Barton v Armstrong
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judgment Date | 1973 |
| Year | 1973 |
| Date | 1973 |
| Court | Privy Council |
Contract - Validity - Duress - Threat to life and unlawful pressure contributing to parry entering into contract - Commercial and financial reasons making in necessary for party under duress to enter into contract - Whether contract void against party under duress - Onus of proof
The appellant and the respondent were the major shareholders in a company. Following business negotiations, the appellant entered into an agreement by deed executed on January 17, 1967, with the respondent agreeing terms on which the appellant would buy out the respondent's interest in the company. On January 10, 1968, the appellant brought a suit in equity against the respondent and other interested parties alleging that the respondent had coerced him into agreeing to the matters dealt with in the deed by threatening to have him murdered and by otherwise exerting unlawful pressure on him and sought a declaration that the deed dated January 17, 1967, and certain ancillary deeds executed by him were void so far as concerned him. The trial judge found that the respondent had threatened the appellant, but that the primary and predominant reason why the appellant had entered into the agreement and executed the deeds was because of commercial necessity and that the threats did not in fact coerce the appellant into executing the deeds. He accordingly dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed substantially with but modified the findings of fact by the trial judge, and held that the appellant was not entitled to succeed unless he established that but for the threats he would not have signed the agreement, and as he had failed to do so, dismissed his appeal.
On appeal to the Judicial Committee: —
Held, allowing the appeal (Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon of Glaisdale dissenting), (1) that the equitable rule, which enabled a contract entered into as a result of fraudulent misrepresentation to be set aside, applied in cases of duress so that if the respondent's threats were a reason for the appellant executing the deed he was entitled to relief even though he might well have entered into the contract if the respondent had uttered no threats to induce him to do so (post, p. 1061A).
(2) That it was for the respondent to prove that the threats and unlawful pressure did not in fact contribute to the appellant's decision to sign the deed and since the proper inference to be drawn from the facts found was that although the appellant might have executed the deed even if the respondent had not made any threats, the threats and unlawful pressure did in fact contribute to the appellant's decision to sign the deed, the deeds were executed under duress and were void so far as the appellant was concerned (post, pp. 1062A, B, D–F).
The following cases are referred to in the judgments:
Cox v. Smail [
Fairbanks v. Snow (
Reynell v. Sprye (
The following additional cases were cited in argument:
Alati v. Kruger (
Anon. (
Astley v. Reynolds (
Attorney-General v. Whelan [
Baudins v. Richardson [
Benmax v. Austin Motor Co. Ltd. [
Cumming v. Ince (
Edwards v. Noble (
Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co. (
Jacob v. Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth (
Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India (
Kesarmal v. N. K. V. Valliappa Chettiar [
Ley v. Hamilton (
Maskell v. Horner [
Mason v. New South Wales (
Pascoe v. Commissioner of Taxation (
Perkowski v. Wellington Corporation [
Ravagnani v. Hollywood Sands Pty. Ltd. [
Reg. v. Hudson [
Reg. v. Hurley and Murray [
Reg. v. Williamson [
Rex v. Steane [
Robertson v. Frank Bros. (
Seear v. Cohen (
Smith v. Kay (
Srimati Bibhabati Devi v. Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy [
Talbot v. Von Boris [
Thoroughgood's Case (
Williams v. Bayley (
Williams' Case (
Woodman v. Skute (
APPEAL (No. 15 of 1972) from a judgment (June 30, 1971) of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Mason J.A. and Taylor A-J.A., Jacobs J.A. dissenting) dismissing a appeal by the appellant, Alexander Barton, from a decree of the Supreme Court sitting in Equity (Street J.) whereby he dismissed a suit brought by the appellant against the first respondent, Alexander Ewan Armstrong, and a number of other defendants in which the appellant sought a declaration that a deed dated January 17, 1967, and certain ancillary deeds to which he and all the other respondents were parties were executed by him under duress and were void so far as concerned him.
The facts are stated in the majority judgment of their Lordships.
L. C. Gruzman Q.C. and L. J. Priestley Q.C. (both of the New South Wales Bar) for the appellant.
P. E. Powell Q.C. and J. S. Goldstein (both of the New South Wales Bar) for the first six respondents.
The seventh to twenty-first respondents did not appear and were not represented.
December 5. The majority judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD CROSS OF CHELSEA.
This is an appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of New South Wales from a decree of that court (Mason J.A. and Taylor A-J.A., Jacobs J.A. dissenting) made on June 30, 1971. That decree dismissed the appeal of the appellant, Alexander Barton, against a decree of Street J. made on December 19, 1968, which dismissed a suit brought by the appellant against the respondents in which he sought a declaration that a deed dated January 17, 1967, made between the appellant md the first 14 respondents and certain deeds ancillary thereto had been executed by him under duress exerted by the first respondent, Alexander Ewan Armstrong, and were void so far as concerned him.
The case is the outcome of a struggle between Armstrong and Barton for control of the 14th respondent, Landmark Corporation Ltd., a public company with an issued capital of 1,753,000 dollars divided into shares of 1 dollar each which is now in liquidation. In the middle of 1966 — when the story begins — Armstrong was the chairman of Landmark and either himself or through the medium of one or other of the second to the sixth respondents (which are family companies controlled by him) held 300,000 shares in the company — the largest single shareholding in its capital. Barton was the managing director of Landmark and was a substantial shareholder in it — though his holding was less than that controlled by Armstrong. The other directors were John Osborne Bovill, the eighteenth respondent, and a Mr. Cotter. The seventh to thirteenth respondents are subsidiaries of Landmark.
In 1966 the principal activity of Landmark was the development through the medium of the eighth respondent, Paradise Waters (Sales) Pty. Ltd. (hereinafter called “Sales”), and the ninth respondent, Paradise Waters Ltd., of a building estate near Surfer's Paradise in Queensland which was to be known as “Paradise Waters.” The land in question had been owned by the tenth respondent, Goondoo Pty. Ltd., which was then controlled by Armstrong. Goondoo sold the land, which was “swamp,” to Paradise Waters Ltd. and Goondoo's shares were bought by Landmark. All the shares in Paradise Waters Ltd. were held by Sales but only 60 per cent. of the shares in Sales were owned by Landmark, the remaining 40 per cent. being held by one of the Armstrong companies, the third respondent, Finlayside Pty. Ltd. Of the purchase price payable in respect of the sale of the Paradise Waters land, 400,000 dollars remained unpaid. This sum was secured by mortgages given by Paradise Waters Ltd. to the respondent, George Armstrong and Son Pty. Ltd., which provided, inter alia, that the sum secured with interest should become payable forthwith if Armstrong should be removed from the chairmanship of Landmark. It will be seen therefore that Armstrong through his companies was interested in the Paradise Waters project in three different ways. Fir as a secured creditor for 400,000 dollars; secondly as holder of 40 per cent. of the share capital of Sales, and thirdly as the largest shareholder in Landmark which held 60 per cent. of the capital of Sales.
The “Paradise Waters” project involved the expenditure of large sums in dredging and forming canals to provide water frontages for the lots into which the land was to be subdivided for sale. This expenditure was being financed by advances made by United Dominions Corporation (Australia) Ltd. (hereinafter called “U.D.C.”) which were secured by mortgages on the land which had priority over the mortgage for 400,000 dollars to George Armstrong and Son Pty. Ltd. By November 1966, a sum of over 400,000 dollars had been advanced by U.D.C. in respect of development costs which were running at the...
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Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (No. 4) (Reduction of Damages)
...other inducements to enter into the transaction. There is an instance of that in the case of Edgington v Fitzmaurice." 68 In Barton v Armstrong [1976] A.C. 104, the House of Lords decided that a contract, entered into under duress, could be set aside under the equitable rule that enabled a ......
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Tam Tak Chuen v Khairul bin Abdul Rahman
...to the plaintiff's decision to execute the decision, and his consent had not been vitiated. Alexander Baron v Alexander Ewan Armstrong [1976] AC 104 endorsed: at [62]. (5) The factors that have to be considered to disprove the second element include whether the person alleged to have been c......
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State v Gobin; State v Griffith
...enter into a contract, but prevents the law from accepting what has happened as a contract valid in law [see the Privy Council case of Barton v. Armstrong and the judgments in the Supreme Court of New South Wale.]” 142 Lord Simon of Glaisdale said (p. 938): “Similarly with duress in the Eng......
- Huyton S.A. v Peter Cremer G.m.b.H. & Company
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Restitution
...in the first place. 20.7 The second point of interest is the test of causation applied by the court. The court accepted Barton v Armstrong[1976] AC 104 (PC, New South Wales), a case on duress to the person, as authoritative for economic duress as well: Tam Tak Chuen v Khairul Bin Abdul Rahm......
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CONSUMER PROTECTION, STATUTE AND
...per Cotton LJ, 485, per Fry LJ. See also Nicholas v Thompson[1924] VLR 554 and Wilcher v Steain[1962] NSWR 1136. 134Barton v Armstrong[1976] AC 104 at 120, per Lords Wilberforce and Simon; see also 118, per Lord Cross. 135Henville v Walker[2001] HCA 52; (2001) 206 CLR 459. 136 Trade Practic......
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AN ACCOUNT OF ACCOUNTS
...Edwin Peel, Treitel on the Law of Contract (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 14th Ed, 2015) at para 20–095 ff; Barton v Armstrong[1973] UKPC 27; [1976] AC 104; Edgington v Fitzmaurice(1885) 29 Ch D 459; UCB Corporate Services v Williams[2002] EWCA Civ 555. 117 Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341: ......
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VITIATING FACTORS IN CONTRACT LAW — THE INTERACTION OF THEORY AND PRACTICE
...(The Siboen and the Sibotre)[1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 292; noted Beatson (1976) 92 LQR 496. The Privy Council decision of Barton v Armstrong[1976] AC 104 is also relevant, although that case dealt, strictly speaking, with the more extreme situation of duress to the person; though cf the observat......