Book Review: International Politics and Economics: Crisis
| Author | Leon D. Epstein |
| Published date | 01 March 1965 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070206502000114 |
| Date | 01 March 1965 |
| Subject Matter | Book Review |
118
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Ciusis.
'The
Inside
Story
of
the
Suez
Conspiracy.
By
Terence
Robertson.
1964.
(Toronto:
McClelland
&
Stewart,
xvi,
349pp.
$7.50)
Several
other
writers
on
the
Suez
crisis
of
1956
have
found
drama,
even
melodrama,
in
the
diplomatic
and
military
mysteries
of
this
strange
affair.
But
their
stories
have
usually
emphasized
the
villains.
Each
writer
has
presented
at
least
one
guilty
statesman,
be
it
Nasser,
Ben-Gurion,
Eden,
Mollet,
or
Dulles.
There
have
been no
major
heroes.
Perhaps
none
has
been
expected
to
emerge
from
an
episode
so
un-
favourable
to
Western
democratic
fortunes.
Terence
Robertson, however,
has
a
hero:
Lester
Pearson.
A
strong
case
is
made
for
Pearson's
special
skills
in
providing
the carefully
negotiated
U.N.
resolution
which
all
parties,
for
different
reasons,
would
accept.
Since
Pearson
subsequently
received
the
Nobel
Peace
Prize,
his
usefulness
on
this
occasion
is
not
an
entirely
new
revelation.
But Robertson,
enjoying
access
to
various
confidential
sources (not
only
Canadian),
presents
considerable
detail
about
Pearson's
tactical
forethought
and
intelligent
use
of
U.N.
machinery.
The
account
is
especially
good
in
its
description
of
how
Pearson
combined
sympathetic
understanding with
principled
disagreement
in
his
approach
to
Britain.
Robertson
tries
to
give
the
"inside
story"
of
the
Suez
crisis
itself
as well as
of
Pearson's
part
in it.
How well
he
succeeds
in
this
larger
purpose,
which
takes
up
most
of
the
book,
is
hard
to
say.
Perhaps
no
scholar
can
judge
by
his
own
standards.
Robertson
frankly
disclaims
scholarly ambitions.
He provides
no
documentation,
even
for
direct
quotations,
and
he
explains
that
he was
shown
papers
and
given
inter-
views
on
condition
that
the
sources
not
be
named.
There
are, therefore,
many
statements
whose
authenticity
and
accuracy
remain tantalizingly
probable.
To
cite two
of
many
examples,
there
are
verbatim reports
of
an Eden-Hammarskjold telephone
conversation
and
of
a
Dulles-Pineau
ideological
discussion
in
Karachi.
Pineau,
incidentally,
seems
to
have
been
an
important
source
for
Robertson.
This would
not
be
the
first
time
that
the
former
foreign
minister
of
France
talked
to
a
writer
on
the
Suez
crisis.
It is
not
easy
to
take
issue
with
Robertson's
unfolding
of
the
"conspiracy."
Partly
this
is
because his
story
appears
sensible
and
consistent with
most
of
the
known
facts. Perhaps
only
the actual
par-
ticipants
could
contradict
Robertson,
if
he
were
wrong,
and
many
of
these
participants, notably
American,
Israeli,
Canadian and
French,
are
listed as
having
talked
with
the author.
It is
easy,
however,
to
disagree
with
Robertson's
judgement,
in
his
epilogue,
that
the
Suez
crisis
was
in
some
way responsible
for
the
strains
of
the
North Atlantic
alliance
in
the
1960's,
and
in
particular
for
the
Kennedy
administration's
imposition
of
its
1962
Cuban
blockade
without
prior
consultation
with
its
allies.
Suez
was
important
in
our
affairs,
but
not
so
overwhelmingly
important.
University
of
Wisconsin
LEON
D.
EPSTEIN
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