Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Date1942
Year1942
CourtCourt of Appeal
[COURT OF APPEAL] BLUNT v. PARK LANE HOTEL, LIMITED, AND ANOTHER. 1942 June 8, 9, 18. LORD CLAUSON., GODDARD L.J.

Practice - Discovery - Interrogatories - Slander - Interrogatories directed to establishing adultery - Admissibility.

Interrogatories directed to establishing, in justification of words complained of as a slander, that a married woman has been guilty of unchaste conduct are admissible.

It is only in proceedings for divorce on the ground of adultery that the spouse will be protected from answering interrogatories if the answers might tend to prove the adultery, and the decision in Redfern v. Redfern [1891] P. 139 is restricted to such cases. Although Bowen L.J. said in that case (at pp. 147, 149) that discovery would not be permitted in any division of the courts in regard to a matter involving ecclesiastical punishment and censure, that can no longer be treated as correct, as the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts (except possibly as regards clerical persons and a few special matters) must now be treated as obsolete.

APPEAL from Hallett J.

On September 24, 1941, the plaintiff, a married woman, brought proceedings against Park Lane Hotel, Ld., and one Briscoe for damages for slander. By her statement of claim she alleged that on April 19, 1941, at the Park Lane Hotel the defendant, Briscoe, acting as manager of the hotel, falsely and maliciously spoke and published to two persons concerning her these words: “If you knew this woman as we do you would not have anything to do with her.” The plaintiff alleged that by these words the defendant meant and was understood to mean that she was a loose woman and was unchaste and adulterous and not fit for decent society. By his defence, the defendant, Briscoe, alleged (inter alia) that the words complained of were true in substance and in fact, and, in support of that plea, alleged by way of particulars a number of occurrences which, if proved, would show that the plaintiff had been guilty of unchastity with numerous men. On April 9, 1942, the defendant, Briscoe, applied for leave to administer to the plaintiff interrogatories which substantially went to the matters in the particulars, all the interrogatories except one being directed to establishing that on a number of occasions the plaintiff had been guilty of unchaste conduct with different men at the Park Lane Hotel and elsewhere. Master Horridge gave the defendant leave to administer the material interrogatories. Hallett J. dismissed an appeal from the master's decision, but gave the plaintiff leave to appeal. The plaintiff appealed.

Beyfus K.C. and Dare (with them Beney) for the plaintiff. It is sought to interrogate the plaintiff to obtain admissions of adultery with sundry persons and that is contrary to the unbroken rule that no form of discovery will be allowed to establish adultery: Redfern v. RedfernF1. That was a petition for dissolution of marriage, and Bowen L.J. laid it down authoritatively that in no division of the courts will discovery be permitted in regard to a matter involving forfeiture, penalties or ecclesiastical punishment or censureF2. Historically the courts have treated proceedings for divorce on the ground of adultery as criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings and the observations of Bowen L.J. were really an application of the doctrine that no one is bound to incriminate himself. Redfern v. RedfernF1 was distinguished in Elliott v. AlbertF3 on the ground that the issue there was whether there had been enticement and the interrogatories were not addressed to the issue of adultery though they might suggest it. The dicta of Maugham L.J. in the latter case that the possibility of ecclesiastical censure in such a case as the present was “fanciful” were erroneousF4.[GODDARD L.J. The object of the interrogatories here is not to prove adultery, but that the plaintiff is a loose woman.] She being a married woman, that must involve the issue of adultery, but the same principle applies to cases of fornication: Chetwynd v. LindonF5 and Finch v. FinchF6. The resulting liability to ecclesiastical censure is made clear in Cripps on Church and Clergy, 8th ed., p. 527, where it is stated that the incumbent of a parish may repel any person who is an open and notorious evil liver from taking part in a celebration of the Holy Communion. If the defence here were made out it would be established that the plaintiff is an open and notorious evil liver. [They referred also to Campbell v. CampbellF7 and Cavendish v. CavendishF8.]

Valentine Holmes for the defendant, Briscoe. Redfern v. RedfernF1 has no application except in the Divorce Court. The dictum of Bowen L.J. relied on shows that he is putting ecclesiastical punishment or censure on the same footing as penalties or forfeiture, but the generally recognized principle is that answers to interrogatories will be allowed where there is no real danger of criminal punishment flowing from them: Reg. v. BoyesF9. There is no appreciable risk of the plaintiff being brought before the ecclesiastical court for punishment or censure if she admits adultery, and the court should not, therefore, refuse to allow the interrogatories. Moreover, all that this defendant is concerned to show is that the plaintiff is an unchaste woman and that does not involve a charge of adultery. Elliott v. AlbertF10, therefore, applies. The only authority relied on is Redfern v. RedfernF11, apart from cases going back to when the ecclesiastical courts punished sin so that the same principle was applied to what was a sin in ecclesiastical law or to what was criminal in the ordinary law. It would be contrary to common sense to refuse to allow the interrogatories in the present conditions.

Beyfus K.C. replied.

Cur. adv. vult.

1942. June 18. Their Lordships read the following judgments.

LORD CLAUSON. The...

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53 cases
1 firm's commentaries
  • Jeopardy To The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination In Cross-Border Proceedings
    • Canada
    • Mondaq Canada
    • 7 December 2011
    ...privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege is best summed up in a passage of Goddard L.J., in Blunt v. Park Lane Hotel, Ltd., [1942] 2 K.B. 253 (C.A.), at p. . . . the rule is that no one is bound to answer any question if the answer thereto would, in the opinion of the judge, have......
4 books & journal articles
  • The Self-Incrimination Privilege in Care Proceedings and the Criminal Trial and ‘Shall Not Be Admissible in Evidence’
    • United Kingdom
    • Sage Journal of Criminal Law, The No. 73-1, February 2009
    • 1 February 2009
    ...liable to be convicted of any offence in theproceedings . . .’ (Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, s. 53(4) and (5)).12 [1942] 2 KB 253.The Journal of Criminal Law50 forum, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 set out todestabilise the operation of privilege, such that ......
  • Defining the Limits of the Common-Law, South African and European Privilege against Self-Incrimination
    • South Africa
    • Juta Stellenbosch Law Review No. , August 2019
    • 16 August 2019
    ...1 NZLR 461 469 34 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electronic Corp [1978] AC 547 574, per Lord Denn ing35 Blunt v Park Lane Ho tel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253, a witness may no t claim privilege w here the risk of exp osure is merely to an ext inct form of ecclesias tical forfeiture i n respect t......
  • Evolution of an Erosion
    • United Kingdom
    • Sage Journal of Criminal Law, The No. 81-2, April 2017
    • 1 April 2017
    ...345.79. I.H. Dennis, ‘Reconstructing the Law of Criminal Evidence’ (1989) 42 Current Legal Problems 21 at 41.80. Blunt v Park Lane Hotel [1942] 2 KB 253 and 257.81. A. Keane and P. McKeown, The Modern Law of Evidence, 10th edn. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013) at 615. See Criminal Ev......
  • Disclosure of information, public interest immunity and the privilege against self-incrimination in the british Virgin Islands
    • Barbados
    • Caribbean Law Review No. 9-1, June 1999
    • 1 June 1999
    ...by provisions which protect a person from unlawful search of his person and property and from unlawful entry upon his 48 Ibid. 49 [1942] 2 All E.R. 187, at p. 189. 50 Cap. 52, rev. edn. 1987. 51 Cap. 23, rev. edn. 1991. 52 See, e.g., Art. 20(7) of the Constitution of the Bahamas, which prov......

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