Between intergovernmental relations and paradiplomacy: Wales and the Brexit of the regions
| Author | Jo Hunt,Rachel Minto |
| Published date | 01 November 2017 |
| Date | 01 November 2017 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117725027 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles - Part Two |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117725027
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2017, Vol. 19(4) 647 –662
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148117725027
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Between intergovernmental
relations and paradiplomacy:
Wales and the Brexit of the
regions
Jo Hunt and Rachel Minto
Abstract
The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) is an assertion of UK nation-
state sovereignty. Notwithstanding this state-centrism, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
have distinct interests to protect as part of the Brexit negotiations. This article explores how
the interests of one regional case, Wales, were accommodated in the pre-negotiation phase, at a
domestic level—through intergovernmental structures—and an EU level through paradiplomacy.
We explore the structures for sub-state influence, Wales’ engagement with these structures and
what has informed its approach. We argue that Wales’ behaviour reflects its positioning as a
‘Good Unionist’ and a ‘Good European’. Despite the weakness of intra-UK structures, Wales
has preferred to pursue policy influence at a UK (not an EU) level. In Brussels, regional interests
inform the context for Brexit. Here, Wales has focused on awareness-raising, highlighting that
the UK Government does not command the ‘monopoly on perspectives’ towards Brexit in the
United Kingdom.
Keywords
Brexit, devolution, EU, intergovernmental relations, paradiplomacy, Wales
Introduction
International law and politics and their associated structures were created by and for
states. Acting within a global arena, states seek economic and political advantage through
foreign outposts, trade missions, bilateral and multilateral agreements, participation in
international organisations and, in more extreme cases, military force. This foreign policy
realm is one in which the primacy of the state is long established. However, primacy does
not imply exclusivity. Indeed, sub-state actors now assert themselves more forcefully on
the international scene, a scene that has become increasingly hospitable to them.
Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
Corresponding author:
Rachel Minto, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF10 3XQ, UK.
Email: mintor@cardiff.ac.uk
725027BPI0010.1177/1369148117725027The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsHunt and Minto
research-article2017
Special Issue Article
648 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19(4)
Although certain states have stood firm against any challenge to exclusive centrality,
others have transferred administrative and political powers from the centre through mod-
els of federalism or processes of devolution (Hooghe and Marks, 2016). However, even
where considerable powers are held by the constituent sub-unit of the state, competence
over the internal dimension of a policy very rarely results in a parallel competence over
the external dimension. This lack of legal capacity has not deterred sub-states from them-
selves engaging in international activity—in the pursuit of various economic, cultural and
political ends—while seeking to influence state foreign policy through intra-state chan-
nels. The final result is a complex foreign policy arena, both within and beyond the state
(Aldecoa, 2009; Duchacek, 1990).
In this article, we use the process of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the
European Union (EU) to expose and explore this multi-layered complexity and gain a bet-
ter understanding of the ways in which sub-states are constrained and enabled in the pro-
motion of their own foreign policy preferences, both inside and outside the state. We are
particularly interested in the structures available for sub-states to advance their policy pref-
erences, the ways in which sub-states use these structures and why. Our particular focus is
Wales. Unlike Scotland, Wales’ electorate voted on 23 June 2016 to leave the EU, although
Wales’ governing parties are staunchly pro-remain. Again, unlike Scotland, Wales’ govern-
ing parties are in favour of the continuation of the union of the United Kingdom.
Withdrawal from the EU involves the enactment of British state foreign policy that
will have profoundly differentiated implications across its sub-states. The arena of this
foreign policy activity, the institutional environment of the EU, is one in which sub-states
(as EU ‘Regions’) have an established presence, legal recognition and some level of
influence. Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have developed their own independent
relationships with the EU, and each devolved nation has its own set of interests and priori-
ties to protect and promote. In particular, Wales has been a net beneficiary of EU funding
(Wyn Jones et al., 2016) through the Common Agricultural Policy and the Structural
Funds, incorporating as it does ‘less developed’ areas attracting a higher level of EU sup-
port (Hunt et al, 2016). Its Government also emphasises the significance of membership
of the Customs Union and Single Market as rendering Wales an attractive location for
major international companies and for foreign direct investment (Minto et al., 2016). As
with the other sub-state nations in the United Kingdom, the Welsh Government’s priori-
ties for withdrawal from the EU are markedly different from those of the UK Government.
However, unlike the other sub-state nations in the United Kingdom, Wales’ bargaining
hand within the United Kingdom is particularly weak. Compounded by the relatively
weak structures for intergovernmental relations in the United Kingdom (House of Lords
Select Committee on the Constitution, 2015), the European arena would appear as a
potentially attractive site for advocacy activity, to advance Wales’ distinctive priorities.
Methodology and hypothesis
Our hypothesis is that if the structures for intergovernmental relations within the UK state
are weak, Wales would seek to make significant strategic use of external channels to rep-
resent its interests that are distinct from those of the UK Government. Our original empir-
ical research draws on 19 semi-structured interviews with Welsh and European policy
actors, based in Wales and Brussels, complemented with documentary analysis of policy
texts.1 The period under examination runs for a little under 12 months, from the date of
the referendum vote on 23 June 2016 and finishing before the 2017 General Election.
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