Blanket Charges Of Conspiracy In The Criminal Law
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1960.tb00619.x |
| Author | J. E. Hall Williams |
| Published date | 01 July 1960 |
| Date | 01 July 1960 |
432
THE
MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
VOL.
23
implicit in the right of the accused to
“
correct and controvert any
relevant statement brought forward to his prejudice.”
S.
A.
DE
SMITH.
BLANKET
CRARGEB
OF
CONSPIRACY
IN
THE
CRIMINAL
LAW
IN
recent years there appears to have been an increasing number of
prosecutions concerning commercial trading frauds and conduct
tending to subvert the course of justice. In such cases the charges
have frequently included a general count for conspiracy. The Court
cf Criminal Appeal has more than once protested against the
tendency to bring blanket charges of conspiracy relating to the con-
duct
of
parties over
a
number of years in relation to a variety of
transactions, but prosecutors continued to insert such counts, and
the cases of
R.
v.
Meyrick
and
Ribufi
and
R.
v.
Hammersley
did
nothing to discourage them. Now we have a very firm decision of
the Court of Criminal Appeal in
R.
v.
Dawson,
R.
v.
WenlockYs
restating the court’s position on these counts of conspiracy.
In addition to a general count alleging conspiracy to cheat and
defraud, there were fourteen charges against George Dawson, includ-
ing four counts for false pretences, six for obtaining credit by fraud,
one for fraudulent conversion, and three for other offences. He was
convicted of conspiracy and three counts of false pretences, five
counts of obtaining credit by fraud, and one of fraudulent conver-
sion; and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment on the conspiracy
count and to lesser concurrent terms on nine other counts. Albert
Wenlock, who was charged with him for the conspiracy, together
with
a
count for false pretences and for aiding and abetting Dawson
in obtaining credit by fraud, was convicted on all these charges and
sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.
Dawson appealed on the grounds,
inter
alia,
(1)
that the judge
had misdirected the jury in failing to tell them that alleged acts
of misconduct in connection with an amorphous agglomeration of
entirely separate transactions between different and unassociated
people at different times and places could not be tried as conspiracy;
and
(2)
that there was a misdirection in that the judge told the
jury to consider the whole of the circumstances of the case first in
regard to the charge of conspiracy, and then to consider the sub-
stantive counts when they had disposed of the first count. Wenlock
appealed against his conviction on the ground,
inter alia,
that the
conspiracy count in the indictment was bad in law, in that, although
it
purported to charge a general conspiracy to cheat and defraud
over a period
of
three years, in reality a number of separate con-
spiracies were charged in one count, which made
it
bad for duplicity.
The arguments against the conspiracy count found favour in the
Both men appealed.
1
(1929)
21
Cr.App.R.
94.
2
(1958) 42
Cr.App.R.
207.
3
[1960] 1
W.L.R.
163; [1960]
1
All E.R.
558.
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