Barter in Russian Prisons
| DOI | 10.1177/1477370804038706 |
| Author | Laura Piacentini |
| Date | 01 January 2004 |
| Published date | 01 January 2004 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Volume 1 (1): 17–45: 1477-3708
DOI: 10.1177/1477370804038706
Copyright © 2004 SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks CA, and New Delhi
www.sagepublications.com
A R T I C L E S
Barter in Russian Prisons
Laura Piacentini
Department of Applied Social Science, University of Stirling, UK
A B S T R A C T
This article discusses findings from research in Russian prison colonies. There has
been a decline in central government funding of prisons in Russia since the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This has led to the utilization of barter to
provide maintenance and resources for prisoners and staff. I argue that the
introduction of barter has created a unique scenario in which the sustainability
of the prison infrastructure is dependent on community involvement. Current
practices can be looked at in two lights. On one level, a very high prison
population is maintained because the prisons have become economically self-
sufficient and this might lead to prisoner exploitation. On another level, current
practices suggest a symbiotic relationship in which the prisons and the local
community are dependent on each other for survival. As Russia moves towards
greater economic stability, the potential concerns posed by the use of barter
provide further opportunities for criminological research.
K E Y W O R D S
Russia / Prison / Labour / Barter / Community.
Introduction
The Russian prison system is best known for the still not fully calculable,
but mainly negative, system of prison labour that operated to sustain the
economic development and hence international supremacy of the USSR
from the 1920s until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Solzhenitsyn,
whose name has become synonymous with forced prison labour, has stated
that the Soviet prison system went way beyond crime control in the usual
sense because huge numbers of people were hastily and ‘greedily consumed’
by the state for its own benefit (Solzhenitsyn 1986: 214). Firm figures on
the extent of crime and punishment in 20th-century Russia are impossible
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European Journal of Criminology
to come by. Any official data are likely to be imprecise owing to the
practice of falsifying official records and census population figures, which
leaves considerable latitude for legitimate debate and disagreement (see
Bacon 1994). Even so, by the 1980s it had become indisputable that crime
and punishment were not incidental but central to the Soviet regime and
that imprisonment was more gruesome and inhumane than previously
thought (Malia 1999).
I shall start with a brief exposition of trends in crime, punishment and
imprisonment in Russia up to 1991. The picture remains woefully in-
adequate because there is still considerable and intense debate on crime
rates and criminal justice in the Soviet Union.
Crime and criminal justice in the Soviet Union
For almost 70 years crime and criminal justice in Russia reflected the
changes in Marxist–Leninist ideology. Under Lenin, crime was recon-
ceptualized as a form of ‘transitional social excess’ so that it was no longer
seen as an innate character flaw. Stalin redrafted criminal justice policy in
1933 to present the Soviet Union as the underdog at war with capitalism
(Serge 1979). Stalin’s view of crime was, in part, faithful to Marxist theory:
crime does not exist in sustained and established socialist societies (Tucker
1992). However, Stalin’s definition of crime was extreme: all crime was
anti-Soviet and hence sympathetic to capitalist ideology; that is, if hooli-
ganism was punishable then it was because it was capitalist.
The 1933 legislation was used to control anti-Soviet elements by
criminalizing wreckers of the Soviet cause. Propaganda conveyed the
message that ‘enemies’ existed in all walks of life so that, once society had
been forced to submit to ideology, legislation could then be used to control
citizens through the relentless pursuit of agitators in need of political
correction. Criminal justice legislation was useful in creating a totally
submissive population, and also for contributing to the calculated myth-
making of Stalinism whereby criminal justice came to have unbreakable ties
to the political and economic arenas of Soviet life (Zhuk and Ishchenko
1983).
Throughout the Soviet period the primary goal of imprisonment was
to correct offenders politically. Yet, under Stalin, the economic role of
imprisonment was to transcend the goal of creating perfect proletarians.
Briefly, in 1925 Stalin abolished Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP)
because industrialization of the rural and manufacturing economies had
failed to materialize quickly enough (Tucker 1992). Stalin’s replacement
‘Five-Year Plans’ aimed ‘to leave behind the age-old Russian backwardness’
Piacentini
Barter in Russian prisons
19
(Stalin, quoted in Tucker 1992: 92) through forced collectivization and
industrialization. A series of resettlement programmes were introduced that
offered tens of thousands of engineers, doctors and scientists attractive
housing and job packages for relocating to less populated areas of the
USSR in order to build up the economic infrastructure (Bacon 1994). But
the plans were at best ambitious and, at worst, wholly unachievable and
depended on a vast non-existent labour force (Tucker 1992).
The Gulag Prison Agency was the solution. Established in 1934, the
Gulag evolved in the industrial period in response to the changes in cap-
ital – it was built with the principal aim of providing additional labour to
realize the economic plans. The 1933 legislation enabled the widespread
use of prisoner work. First, it was used to force individuals accused of
posing a potential threat to the USSR to take up new jobs in new cities.
Second, it was used to arrest and send into exile the intelligentsia and those
party members who were high on Stalin’s target list. By 1940 the stability
of the command economy and political structure was dependent on the vast
prison workforce.
Prisoners were told that they were living and working the Soviet
dream, the outcome of which would be rehabilitation and honour as
worthy members of society. Yet former camp survivors who were inter-
viewed for the wider study describe how prisoners were debased in the eyes
of Soviet society. Poor health combined with non-acceptance by society
meant that personal and social rehabilitation was a struggle. None of the
former prisoners interviewed believed that they became more loyal to the
Soviet cause as a result of forced labour and education. Instead, oral
histories expose the procurement of prisoners for exploitation.
During interrogation we were rigorously ‘assessed’ about our loyalty to the Soviet
regime. But when we got to the Gulag, the most important question on the Gulag
registration card was ‘Trade or profession’.
Solzhenitsyn 1986: 589
The Gulag Prison Agency was the model for centralized management
and organization of labour in both prison and non-prison life. The Agency
managed most prison camps (known also as Gulags)1 and comprised
several specialized agencies created to administer different types of in-
dustrial projects. Metallurgical industries, railway construction, road con-
struction, timber and forestry work – all these industries were developed by
1 There were also camps and colonies managed by the NKVD (Ministry for Internal Affairs),
which was responsible for policing. Some camps were semi-independent. Bacon (1994) argues
that these camps would have been few in number and that matters to do with administering
ideology and coordination of the types of industry conducted would have been controlled
centrally.
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European Journal of Criminology
scores of engineers, scientists, workers and managers. The smaller Gulag
administrations undertook many of the tasks that the government of a
nation-state would have to fulfil. Security, health care, education, provision
of food, political indoctrination and surveillance – all of these roles
exercised by the Soviet government in national life had their Gulag
equivalent in prison life. The Gulag became an exaggerated microcosm of
the bureaucracy and social control of the Soviet system of government.
The size and extent of the prison population under Stalin have
provoked many debates.2 The highest estimates are provided by former
victims and it is claimed that in the Stalin period (1926–52) 20 million
citizens were imprisoned (Wheatcroft 1985). Lower estimates come from
methodologies based on the size of the Soviet economy, census figures,
mortality rates and arrests by the Soviet police (Rosefielde 1987). Bacon’s
figure of 12 million for the years 1934–47 is widely accepted as accurate
because it is based on the actual numbers imprisoned and not on the
numbers ‘repressed’ (those persecuted, harassed and exiled to work and live
in other cities), and the figure also takes into account the different types of
camps (forced settlers were not classified as ‘prisoners’) (Bacon 1994).
Although the Gulag was disbanded in 1956, the integration of
prisoners’ work into the centralized command economy and the imprison-
ment of dissidents and anti-Soviet ‘elements’ continued until the collapse of
Soviet communism in 1991. For the best part of a century, prisons were
presented as mechanisms that benefited the regime and therefore its
citizens, but there is little doubt that they also blurred the boundaries of
civil society.
Crime and criminal justice in Russia since 1991
After the USSR collapsed in 1991, criminal justice practitioners were faced
with the task of building a justice system that was more democratic,
transparent...
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