Book Review: Confronting Saddam Hussein: George W. Bush and the Invasion of Iraq
Published date | 01 September 2023 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231198023 |
Author | Aaron Ettinger |
Date | 01 September 2023 |
Subject Matter | Book Reviews |
Book Reviews
Melvyn P. Leffler
Confronting Saddam Hussein: George W. Bush and the Invasion of Iraq.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023, 368 pp. $27.95 (hardcover)
ISBN: 978-0-19-761077-0
Reviewed by: Aaron Ettinger (aaron.ettinger@carleton.ca), Department of Political
Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
DOI: 10.1177/00207020231198023
A cynic might dismiss sucha fortuitously timed book release as anniversary journalism.
Melvyn Leffler published Confronting Saddam Hussein in early 2023 around the
twenty-year anniversary of the US invasion of Iraq. However, Leffler was in no partic-
ular rush to publish. The book is theproduct of many years of interviews,enviable access
to the principals, and Leffler’s own extensive research over the past two decades. The
outcome is a diplomatic history of the internal decision-making within the Bush admin-
istration as it “confronted”Saddam Hussein—a peculiar characterization that I will
return to momentarily. Perhaps as a result of Leffler’s unhurried approach, the book
does not feature anything that will surprise close observers of US foreign policy.
Much of what the readerencounters has already been coveredin the voluminous scholar-
ship and journalistic accounts of the war. Still, the tale is presented clearly and accessi-
bly. If nothing else, it is good to have all this material in one place.
Leffler’s animating questions are simple: why did the Bush administration decide to
invade Iraq? Why did the war go awry so quickly? Accordingly, the book covers pri-
marily the period between the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the invasion of 18
March 2003. Its focus is the internal deliberations within the Bush administration in
the early post-9/11 environment as the Global War on Terror took shape. Leffler’s
attention on the executive and key players illustrates the dysfunctional decision-
making process and an administration whose principals were, at times, hopelessly at
odds. We know much of this already. Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld constantly fought with Secretary of State Colin Powell.
Their subordinates and deputies behaved much the same. Caught in between was
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who was unable to run an interagency
process amid the rancour. At the top, Bush did little to reconcile the factions.
International Journal
2023, Vol. 78(3) 479–495
© The Author(s) 2023
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