Between Authority and Interpretation by Joseph Raz
| Date | 01 January 2010 |
| Author | Marco Goldoni |
| Published date | 01 January 2010 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2009.789_1.x |
over to the lower classes. However, the argument would have been even stronger
if the analysis were somewhat expanded to include‘lower-brow’ literary charac-
ters, designed for a broader readership, such as gothic and sensational novels.
These issues,however,do not detractfrom the qualityof the book,which o¡ers
an important contributionto our understanding of the interplay between cultural
perceptions, criminality, and the practical operations of the criminal process.
HadarAviram
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Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation,Oxford:Oxford University
Press, 2009, 413 pp, hb d35.00.
The title of this newcollection of essays by Joseph Raz hints at the realmwithin
which one can ¢nd law, that is, precisely between authority and interpretation.
An analysis of the concept of law necessarily entails the recognition of at least
two essential moments: the authoritative dimension and the recovery of legal
meaning. To be clear, these two dimensions do not have the same force in Raz’s
approach.The building blockof Raz’s theory is that there is a decisive moment in
law and this is the authoritative moment. It is an essential feature of every legal
system to claim authority.This is indeed ‘the moment in which legal standards
come into existence and provide new reasons for action’ (109). In other words,
law is a structure of authority aswell as the product of that structure of authority.
In this sense, authority not only precedes, but guides interpretation. To be fair,
authority and interpretation are only two among several foundational questions
withwhich Raz confrontsin this book. Since it is impossible todo justice in a few
pagesto the complexityand subtlety of the arguments developed in the book,this
review will focus on these two concepts.
Raz has developed over the years a highly in£uential conception of authority
called ‘the service conception’. In the second partof the book, this important the-
ory is re¢ned and revised, even though its constitutive core is con¢rmed. This
core revolves around three theses: the normal justi¢cation thesis; the pre-emption
thesis; and the dependence thesis.To put it succinctly, the legitimacy of an author-
ity is secured by the fact that conformity with its directives improves one’s con-
formity with reason. Understood in thisway, legal authority amounts to a device
throughwhich peopletry to attain the goalof their capacity to act rationally.This
is the thrust of what is knownas the normal justi¢cation thesis.Authority is valu-
able and legitimate insofar as it provides reasons which advance the good of the
subjects towhom it applies.This can be done ‘not only by securing coordination,
but also by having more reliable judgment regarding the best options, given the
circumstances’ (153). Coordination and expertise are necessary conditions for
satisfying the normal justi¢cation thesis. Another essential element for being an
authority is represented by the dependence thesis, according to which all the
directives adopted by an authority should be based on reasons which already
apply independently to the subjects and are relevant in the circumstances they
n
Universityof California, Hastings College of the Law
Reviews
157
r2010The Authors. Journal Compilation r2010The Modern Law ReviewLimited.
(2010) 73(1) 155^173
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