Beyond the Objectivist Conception of Civil Society: Social Actors, Civility and Self-Limitation
| Date | 01 June 2012 |
| Published date | 01 June 2012 |
| Author | Ayhan Akman |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00913.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Beyond the Objectivist Conception of Civil
Society: Social Actors, Civility and Self-Limitationpost_913321..340
Ayhan Akman
Sabanci University, Istanbul
What I would like to do in this article is threefold. First, I would like to sketch the anatomy of the dominant
perspective on civil society (which I call‘objectivist’) by discussing its basic postulates. Second,I would like to highlight
the main problems that are immanent to this conception.I will try to demonstrate the presence of certain blind spots,
erasures and contradictions which are constitutive of this dominant understanding. I will argue for the need not so
much to reject it outright but to try to transcend it by incorporating it in a wider and more encompassing framework.
The attempt to achieve this constitutes the third part of the article where I propose an alternative conception of civil
society that is based upon the orientations of social actors. My argument is that an alternative to the objectivist
understanding involves treating civility and toleration as not simply being incidental but rather essential aspects of a
proper understanding of civil society. The current literature’s focus on non-state organizational capacity needs to be
complemented by an analysis of the normative orientations of social actors along five distinct yet interrelated
dimensions of civility.The per spective outlined here attempts to combine the ontological parameters of the dominant
understanding of civil society with the normative criteria that usually get overlooked.It will be argued that, rather than
being occasionally and unsystematically alluded to in passing, the specifically ‘civil’ property of social interactions
should be recognized as the formative principle of civil society.
Keywords: civil society; civility; self-limitation; social actors; democratization
Reviewing the literature produced over the last 25 years on civil society,one is struck both
by the immense popularity of the concept as well as its slippery character which seems to
defy all attempts to pin it down firmly. Almost every academic article that touches upon the
concept feels obliged to begin with an attempt to define what civil society means in its first
or second paragraph. Despite all these efforts,however,it is evident that a consensus on what
civil society ‘really is’ seems farther from our grasp than ever. It is strange that despite the
availability of a number of widely read and respected ‘biographies’ of the concept,1there
does not seem to be an authoritative and uncontroversial definition of civil society. Hence
the continuing quest for the ‘definitive definition’of this concept and the ritual of offer ing
a (what is hoped to be, if not definitive, then at least useful) definition of the concept in
almost every article on the subject.
Notwithstanding the absence of an authoritative definition, one can nonetheless sketch
the broad contours of a well-established and familiar perspective that is involved in
producing the vast majority of the currently available definitions of the concept of civil
society. There seems to be a common cluster of ideas and presuppositions that inform
the attempts to define the meaning and uses of the concept of civil society in a particular
way; the apparent multiplicity of the current definitions of civil society is characterized
by ‘family resemblances’ that belie a common orientation. An inquiry into this common
orientation reveals an ‘objectivist’ perspective that has dominated the recent debates on
civil society.
bs_bs_banner
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00913.x
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2012 VOL 60, 321–340
© 2011The Author.Political Studies © 2011 Political Studies Association
What I would like to do in this article is threefold. First, I would like to sketch the
anatomy of the dominant perspective on civil society (which I call ‘objectivist’) by
discussing its basic postulates. Second,I would like to highlight the main problems that are
immanent to this conception. I will try to demonstrate the presence of certain blind spots,
erasures and contradictions that are constitutive of this dominant understanding.I will argue
for the need not so much to reject it outright but to try to transcend it by incorporating
it in a wider and more encompassing framework. The attempt to achieve this constitutes
the third part of the article where I propose an alternative conception of civil society that
is based upon the orientations of social actors. My argument is that an alternative to the
objectivist understanding involves treating civility and toleration as not simply being
incidental but rather as an essential aspect of a proper understanding of civil society. The
current literature’s focus on non-state organizational capacity and mobilization needs to be
complemented by (and contextualized within) a broader framework which will incorporate
the normative orientations of social actors. Finally, I propose to consider the normative
orientations along five distinct yet interrelated dimensions as they relate to civility and
engagement.
The new perspective outlined in this article attempts to combine the ontological
parameters of the dominant understanding of civil society with the normative consider-
ations and criteria that usually get overlooked or ignored. It will be argued that rather than
being occasionally and unsystematically alluded to in passing, the specifically‘civil’ property
of social interactions should be recognized as the formative principle of civil society.
Reframing our understanding of civil society in this manner promises qualitatively to
improve our understanding of civil society above and beyond what the currently dominant
objectivist view has to offer in at least three ways: it can clarify civil society’s contribution
to democracy; it can instruct us regarding civil society’s cross-cultural applicability as a
concept; and finally it can help us assess the political value of this concept.
The Anatomy of the Objectivist Perspective on Civil Society
The commonly held view regards civil society as a socio-political entity that is ontologically
distinct from the state on the one hand and family on the other. In this view, civil society
is understood as the totality of objectively present non-state organizational resources and
capacities. I will refer to this conception as the objectivist conception of civil society. This
view of civil society has two main postulates.
Postulate 1: Civil society as a set of institutions, organizations and groups is an entity that
exists ‘out there’ whose material properties (strength,size, structure, etc.) can be objectively
observed and assessed. This constitutes the ontological aspect of the common definition of
civil society; it emphasizes the‘ontolog ical autonomy’ of civil society as an objective entity.
The objectivist perspective assesses the strength of civil society by looking at the various
characteristics of civil societal organizations (CSOs). A researcher who employs the objec-
tivist conception typically asks how many CSOs operate in a country, how many members
they have, how effectively these members are mobilized, what issue areas these CSOs
operate in and what resources they command (financial, political, cultural). They also pay
attention to the character of membership; whether it is active or passive,due paying or not,
multiple or single-issue oriented, etc.
322 AYHAN AKMAN
© 2011The Author.Political Studies © 2011 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2012, 60(2)
To continue reading
Request your trial