Belt and Road Initiative: Responses from Japan and India – Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Collaborations

Date01 May 2019
Published date01 May 2019
AuthorSuresh Nanwani
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12666
Belt and Road Initiative: Responses from Japan
and India Bilateralism, Multilateralism and
Collaborations
Suresh Nanwani
Australian National University
Abstract
The responses from Japan and India to the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) were not positive unlike many other Asian
countries. Only in late 2017 did Japan extend its cooperation with BRI and India is still on record that it does not support BRI.
The positions taken by both Japan and India, together and singly, in relation to BRI as well as the interrelationship of policy,
politics, and institutions at the global level are discussed. The discussion also explores how Japan supplements its central alli-
ance with the United States till the 1980s with other key relationships such as India and Australia in security and in its initia-
tives with India on Vision 25 and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). The discussion also explores the shift by India
following its non-alignment policy and its friendship treaty with the Soviet Union and with the end of the Cold War, on its
renewed foreign policy of diplomacy and bilateralism and multilateralism with many countries and organizations. The chal-
lenges and opportunities of collaboration by Japan and India are discussed, together with the geo-economic and geo-political
aspects of BRI for both countries in moving forward.
Chinas Belt and Road Initiative
China proposed the Be lt and Road Initiativ e (BRI) in 2013.
There is momentum af ter 5 years from initia l planning. At
the inaugural Belt a nd Road Forum for Inter national Coop-
eration in May 2017 (BRI S ummit), President Xi J inping
referred to his two proposals for the belt and road made
in 2013 and highlighte d the strengthening o f the f‌ive BRIs
connectivities policy, infrastruc ture, trade, f‌inancial and
people-to people over the 4 years from 2013 to 2017
(Xi, 2017). The land be lt includes six major e conomic corri-
dors including China -Indochina Peninsu lar Economic Corri-
dor (CIPEC); China-P akistan Economic Cor ridor (CPEC); and
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Econ omic Corri-
dor. In June 2017, the Nationa l Development and Reform
Commission, Chinas lea ding planning agency and the
driving force in BRI im plementation, co- issued the Vision
for Maritime Coopera tion under the BRIand specif‌ied
three sea blue economic passagesfor the maritime belt:
China-Indian Ocean- Mediterranean Sea b y linking CIPEC
and connecting with CPEC and BCIM Economic Corridor;
China-Oceania-So uth Pacif‌ic; and China- Europe through
the Arctic Ocean (Xinhua, 2017).
Responses from Japan and India, and reasons for
Japan and India case study selection
The responses from Japan and India to the BRI were not
positive unlike many other Asian countries. The prime minis-
ters of Japan and India did not attend the BRI Summit in
May 2017. Only in late 2017 did Japan extend its coopera-
tion with BRI and India is still on record that it does not sup-
port BRI but recent developments suggest that India is
having better relations with China.
Before analyzing the positions of Japan and India in rela-
tion to BRI, I highlight the reasons for the case study selec-
tion of these two countries. First, both are Asian countries
and major players in global policy in Asia and worldwide.
Second, Japan and India are the worlds third and seventh
largest economies (with China as the second largest). Third,
they have shared interests as the largest and oldest democ-
racies in Asia in contrast with China which is governed by a
strong communist party with extensive control over its
state-owned and private enterprises. Fourth, their connectiv-
ity to BRI. While Japan is geographically not on the BRI
routes, by virtue of its development assistance and exten-
sive private sector involvement in public infrastructure, it
can play a crucial role in the growth and development of
BRI. India is on the BCIM Economic Corridor and is opposing
CPEC over sovereignty border issues.
Fifth, there have been changes in their foreign policies
over the years since the 1980s, and now there is a strong
bilateralism between them and multilateralism in their rela-
tionships with organizations. Japan has traditionally been a
strong ally of the United States since the Second World
War and till the 1980s, relations between the two countries
were characterized by bilateralism. However from the
1980s, there has been a shift to beyond bilateralismor
multilateralism with conf‌igurations of geopolitical power in
Asia, enhanced role of private capital f‌lows, and
©2019 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2019) 10:2 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12666
Global Policy Volume 10 . Issue 2 . May 2019
284
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