Beyond Autocracy Promotion: A Review
| Date | 01 May 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1478929918774976 |
| Author | Katsiaryna Yakouchyk |
| Published date | 01 May 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2018
Article
Political Studies Review
2019, Vol. 17(2) 147 –160
Beyond Autocracy
© The Author(s) 2018
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Promotion: A Review
https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929918774976
DOI: 10.1177/1478929918774976
journals.sagepub.com/home/psrev
Katsiaryna Yakouchyk
Abstract
In this article, I provide a survey of the recent and rapidly growing theoretical and empirical
literature on autocracy promotion. In a relatively concise way, the reader is able to grasp all key
concepts and related aspects on the topic. This article is a guide for all those aiming to begin
their journey in the scholarly land of autocracy promotion, trying to stimulate these travelers in
exploring off-beaten research avenues.
Keywords
authoritarian collaboration, authoritarian diffusion, authoritarian persistence, regime stability,
autocratic sponsorship
Accepted: 4 April 2017
Introduction
It is now widely recognized that the results of the Western assistance for democratization
have been modest (e.g. Börzel, 2015; Börzel and Van Hüllen, 2014; Grimm, 2015; Jahn,
2012). This is also due to the fact that authoritarian regimes have become more self-
confident and learned to resist to democracy promotion (e.g. Ambrosio, 2009; Carothers,
2006; Silitski, 2010a, 2010b; Whitehead, 2015). As a result, a research agenda has
emerged in the past 3–4 years, focusing on how external actors support authoritarianism
or hinder democratization in third countries. Scholars emphasize that countries such as
Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia often protect friendly autocrats from democratic pushes.
In many studies, the phenomenon was labeled as “autocracy promotion,” which has gen-
erated an additional debate on the appropriateness of this expression itself. There is an
emerging consensus in the literature that authoritarianism per se is not an explicit goal of
illiberal powers, and what has been labeled as autocracy promotion does not replicate the
concept of democracy promotion with its clear normative underpinnings (e.g. Carothers
and Samet-Marram, 2015; Libman and Obydenkova, 2015; Nodia, 2014; Risse and
Babayan, 2015; Tansey, 2016b; Von Soest, 2015; Way, 2015; Whitehead, 2015a). It is not
a surprise that the debate on autocracy promotion has gained scholarly and public interest
University of Passau, Passau, Germany
Corresponding author:
Katsiaryna Yakouchyk, University of Passau, Dr.-Hans-Kapfinger-Straße 14, 94032 Passau, Germany.
Email: yakouchyk@gmail.com
148
Political Studies Review 17(2)
in the recent years. At least two empirical observations motivate this emergence: first, the
worldwide stagnation of political rights and civil liberties;1 second, the rise of authoritar-
ian powers such as China (e.g. Gat, 2007), whose development models could appeal to
other authoritarian regimes (e.g. Jackson, 2010).2
What do we know about autocracy promotion so far? Who are the promoters? What
are the motives to support other regimes? How and when do “autocracy promoters” act?
This study considers all scholarly contributions in English on autocracy promotion and
is thematically organized around different topics.3 This article critically engages with the
literature and helps the reader to organize the studies along key dimensions, clarifying
debates and providing intuitions for future research. The review also briefly addresses
the role of democracies in authoritarian stability. Due to space constraints, this review
does not deal with the role of regional organizations in authoritarian stability.
Conceptual Debates: From Autocracy Promotion to
Autocracy Support
Scholars agree that external actors can play a role in the persistence of authoritarian
regimes. The conceptualization and typology of external influence on authoritarian sta-
bility have been, however, a subject of debate since the introduction of the catchy term
“autocracy promotion” by Peter Burnell. Burnell (2010) highlights that regional authori-
tarian powers help similar regimes to persist and asks whether autocrats do so for strate-
gic considerations or because they believe that authoritarianism is an appropriate form
of rule for these countries. Burnell (2010: 6) defines autocracy promotion as both “delib-
erate attempts to influence a regime in an anti-democratic direction” and unintentional
processes, such as “the diffusion of authoritarian values across borders and the borrow-
ing of foreign models of authoritarian rule and their institutions.” On the same line of
reasoning of Burnell (2010), Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber (2016: 777)
suggest that autocrats (or, as they call them, Authoritarian Gravity Centers) “induce both
the promotion and diffusion of autocracy” on the regional level. They put forward (but
do not test) a conceptual framework to facilitate the tracing and categorization of the
instances of autocracy promotion, encompassing both intentional and unintentional (i.e.
diffusion) modes of external influence. Other scholars proposed alternative definitions
of autocracy promotion.
Rachel Vanderhill (2013: 9) defines the promotion of authoritarianism4 as a situation
in which an actor “is actively supporting illiberal elites, groups, or regimes through direct
assistance.” She further argues that the actions of powerful autocrats and “[t]he primary
goal of their support may not be to develop authoritarian regimes” (Vanderhill, 2013: 8),
a view shared with Burnell (2010). Katsiaryna Yakouchyk (2016) also supports this view
by differentiating between active and passive autocracy promotion. The former is defined
as “deliberate actions undertaken with a view to weaken another country’s liberal perfor-
mance, or to strengthen the survival capacity of authoritarian rulers” (Yakouchyk, 2016:
6). Passive autocracy promotion is in her view the “support of an authoritarian regime
through increasing economic and financial ties, and diplomatic support” without the
intentionality to strengthen certain regimes, whereas “[t]he regime outcome in this case is
a side-effect of pursuing economic interests” (Yakouchyk, 2016: 6–7).
The most recent literature doubts the appropriateness of the term autocracy promotion as
an overarching term defining the international influences on the persistence of authoritarian
regimes. Ghia Nodia (2014) proposes to call the phenomenon “democracy resistance” and
highlights that there is no need to promote from abroad authoritarianism that is already there
Yakouchyk
149
with homegrown roots. As there is no encompassing ideology of authoritarianism (in con-
trast to universalist democratic ideas), autocracy cannot be promoted but can be only main-
tained, and what has been labeled as autocracy promotion is only anti-Americanism and
anti-Europeanism (Nodia, 2014). As Tanja Börzel (2015: 524) highlights, “[c]ountervailing
democracy promotion is not the same as autocracy promotion. Yet, the outcome of such
activities may be still autocracy enhancing.”5 Hence, for Börzel (2015: 525), “illiberal
regional powers do not engage in autocracy promotion” and the term “countervailing
democracy promotion” is similar to Nodia’s “democracy resistance.” Thomas Carothers
and Oren Samet-Marram (2015) similarly argue that neither effects nor motivations of
authoritarian powers’ engagement are anti-democratic. Laurence Whitehead (2014: 8)
writes on “anti-democracy promotion” and defines it as “sustained external policy initia-
tives intended to shelter or preserve allied regimes that appear to be at risk from interna-
tional (Western) democracy promotion activities.” He highlights that anti-democracy
promotion should be understood as sustained, consistent, and persistent policy initiatives.
Oisín Tansey (2015, 2016b) and Jakob Tolstrup (2015b) urge to distinguish what
counts as autocracy promotion and what does not, as well as to adopt a “strict” definition
of autocracy promotion, by clearly distinguishing intentional actions from unintentional
ones. Tansey (2016b: 142) argues that the term autocracy promotion should be used only
when there is “a clear intent on the part of an external actor to bolster autocracy as a form
of political regime as well as an underlying motivation that rests in significant part on an
ideological commitment to autocracy itself.”6 He differentiates between autocracy pro-
motion and other types of international influences. For Tansey (2016b), the term “democ-
racy resistance,” as used by Nodia (2014), better captures much of the activities discussed
in the previous studies. Tansey admits, however, that applying a strict definition of autoc-
racy promotion, as based on ideological commitment, would imply difficulties in identi-
fying true motivations and intentions of international actors. As a consequence, Tansey’s
definition relegates the phenomenon to historical periods until the end of the Cold War
(except for the relatively recent case of Venezuela under Chavez).
Some recent contributions propose conceptual frameworks differentiating between
multiple channels of authoritarian support. The works of Christian Von Soest (2015) and
Tansey (2016a) are examples of well-argued overarching frameworks highlighting vari-
ous aspects of authoritarian collaboration. For example, Tansey (2016a) differentiates
between active and passive external influences. Active influences are divided in two sub-
groups: unintended consequences of international policies,...
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