Beyond coups: terrorism and military involvement in politics
| Author | Vincenzo Bove,Mauricio Rivera,Chiara Ruffa |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066119866499 |
| Published date | 01 March 2020 |
| Date | 01 March 2020 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119866499
European Journal of
International Relations
2020, Vol. 26(1) 263 –288
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066119866499
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Beyond coups: terrorism and
military involvement in politics
Vincenzo Bove
University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
Mauricio Rivera
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway
Chiara Ruffa
Uppsala University/Swedish Defence University, Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract
A wealth of research in comparative politics and international relations examines how
the military intervenes in politics via coups. We shift attention to broader forms of
military involvement in politics beyond coups and claim that terrorist violence and the
threat of terror attacks provide a window of opportunity for military intervention,
without taking full control of state institutions. We highlight two mechanisms through
which terrorism influences military involvement in politics: (1) government authorities
demand military expertise to fight terrorism and strengthen national security and “pull”
the armed forces into politics, and (2) state armed actors exploit their informational
advantage over civilian authorities to “push” their way into politics and policy-making.
A panel data analysis shows that domestic terror attacks and perceived threats from
domestic and transnational terrorist organizations increase military involvement in
politics. We illustrate the theoretical mechanisms with the cases of France (1995–1998
and 2015–2016) and Algeria (1989–1992).
Keywords
Terrorism, military involvement in politics, civil-military relations, quantitative
methods
Corresponding author:
Vincenzo Bove, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK.
Email: v.bove@warwick.ac.uk
866499EJT0010.1177/1354066119866499European Journal of International RelationsBove et al.
research-article2019
Article
264 European Journal of International Relations 26(1)
Introduction
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the military has played a far larger role in US politics than
ever before, leading some experts to talk about an increasing politicization of the US
military (Owens, 2011; Ulrich and Cook, 2006). Similarly, the French government rein-
forced military means and prerogatives to counter terrorist threats after the terror attacks
in Paris and Nice, including the deployment of 13,000 troops, an increase in the defense
budget and much wider autonomy for the military. These examples illustrate greater
military intervention in politics following terrorist attacks, which in turn can change the
civil–military equilibrium, and may hinder civilian control over the military and under-
mine the quality of democracy.
Surprisingly, previous research has not systematically examined the link between ter-
rorism and military involvement in politics (MIP). Aksoy et al. (2015) show that terror-
ism increases the probability of coups in autocracies, which is consistent with other
studies stressing that domestic and external security threats raise the risk of coups (e.g.
Ezrow and Frantz, 2011; Goemans, 2008; Marinov and Goemans, 2014; Piplani and
Talmadge, 2016; Powell, 2012; Svolik, 2013; Bove and Nisticò, 2014a; Bove and Rivera,
2015). However, even though coups marked the 20th century, these events are rare and
affect autocracies disproportionately. More importantly, coups represent only one strat-
egy that military actors have at their disposal to intervene in politics. To quote Finer
(1975: 4), “the modes of military intervention are as often latent or indirect as they are
overt or direct (. . .) the level to which the military press their intervention varies; they
do not always supplant the civilian regime. Often, they merely substitute one cabinet for
another, or again simply subject a cabinet to blackmail.”
This article focuses on the relationship between terrorism and military intervention in
politics, beyond coups. Whereas coup plotters seek to obtain power and take over the gov-
ernment, we focus on MIP and define it as military actions that fall short of an outright
attempt to acquire full control of the government.1 MIP ranges from coup events to increas-
ing levels of military autonomy that often imply greater influence on governments’ deci-
sions in policy areas within the defense domain (i.e. military expenditures, the structure
and organization of the security sector), and sometimes extend to drafting constitutions,
redefining justice, and appointing specific actors in key state institutions (e.g. Feaver, 1999;
Huntington, 1957; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Pion-Berlin, 1992). Any such change in MIP is
relative to a country-specific level of involvement that is usually a function of geopolitical,
institutional, and idiosyncratic factors (Brooks, 2008; Levy, 2016).
Our theory highlights that military actors have motives to intervene in politics and
their ability to do so depends on the presence of an opportunity structure. To a varying
degree and extent, military actors generally have incentives to intervene in politics and
influence policymaking, particularly in defense and foreign policy arenas (Brooks, 2019;
Recchia, 2015; Talmadge, 2015). Because terrorism threatens national security—includ-
ing a state’s population, infrastructure, and sovereignty—and has deep psychological
effects among the population, civilian authorities use the armed forces to signal their
willingness and commitment to stop terrorism and secure the country from violence by
domestic and transnational terrorist organizations. Accordingly, we argue that terror
attacks and the threat of terrorist violence can open a window of opportunity that
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