Bernard Mandeville on the Use and Abuse of Hypocrisy
| Author | Robin Douglass |
| Published date | 01 May 2022 |
| Date | 01 May 2022 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720972617 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720972617
Political Studies
2022, Vol. 70(2) 465 –482
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321720972617
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Bernard Mandeville on the
Use and Abuse of Hypocrisy
Robin Douglass
Abstract
In The Fable of the Bees, Bernard Mandeville declared that ‘it is impossible we could be sociable
Creatures without Hypocrisy’. Mandeville set out his ideas of sociability against Anthony Ashley
Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, whose notions of virtue he dismissed as ‘a vast Inlet to
Hypocrisy’. The main goal of this article is to reconstruct Mandeville’s account of hypocrisy, first
by explaining why he accords it such a prominent role in understanding our moral and social
norms, and, second, by piecing together his criticisms of Shaftesbury’s rival ethical theory. In doing
so, the article outlines a more general Mandevillean framework for assessing when hypocrisy is
likely to prove either socially beneficial or pernicious, while also examining what is at stake in
choosing to expose rather than tolerate other people’s hypocrisy.
Keywords
Bernard Mandeville, hypocrisy, sociability, virtue, Shaftesbury
Accepted: 8 October 2020
Hypocrisy is widely classified as a moral vice. But should it be regarded as a vice with
wholly pernicious social consequences or one that has a positive and even indispensable
role to play in allowing us to live together peacefully? Invocations of hypocrisy in day-
to-day politics are invariably negative. ‘Hypocrisy remains the only unforgivable sin’,
Judith Shklar (1984: 45) observes at the outset of her landmark discussion. We too often
explain away cruelty and other evils, but ‘not hypocrisy, which alone is now inexcusable’.
Shklar saw both sides of hypocrisy. She was aware that it often works alongside cruelty,
‘unified in zeal’ behind some of the worst human atrocities (Shklar, 1984: 11–12). Yet she
also recognised hypocrisy as an inevitable feature of politics, especially in liberal democ-
racies that are committed both to resolving disagreements through compromise and to the
‘democracy of everyday life’, where we are called upon publicly to accept a diversity of
ways of life that we might not privately endorse (Shklar, 1984: 77–78). Hypocrisy, Shklar
(1984: 248) concludes, ‘is one of the few vices that bolsters liberal democracy’.
Department of Political Economy, King’s College London, London, UK
Corresponding author:
Robin Douglass, Department of Political Economy, King’s College London, London WC2B 4BG, UK.
Email: robin.douglass@kcl.ac.uk
972617PSX0010.1177/0032321720972617Political StudiesDouglass
research-article2020
Article
466 Political Studies 70(2)
Much subsequent scholarship on hypocrisy has followed Shklar in assessing the impli-
cations of the vice for contemporary democratic politics, typically (but not exclusively)
focusing on questions of how we should judge the hypocrisy of politicians (e.g. Dovi,
2001; Furia, 2009; Grant, 1997; Runciman, 2008; Thompson, 1996; Tillyris, 2016). My
approach in this article involves stepping back to reflect more generally on the hypocrisy
underlying our sociable and moral norms, for hypocrisy is not only a ubiquitous feature
of political life but of social interaction more broadly. Or so I shall suggest, at least, taking
for my guide one of the great champions of the social benefits of hypocrisy, Bernard
Mandeville, who declared that ‘it is impossible we could be sociable Creatures without
Hypocrisy’ (FB I: 349).1
Mandeville is mostly remembered today for his infamous ‘private vices, public bene-
fits’ thesis, according to which most of, if not all, the benefits associated with living in a
large and prosperous society are ultimately rooted in human vices. This is typically cashed
out in terms of economic considerations, with the pursuit of certain vices, such as vanity,
stimulating demand for luxury goods and fuelling economic prosperity. Although this
constitutes an important strand of Mandeville’s thought, he regarded his most famous
work, The Fable of the Bees, as largely comprising ‘a Philosophical Disquisition into the
Force of the Passions, and the Nature of Society’ (LD: 54–55; see also FB I: 406). In what
follows, I take Mandeville’s philosophical credentials seriously and focus on questions of
moral psychology and sociability,2 rather than economics and markets. Indeed, we could
even view his claims about hypocrisy as one of the ways in which his more general ‘pri-
vate vices, public benefits’ thesis plays out: large-scale human society depends upon
vices like hypocrisy being turned to good use, which is not, of course, to say that hypoc-
risy or any other vice is always beneficial.
Theoretical discussions of hypocrisy often commence with the Oxford English
Dictionary’s definition (e.g. Shklar, 1984: 47; Wallace, 2010: 308): ‘The assuming of a false
appearance of virtue or goodness, with dissimulation of real character or inclinations, esp.
in respect of religious life or beliefs; hence in general sense, dissimulation, pretence, sham’.
This proves a helpful starting point for present purposes too, since Mandeville associated
hypocrisy with dissimulation: hiding away the sentiments and motives from which we act,
while putting on an outward appearance we do not feel within (see FB I: 281; FT: 31; OH:
202). In Mandeville’s day, hypocrisy was exemplified by feigning religious sincerity or hid-
ing our vices behind a mask of virtue, and while philosophers continue to debate how best
to conceptualise hypocrisy, the idea of ‘the hypocrite as someone who dissembles or shams
regarding her motives or intentions in regions where we take such things seriously’
(McKinnon, 1991: 322) remains one of the main contenders.3
That Mandeville enjoyed exposing the hypocrisy of his adversaries is well-known.
Daniel Luban (2015: 848), for example, claims that hypocrisy was the ‘fundamental theme’
of Mandeville’s social criticism, and that ‘it is difficult to come up with a thinker who was
more exhaustive in investigating and exposing hypocrisy’. Nonetheless, the place of hypoc-
risy in Mandeville’s theory of sociability has received little sustained attention.4 The main
aim of this article, then, is to reconstruct his ideas on hypocrisy and its relation to our social
and moral norms. My point of departure is ‘A Search into the Nature of Society’, which
Mandeville added to the enlarged 1723 edition of (the first volume of) The Fable of the
Bees. This essay announces his opposition to Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of
Shaftesbury – an opposition that structures much of Mandeville’s subsequent philosophy.5
Where Shaftesbury had argued that our social love and generous affections lead us to seek
the welfare of others, Mandeville denies that ‘the good and aimable Qualities of Man . . .
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