Blowback or overblown? Why civilians under threat support invasive foreign intervention
| Author | Austin J Knuppe |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211044059 |
| Published date | 01 July 2022 |
| Date | 01 July 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Blowback or overblown? Why civilians
under threat support invasive
foreign intervention
Austin J Knuppe
Department of Political Science, Utah State University
Abstract
How do military tactics shape civilian support for foreign intervention? Critics contend that invasive tactics
undermine popular support by alienating the civilian population. Counterexamples suggest that civilians will support
invasive tactics when foreign counterinsurgents are willing and able to mitigate a proximate threat. I reconcile these
divergent findings by arguing that civilian support is a function of threat perception based on three interacting
heuristics: social identity, combatant targeting, and territorial control. To evaluate my theory, I enumerate a survey
among Iraqi residents in Baghdad during the anti-ISIS campaign. Respondents preferred more invasive tactics when
foreign counterinsurgents assisted the most effective local members of the anti-ISIS coalition. Across sectarian
divides, however, respondents uniformly opposed the deployment of foreign troops. These findings suggest that
in regime-controlled communities, civilians will support counterinsurgents who are invasive enough to mitigate
insurgent threats, but not too invasive as to undermine local autonomy.
Keywords
civilian support, counterinsurgency, foreign intervention, Iraq, ISIS
Introduction
How do military tactics shape civilian support for foreign
intervention in proxy conflicts? After a decade-long
attempt to win local ‘hearts and minds’ in Afghanistan
and Iraq, the United States and her allies have transi-
tioned away from population-centric counterinsurgency
(COIN) in favor of a ‘light footprint’ model. This transi-
tion was motivated by the belief that invasive tactics
undermine local support by alienating non-combatants
and triggering violent resistance against the incumbent
regime. By favoring offshore tactics – including air-
power, special operations forces, and assistance to local
proxies – coalition leaders hoped to strengthen incum-
bent regimes without alienating the civilian population.
While cases of intervention blowback abound, coun-
terexamples suggest that invasive foreign intervention
can also generate civilian support. US assistance to pro-
government militias during the troop surges in Iraq
(2007–08) and Afghanistan (2009–11) stand as promi-
nent examples. Beyond complicating the blowback
narrative, these vignettes reveal that civilians will support
invasive tactics when foreign counterinsurgents are will-
ing and able to mitigate insurgent threats. While most
civilians oppose foreign occupation, they also opportu-
nistically seek security, supporting outside intervention
that will improve access to basic needs.
I argue that public support for foreign intervention
derives from how civilians balance relative threats. Civi-
lians detect and respond to threats by drawing on three
interacting heuristics: social identity, combatant target-
ing, and territorial control. Civilians judge counterinsur-
gents’ motives and intentions based on their social
identity and how they behave on the battlefield.
Perceptions of territorial control, in turn, condition
non-combatants’ sensitivity to combatant targeting prac-
tices. Absent proximate insurgent threats, civilians will
prioritize autonomy over security and will oppose
Corresponding author:
austin.knuppe@usu.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2022, Vol. 59(4) 478–494
ªThe Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433211044059
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invasive forms of foreign intervention. A baseline aver-
sion to foreign occupation tempers instrumental support
for outside intervention, even when counterinsurgents
belong to a common in-group.
Itestmytheorybyenumeratingasurveyamong
Iraqis living in Baghdad during the campaign against the
Islamic State.
1
I find that variation in support for local
coalition partners shapes respondent preferences over
counterinsurgent tactics. Respondents favored more
invasive tactics – including foreign airpower and military
trainers – when foreign counterinsurgents assisted effec-
tive local partners like the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), but
opposed invasive tactics assisting out-group partners like
the Kurdish Peshmerga. Despite the strength of in-group
attachments, respondents uniformly opposed the
deployment of foreign combatant troops, even from
popular foreign patrons like Iran.
This study contributes a novel theory and new data
to the study of wartime civilian attitudes. Civilian
threat perception provides a consistent framework for
understanding civilian support for foreign interven-
tion. Specifically, vulnerability to local threats changes
how civilians prioritize their basic needs and in-group
attachments. On the empirical front, I collect original
survey data on Iraqi attitudes at a critical moment in
the anti-ISIS campaign. Beyond Iraq, my theory pro-
vides an analytical framework for studying civilian
preferences in proxy conflicts across different fragile
states.
I develop my argument in six parts. In the next sec-
tion, I explore existing explanations for wartime civilian
attitudes. I then offer a theoretical framework for under-
standing how civilians detect and respond to threats.
Following that, I outline Iraqi public opinion toward the
anti-ISIS coalition. I then describe how I measure and
identify civilian preferences for foreign intervention.
Next, I discuss the main findings of the Baghdad survey.
I conclude by considering the policy implications of my
argument and exploring opportunities for future
research.
How does foreign intervention affect civilian
support?
Civilian support reflects the degree to which non-
combatants identify with or provide material assistance
to combatants during wartime (Lyall, Imai & Blair,
2013; Lyall, Zhou & Imai, 2020).
2
It consists of a con-
stellation of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors, including
how non-combatants detect and respond to threats.
Proxy wars complicate civilian threat perception because
local combatants affiliated with regime or rebel forces are
supported by foreign patrons.
Patron–client relationships also create the potential
for blowback, or the risk that foreign intervention alie-
nates local civilians and incentivizes violent resistance
against the incumbent regime (Chomsky, 2003; John-
son, 2004; Kinzer, 2007; Walt, 2018). The risk of blow-
back is particularly acute for foreign counterinsurgents
seeking to build the capacity and legitimacy of regime
security forces (Lake, 2016; Berman, Shapiro & Felter,
2011; Berman, Felter & Shapiro, 2018; Berman & Lake,
2019).
The stakes of the blowback debate hinge on two con-
siderations. First, scholars must clarify the mechanisms
through which foreign intervention alienates local com-
munities and triggers violent retaliation. Are some tactics
inherently threatening, or do civilians use foreign coun-
terinsurgents’ tactics as a proxy for combatants’ motives
and intentions? Second, scholars must disaggregate the
relationship between civilians’ beliefs, attitudes, and
behaviors. If the logic of blowback is valid, one should
observe a shift in beliefs and attitudes – embodied as
alienation, humiliation, or revenge seeking – prior to
observing change in civilian behavior.
Foreign counterinsurgents employ different tactics to
achieve their objectives in the target state. Tactics reflect
the capabilities combatants deploy as well as how they
are used on the battlefield. When intervening in a pre-
existing civil conflict, foreign counterinsurgents often
draw on a suite of capabilities, including economic aid
and arms sales, security assistance to client security
forces, offshore airpower, and the forward deployment
of combat troops (Biddle, 2005/2006; Biddle, Macdo-
nald & Baker, 2018). Beyond capabilities, tactics include
targeting decisions, the frequency of attacks, and how
attacks are orchestrated. Crucially, the employment of
force includes not only the identity of targets (e.g. selec-
tive vs. collective violence) but also combatants’ level of
discrimination or intentionality (Gutie
´rrez-Sann &
Wood, 2017; Balcells & Stanton, 2020; Schubiger,
2021). While some capabilities provide combatants with
1
A pre-analysis plan was preregistered with Evidence in Governance
and Politics (EGAP) in November 2017 (Protocol no.
20171023AA).
2
‘Civilians’ refers to all actors living in a given territory who do not
participate in hostilities or belong to any state or non-state armed
group (Arjona, 2017).
Knuppe 479
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