Between hearts and minds: The relevance of the British colonial experience to contemporary Russian counter-insurgencies in the North Caucasus
| Published date | 01 March 2015 |
| Date | 01 March 2015 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020702014563812 |
| Author | Marat Grebennikov |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essays |
International Journal
2015, Vol. 70(1) 63–83
!The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702014563812
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Scholarly Essay
Between hearts and
minds: The relevance of
the British colonial
experience to
contemporary Russian
counter-insurgencies in
the North Caucasus
Marat Grebennikov
Department of Political Science, Concordia University, Montreal,
Quebec, Canada
Abstract
Although Russian authorities point to the supposed success of Britain’s late colonial
counter-insurgency campaigns as a model even in the 21st century, their grasp of the
historical lessons is partial at best. This article considers the applicability and relevance
of the counter-insurgency experience of the late British colonial state to present-day
ethno-religious conflicts in the North Caucasus. The article suggests that the flexibility
of British arrangements for counter-insurgency was a major factor in achieving long-
term stability for the gradual transition to indigenous self-rule . The key practice was to
devolve responsibility and power to indigenous elites operating with a high degree of
autonomy. The article then proposes guidelines relevant to the conditions of the pre-
sent and the near future that will affect prospects both for full-fledged democratization
of Russia and for effective state-building, also vitally important for the development of
the North Caucasus. The article concludes that the most relevant factor in the British
counter-insurgency experience is to win the hearts and minds of the population.
However, this cannot be achieved without a legitimate indigenous administration cap-
able of taking full responsibility and ownership of the campaign. Otherwise, diminished
political access and accountability create propitious conditions for adherents of radical
movements, who are increasingly capable of and prepared to use violence and who are
the only de facto rival political forces within the Russian Federation.
Corresponding author:
Marat Grebennikov, Department of Political Science, Concordia University, 1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd.,
West Montreal, Quebec, QC H3G 1M8, Canada.
Email: marat.grebennikov@concordia.ca
Keywords
Counter-insurgency, North Caucasus, hearts and minds, democratization
Radical Islamic ideology is making gains in the North Caucasus, a region facing
both an identity crisis and an internal ideological struggle to define its position
within the Russian Federation.
1
For over two decades, post-Soviet Russia has
struggled with persistent domestic insurgency and terrorism. In response to this
threat, Russian authorities have adopted extensive counter-terrorism legislation,
established and modified institutions responsible for combating terrorism, and
streamlined the leadership and conduct of counter-terrorist operations.
2
According to numerous statements by the Kremlin, the terrorism problem in the
region has finally receded, and the challenge of separatism had been temporarily
muted. Yet daily reports on the shoot-outs and clashes between insurgents and
Russia’s security forces cast serious doubts on these official claims. Despite signs of
a slow return to normal life in North Caucasus, the security situation remains
highly unstable, and deadly incidents have spread into neighbouring regions pre-
viously unaffected by insurgency.
3
Much scholarly writing has criticized Russia for excessive and poorly coordi-
nated responses, for the lack of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy encom-
passing socio-economic approaches, and for the lack of an effective system of
prevention and protection from terrorism. These critiques do not, however,
improve our general understanding of why Russia has always favoured the tactics
of force and suppression in combating terrorism. Stressing the futility of a short-
term reactive approach does not explain Russia’s choice of the military approach
over long-term socio-economic solutions as a way to resolve complex security
concerns.
Academics and military practitioners, including some in Russia, point to the
British experience of late colonial counter-insurgency as a model worthy of replica-
tion. Speaking in an interview with Rossiya 1 television in late November 2013,
Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said international terrorism is Russia’s ‘‘main foe’’
since many insurgents are members of international terrorist organizations.
Russia therefore needs to turn for models to international experience of
1. Politically, the Northern Caucasus includes seven autonomous republics—Dagestan (2,910,249),
Chechnya (1,268,989), Ingushetia (412,529), North Ossetia (712,980), Kabardino-Balkaria
(859,939), Karachay-Cherkessia (477,859), and Adygea (439,996)—and two krais—Stavropol krai
(2,786,281) and Krasnodar krai (5,226,647).
2. Mariya Omelicheva, ‘‘Russia’s counterterrorism policy: Variations on an imperial theme,’’
Perspectives on Terrorism 3, no. 1 (2009), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/
article/view/61/html (accessed 12 November 2014).
3. Ibid.
64 International Journal 70(1)
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