particular: the bargaining or
influence process and the final voting stage. Each stage has its own dynamics
(Stokman and Van den Bos, 1992). The bargaining or influence process is
driven by individual-level behaviour, whereby each actor aims to build a
European Union Politics 5(1)
48
Figure 1 The two-stage decision-making process in the EU.
03 040445 (to/d) 9/1/04 11:26 am Page 48
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