Book Review: Deterrence and Defense
| Date | 01 June 1962 |
| Published date | 01 June 1962 |
| Author | J. David Singer |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070206201700217 |
| Subject Matter | Book Review |
172
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
miscalculation of
the
realities
of
power and
to
a
weakening
of
relations
between
the
United
States
and
other
members
of
the
Atlantic
alliance.
Second,
there
is
a
general
acceptance
of
the
fact
that
the
United
States
can
no
longer
count
upon
automatic
and overwhelmingly
favourable
votes
in
the
General
Assembly
on
questions
about
which
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
are
at
odds.
There
is
not,
however,
agree-
ment
on
the
implications
of
this
development.
On
balance, those
con-
tributors
who
hold
or
who
have
held
official
positions
tend
to
be
more
alarmed
by
it
than
do
the
other
three.
Finally,
there
seems
to
be
a
consensus
that
while
the
Soviet Union
has
used
and
will
continue
to
use
the
United
Nations for
its
own
ends
and
would
not
hesitate
to
destroy
it,
the
United
States
must
make
an
even
greater
effort
than
in
the
past
to
maintain
and
strengthen
the
United
Nations
in
the interests
of
all
nations.
Despite
occasional
lapses into both
frustrated
cynicism
and
artless-
ness,
the
authors
of these
papers
leave
the
impression
that
they
are
well
aware
of
both
the
limitations
and
the
strengths
of
the
United
Nations
as
one
of
the
areas
of
negotiation
for
American foreign
policy.
No
serious
student
of UN
affairs
or
of
U.S.
foreign
policy
can
afford
to
disregard
these
papers, but
anyone
with
a
disposition
to
be
selective
should
at
all
costs
read
carefully
the
paper
by
Professor
Inis L.
Claude,
Jr.,
on
the
"Containment
and
Resolution
of
Disputes."
University of
A/berta
G.
R.
DAVY
DETERRENCE
AND
DEFENSE.
Toward
a
Theory
of
National
Security.
By
Glenn
H.
Snyder.
1961.
(New
Jersey:
Princeton
University
Press.
Toronto:
S.
J.
Reginald
Saunders.
ix,
294pp.
$7.80.)
In
the
past
fifteen
years,
the
members
of
the
Western
alliance have
-together
and
singly-had
to
make
a
number
of
critical
strategic
decisions,
and of these
a
great
many turned
out
to
be
irrational.
And
in
the
time required
for
the establishment
of a
more intelligent
means
of
handling
inter-nation
conflict,
we
will
have
to
make
further
choices
of
equal
significance. The
degree
to
which
we
improve
the
quality
of
these
choices
in
the
future
may
well
be a
function
of
how
widely
and
carefully this
book
is
read.
After
wading
through the
inconsistent and
anti-scientific tomes
which
have
passed
for strategic
analysis
in
the
nuclear-missile
era
Deterence
and
Defense
is
a
welcome
and exciting
breakthrough.
With
the
possible
exception
of
Schelling's
Strategy
of
Conflict,
there has
been
no
other
post-war
book
(in
English
or
French)
which
comes
closer
to
offering
a
useful
model
for
the analysis
of
strategic
choice.
What
Snyder
attempts
here
is
the
application
of
a
sophisticated
model of
decision
theory
to
military
policy,
and
to
a
considerable
extent,
the
attempt
is
successful,
Not
that
I
would
agree
with
all,
or
even
most,
of his
con-
clusions;
that
is
of
much
less
importance
in considering
this particular
book.
Basically
the author
suggests
a
mode
of
analysis
which
flows
from
two
of
the central
notions of
game
theory:
subjective
probability
and
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