Benyon v Evelyn
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 01 January 1823 |
| Date | 01 January 1823 |
| Court | Court of Common Pleas |
English Reports Citation: 124 E.R. 780
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
K. (P. 334.) bbnyon v. evelyn. "Not reporting, nor questioning out of the Parliament what is said in Parliament are, as it were, of the essence of the Parliament, and not dispensable withal," &c. The general usage of Parliament on the former of these points is entirely changed since the Restoration ;(a) and late transactions have done much to establish that from such change has followed the right, under certain circumstances, to "question what is said in Parliament." The new rule seems to be dangerous so far only as the irrational principle of compromising differences by means of duelling was countenanced by tbe unrebuked tendency of the " questioning " upon the occasion alluded to. See the Debates and Journals of the House of Commons for the 9th and 17th days of July, 1822, in the case of the Scotch advocates. . In this case particular grounds of justification were understood to protect the parties charged with breach of privilege; and the declaration on the Journals, " that taking notice of the speeches of members of the House is a breach of privilege," seems to constitute an example of adherence to form after the substance of a rule has vanished. In other respects the practice on both points may be said to be fixed on a reasonable basil; namely, that in ordinary cases the proceedings of Parliament are to be made known to the public ; and that if what passes is injurious to persons out of Parliament, they are entitled to such vindication as is consistent with the true dignity of the Parliament; itself. The necessity of freedom of speech in Parliament is only to be inferred from its tending to tbe due performance of the duties of the [622] members : but it is equally clear that the people should know what passes there, if their interests will by that means be best guarded. It is understood that a vote of either House of Parliament is tiotice to all the world; which could scarcely be, if by no diligence it was competent to attain knowledge of it; and even in the arbitrary reign of Henry the Eighth, the Lord Chancellor dismisses the Commons.' House, with an injunction "to report in their counties what they had seen and heard."-What the members were thus injoined to do for the people, the facilities of the press enable us to effect now most conveniently for ourselves. It ia remarkable that neither Sir Edward Coke, 4 Inst. 8, nor Sir William Blackstone, specifies the "not reporting" as one of the privileges of Parliament; and Mr. Justice Doddridge, in enumerating the essential rights of the Commons, states only "lawful summons, free election, liberty of admission into the House, a quiet session there, with a just freedom of speech and debate without fear or disturbance." See tbe book called The several Opinions of sundry learned Antiquaries touching the Parliament of England. The claim to secrecy of debate, and of proceedings, may be traced perhaps to an apprehension! of the power of the Crown, which is no longer exercised through this medium of personal intimidation. In 1410 it was ordained that it should be "lawful as well for tbe Lords by themselves as to the Commons by themselves to debate of all matters relating to the realm without disclosing the same to the King before a determination made thereof, and that to be done only by tbe mouth of the Speaker," (a) See amongst many other proofs of the usage of Parliament, Lord John Rassel's Essay an the Constitution, p. 466, 2d edit. Mr. Wyne's Argument, p. 59, &c. and Mr. Burden's "Brief Treatise on the Privileges of the House of Commons." S. APPENDIX 781 Cobbet'i Parliamentary History, vol. i. p. 30,8. It was at that time a reasonable desire tbat the share which individuals might take in certain measures should not be betrayed to the Crown, since the whole body was scarcely secure against regal encroachment. In the preceding reign a member had been adjudged guilty of treason upon a bill which he brought into Parliament to restrain the corrupt manners of the Court. 1 Parl. Hist. 222. Cotton's Ab. 361, 362. Hume's Hist., Rich. 2, note 0. The struggle between independence of deliberation and undue influence continued to be violent throughout the reigns of Elizabeth and the Stuarts. This danger might perhaps justify the old claim, which indeed was sometimes put forth with a jealousy only to be rationally accounted for by the peculiar circumstances of the times. In 1588, Feb. 15, "By consent of the House ad monition was given to the members of the House of Commons that speeches should not be made table talk, nor given in notes in writing to any not members of the House." Observations, Rules, and Orders Collected Ottt of Divers Journals of the House of Commons, 1717, p. 44. This year 1588, was however one of great national hazard, when the measures of Government might well [62$] be guarded with peculiar jealousy : but the admonition itself shews not only the rule, but that the practice ran counter to it; which the circumstances of ffie time alone might render it fitting to restrain. In the gross case of libel by Hall, a member of the House of Commons, in 23 Eliz., the "publishing the conferences of the Houses abroad in print" appears to have been coupled with many highly offensive acts; Sir Simon D'Ewe's Journals, 291, &c. and the Journals of the House of Commons, vol. i. p. 122-125, &c.-and in The Bishop of Bristol's case in 1604, 1 Hatsell, 233, 3d edit, and the Journals of the House of Commons, vol. i. p. 226, &c. 251-1000, the Commons grounded their proceedings upon heavy charges. But that the mere "report/lag mentioned in the text prevailed, without the imputation or consciousness of offence, the preface to the Ephemeria Parliamentaria, and the existence of Sir D'Ewe'e Journal, and of Hake wil's and other collections, furnish strong presumptive proof. In the publication of Parliamentary papers, transactions of committees, and of daily orders, and in many other respects, the asserted ancient rule is, and in almost all periods has been, infringed with the greatest advantage. In most of the cases also the offence has been, noticing the proceedings injuriously; although it cannot be denied teat plain precedents, in good times, may be produced, of the calm denial of the right of the public to access to the deliberation of Parliament. If, however, experience has proved that the public business in Parliament is best done after full discussion, and by enjoying the...
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