Base Closings: The Rise and Decline of the US Military Bases Issue in Spain, 1975-2005
| Date | 01 September 2010 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512110372975 |
| Published date | 01 September 2010 |
| Author | Jonathan Hopkin,Alexander Cooley |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Corresponding author:
Jonathan Hopkin, Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street,
London WC2A 2AE, UK
[email: J.R.Hopkin@lse.ac.uk]
Base Closings: The Rise and Decline
of the US Military Bases Issue in
Spain, 1975–2005
Alexander Cooley and Jonathan Hopkin
Abstract
This article examines the conditions under which the United States foreign military bases become a
contentious political issue in democratic base-hosting countries. Democratic consolidation, and in particular
the institutionalization of the party system, reduces the incentives for political elites to mobilize domestic
political support in opposition to foreign militar y presence. In the Spanish case, changes in the pattern of
party competition explain why the basing issue was particularly contentious in domestic politics from 1981 to
1988, despite long-standing and profound public opposition to the use of the bases by the United States, and
most recently in the 2003 Iraq campaign. Neither a public opinion explanation, focusing on anti-Americanism,
nor a security-based explanation, focusing on the nature of bilateral security relations, can explain these same
trends. The argument illuminates long-neglected important interactions in emerging democracies between
party system dynamics and foreign policy positions and has important implications for determining the
domestic political conditions under which overseas democratic countries will contest United States security
hegemony.
Keywords
democratization, elections, international relations, military bases, party system
Introduction
Just days after the dramatic election victory of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) on
14 March 2004, Spanish President-elect José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero ordered the withdrawal
of Spanish troops supporting the American-led military presence in Iraq. During the election
campaign, Zapatero had been scathing in his criticism of the Iraq War and the Aznar govern-
ment’s almost unqualified support for the Bush administration’s policies. Zapatero’s withdrawal
announcement fulfilled a major campaign pledge and the Spanish public and media broadly sup-
ported the decision, even as United States–Spanish relations markedly deteriorated.
International Political Science Review
31(4) 494–513
© The Author(s) 2010
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512110372975
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Cooley and Hopkin 495
Much less publicized was the fact that as Spanish troops withdrew from their positions in Iraq,
military facilities on Spanish territory were being used daily for the support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). United States armed forces at the Morón airbase and the Rota naval station contin-
ued to fly hundreds of staging and logistical missions. Despite Zapatero’s vigorous opposition to
the war and the strong public support for this stance, the new Spanish government never requested
that the United States stop using military bases in Spain for the campaign, nor did it curtail the
blanket authorization that the Aznar government had given for OIF-related activities.1 American
officials in Spain had prepared for such a request and were surprised when it never materialized.2
How could the Spanish government publicly oppose the Iraq campaign, withdraw Spanish troops
from the Middle Eastern theater and yet still allow the use of bases in Spain for the conduct of the
same war?
Analytically, the above incongruence suggests that the politics surrounding the control and
operation over foreign military bases is neither reducible to purely strategic factors, such as
security agreements and threat considerations, nor to domestic pressures such as public opinion.
In the security realm, the Spanish troop withdrawal was rooted in a defense doctrine held by the
PSOE leader that active military intervention in Iraq would exacerbate the growth of global
Islamic terrorism and subject the Spanish public to attacks similar to the 11 March 2004 bombings
(El País, 2004; La Vanguardia, 2004). Moreover, the Zapatero government was willing to pay
the price of damaging bilateral relations with the United States and destabilizing the bilateral
security relationship over the Iraq issue, so it made little sense to continue authorizing use of its
military facilities for purposes totally inconsistent with this new Spanish security doctrine.
Similarly the tide of anti-American public opinion and overwhelming opposition to OIF by the
Spanish public would seemingly have demanded that Spain order the United States out of the
Spanish bases, yet, apart from proclamations by the minor left-wing umbrella party Izquierda
Unida (United Left [IU]), no such political demands were made of the PSOE by politicians, civic
groups or the media.
We argue that the key to explaining this disjuncture between security policy and public opinion,
on the one hand, and the political status of bases, on the other, lies in the evolution of Spanish party
politics after Franco’s death. More generally, we argue that the political salience of the foreign
military presence in a host country, or ‘base issue,’ tends to be elevated to national prominence and
political debate during the period of democratic transition and the initial phase of party consolida-
tion. During this period issues of sovereignty, legislative transparency, party accountability and
external support for a previous anti-democratic regime all become inextricably tied to the issue of
the foreign military basing presence, as party elites engage in aggressive mobilization strategies.
Conversely, during periods of consolidated democracy, the foreign military presence is depoliti-
cized or taken off the political agenda, as party politicians treat the issue as an irrevocable contrac-
tual obligation and, instead, emphasize issues of competence in governance and foreign policy in
an effort to appeal to moderate voters.
As a result, the importance of foreign military bases to domestic politics will vary depending on
domestic political developments and consolidation, rather than simply security considerations or
public opinion (Calder, 2007; Cooley, 2008; Duke, 1989; Duke and Krieger 1993; Sandars, 2000).
Ironically, we suggest that party system dynamics in stable democracies may actually constrain
host countries on bilateral agreements and security issues to a greater extent than is the case for
democratizing polities. The PSOE’s silence on the United States basing issue in 2004 stood in stark
contrast to its more confrontational stance during the earlier period of democratic consolidation.
For example, in 1986 the PSOE government, then headed by Felipe González, publicly denounced
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