Blame Games and Climate Change: Accountability, Multi-Level Governance and Carbon Management
| Author | Ian Bache,Greg Marsden,Ian Bartle,Matthew Flinders |
| Date | 01 February 2015 |
| Published date | 01 February 2015 |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-856X.12040 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
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doi: 10.1111/1467-856X.12040
B J P I R : 2 0 1 5 V O L 1 7 , 6 4 – 8 8
Blame Games and Climate Change:
Accountability, Multi-Level Governance
and Carbon Management
Ian Bache, Ian Bartle, Matthew Flinders and Greg Marsden
Research Highlights and Abstract
•
This article provides the first detailed and evidence-based account of the coalition
government’s approach to transport-related carbon management.
•
It exposes the existence of a ‘governance vacuum’ between the statutory target and
a very weak devolved implementation system (i.e. ‘fuzzy governance’ and ‘fuzzy
accountability’).
•
Research in four major city regions reveals a systemic switch from an emphasis on
carbon management and reduction towards economic growth and job creation.
•
Officials within the policy design and delivery chain emphasise the manner in which
the demands of democratic politics tend to frustrate meaningful policy change.
•
A general demand by actors at the local level not for the discretions delivered by
localism but for a more robust and centrally managed—even statutory—governance
framework.
The Climate Change Act 2008 received global acclaim for embedding an ambitious set of targets
for the reduction of carbon emissions in legislation. This article explores the policies and institu-
tional frameworks in place to deliver transport-related carbon reductions as part of the subsequent
Carbon Plan. A detailed methodology involving institutional mapping, interviews and focus groups
combined with a theoretical approach that combines the theory of multi-level governance with the
literature on ‘blame avoidance’ serves to reveal a complex system of ‘fuzzy governance’ and ‘fuzzy
accountability’. Put simply, it reveals there are no practical sub-national implementation levers for
achieving the statutory targets. Apart from symbolic or rhetorical commitments, the emphasis of
policy-makers at all levels in the delivery chain has switched from carbon management and
reduction to economic growth and job creation. This raises fresh research questions about the
pathologies of democratic competition and future responses to the climate change challenge.
Keywords: governance; public policy; delegation; depoliticisation
‘As climate change has moved from the possible to the probable’ Dieter Helm and
Cameron Hepburn (2009, 4) note ‘and as scientists have both refined our knowl-
edge of the processes and the predictions of the consequences, climate-change
policy has not kept pace [emphasis added]’. Anthony Giddens (2009, 4) goes as far to
suggest that ‘we have no politics of climate change’, whilst David Orr (2009) argues
that a combination of political negligence and a disdain for the wellbeing of future
generations have brought global society to a crucial tipping-out. The question
© 2014 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2014
Political Studies Association
B L A M E G A M E S A N D C L I M AT E C H A N G E
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these studies—and many others—promote is ‘why has so little been achieved?’
Theoretically this article seeks to engage with this question by drawing upon the
concept of multi-level governance (MLG) in a way that is sensitive to ‘the politics
of blame-avoidance’. Empirically it deploys a case study of the changing interplay
between central and local government in the United Kingdom (UK) in relation to
sustainable transport and carbon emissions reduction. The existence of a statutory
and ambitious target for carbon reductions, under the Climate Change Act 2008,
alongside measures that have sought to decentralise powers to the local level, under
the Localism Act 2011, make the UK a particularly attractive case study of MLG in
general, and the politics of climate change, in particular.1
What this research reveals is an accountability vacuum within an increasingly
complex architecture of MLG; despite the existence of a high-profile statutory target
at the national level detailed research reveals that although there is a top-down
delegation of responsibility for transport emissions management to local authorities
there are no bottom-up systems of accountability anywhere in the UK for interven-
tions in transport governance that are explicitly connected to a national target. If
anything the research reveals a complex architecture of ‘fuzzy governance’ and
‘fuzzy accountability’ that when set against the literature on ‘blames games’ and
‘blame avoidance’ begins to suggest that politicians may create or tolerate increas-
ingly complex and fluid governance structures as a rational self-defence mechanism
when faced with apparently intractable socio-political challenges. More specifically,
what this research reveals is a sophisticated awareness amongst actors in the
delivery chain about the manner in which the nature of democratic politics (i.e.
short-term, risk averse, etc.) frustrates the pace of reform (qua Helm and Hepburn
2009, above). As such this article attempts to make a distinctive contribution to the
existing research base in at least five ways.
(1)
Theoretically: Although the concept of MLG has emerged as a dominant
concept within political science (and beyond) very few studies have focused
specifically on the issue of accountable governance and none have sought to
integrate the insights of ‘the politics of blame avoidance’.
(2)
Technically: Although a great deal of scientific, technical and economic
research and analysis has been undertaken in relation to climate change
mitigation in transport very little has drawn upon the insights of political
science.
(3)
Empirically: Studies that examine the implementation of policy in domestic
contexts, given the different political and administrative structures and the
trend towards decentralisation of powers to provincial and local authorities,
remain exceptional.
(4)
Temporally: The article provides the first detailed analysis of recent reforms in
the UK that have sought to shift the balance of power towards local govern-
ance vis-à-vis transport which, in turn, raise broader questions about ‘credible
commitment’ dilemmas.
(5)
Normatively: By seeking to emphasise the climate change challenge and
suggesting that the existence of ‘fuzzy governance’ and ‘fuzzy accountability’
produce certain benefits for politicians this article challenges depoliticised
accounts of MLG.
© 2014 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2014 Political Studies Association
BJPIR, 2015, 17(1)
66
I A N B A C H E E T A L .
A multi-levelled account of this article might therefore identify three inter-related
analytical levels or lenses that are deployed in relation to a case study of carbon
management in the UK transport sector (Table 1, below).
At root, what this article leaves the reader with is a suggestion of complexity as a form
of statecraft. Or, put slightly differently, a picture of complexity by accident and by
design; accident in the sense that climate change is a complex socio-political issue
that does not respect political borders, is the focus of debates regarding cause
and effect, which intersects with a number of related global challenges (over-
population, resource-depletion, etc.), is largely invisible to the public (and therefore
easy to ignore), and cannot be successfully addressed by any single actor (i.e. it
demands an effective politics of MLG); but design in the sense that the climate
change challenge will—at some point—demand that elected politicians take
Table 1: A Multi-Levelled Article
Analytical lens
Emphasis
Key references
Macro The politics of climate The basis of democratic
Shearman, D. and Smith,
change and the
politics on the
J. (2008) The Climate
limits of democracy
maintenance of popular
Change Challenge
support within a
and the Failure of
relatively short
Democracy (London:
electoral cycle builds in
Pentagon Press).
short-termism and
creates incentives for
politicians avoid
making tough (i.e.
unpopular) decisions.
Meso Multi-level governance The capacity of national
Piattoni, S. (2010) The
politicians to control a
Theory of Multi-Level
range of functions and
Governance (Oxford:
policy areas has
Oxford University
become less direct due
Press).
to a combination of
increasingly complex
bureaucratic structures
(above and below the
nation state) and the
existence of a range of
challenges that defy
geographical
boundaries.
Micro Blame avoidance and
Politicians will prioritise
Hood, C. (2010) The Blame
blame games
the avoidance of blame
Game (Princeton, NJ:
over the taking of
Princeton University
credit.
Press).
© 2014 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2014 Political Studies Association
BJPIR, 2015, 17(1)
B L A M E G A M E S A N D C L I M AT E C H A N G E
67
unpopular decisions. This is a critical point. At the heart of the politics of climate
change is less an issue of institutions and structures and more of an issue of political
will. ‘Some policies will have to have a hard edge to them’ Giddens (2009, 22)
admits, ‘many will be unpopular and actively resisted’. The insight offered by this
article is the manner in which the construction or toleration of fuzzy governance
structures facilitate a form of fuzzy accountability in which the problem of ‘many
hands’ creates a valuable shield for elected politicians. The case-study research
presented in this article concerning the levels of multi-levelled complexity and the
absence of a clear, explicit or integrated accountability system for the governance of
transport or carbon...
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