Book Review: International Politics and Economics: Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970's
| Date | 01 September 1970 |
| Published date | 01 September 1970 |
| Author | John W. Holmes |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070207002500313 |
| Subject Matter | Book Review |
BooK
REVIEWS
639
an
angry
hippopotamus,"
on
the
evening
of
September
2,
enraged
at
Chamberlain's
slowness
in
declaring
war,
and
stymied
by
his
recent
entry
into
the
cabinet.
Mr.
Mosley
is
convined
that
the
Russians
would
have
fought
with
the
Czechs in
1938
if
the
West
had
supported
them.
Oddly
enough
he
glosses
over
the
army
purges and
their
effect
upon
Western
leaders.
The
recent
release
of
the
British
cabinet
papers
for
1939
does
not
materially
affect
this
exciting
book.
University
of
British
Columbia
F.
H.
SOWARD
Controlling Small
Wars:
A
Strategy for
the
1970's.
By
LINCOLN
P.
BLOOMFIELD
and
AMELIA
C.
LEIss.
New
York:
Alfred
A.
Knopf
[Toronto:
Random
House].
1969.
xiv,
421pp.
$10.95.
There
is
an
ambiguity
in
the
idea
of
"controlling"
small
wars.
Does
it
mean, in
accordance
with
much
"peacekeeping"
philosophy, simply
the
cessation
or
limitation
of
violence,
extinguishing
the
brush-fire
out
of
simple
faith
in
the
rightness
of
pacification? Or
does
it
mean
the
mani-
pulation
of
small
wars,
supporting
one
side
or
even
setting
them
up,
to
serve
either
selfish
national
interests,
the
balance
of
power,
or progress
and
peaceful
change?
It
is
the
special
virtue
of
this
book
that
the
authors
fully
understand
this
ambivalence
and
refrain
therefore
either
from
concocting
more
rigid
international
machinery
to
nip
conflict
in
the
bud
or
from
postulating
principles
of
conflict
control
other
than
some
pretty
general
and very
sensible
conclusions
drawn from
a
close
look
at
fourteen
small wars
since
1945.
Most
of
the
book
is
taken
up
with
a
remarkably
fair
and
perceptive
record
and analysis
of
five
conflicts:
the
Soviet-Iranian
conflict,
the Bay
of
Pigs,
the
Greek
insurgency,
the
Indonesian
war
of independence,
and
the
Middle
East.
Phases
of
the
conflicts
are
identified
and
the
factors
which
stimulated,
forced,
and
prolonged
or
shortened
or
terminated
hostilities.
Alongside
these
factors
are
suggested
a wide
variety
of
steps
that
might
have
been
taken
by
third
parties
to
control
the
conflict.
These
steps
are,
of course, as
the authors
point
out,
frequently
politi-
cally
absurd
and
totally
contradictory.
The
Greek,
Iranian,
and Indo-
nesian
conflicts
could
best have
been
prevented
by
not
letting
World
War
ii
happen. The
conflicts
in
Iran
and
Cuba could
have
been cut
short
by
discouraging
Iranian
and
Cuban
resistance
to
their
superpower
neighbours.
Yet
there are
many situations
noted
when
some
imaginative
or
courageous
step
by
the
United
Nations
or
the
great
powers
could
have,
or
so
it
seems,
averted
or
diverted
hostilities in
the
Middle
East.
It
is
exceedingly
valuable
to
immerse
ourselves
in
these
records
and
to
calculate
the
forces
in
perspective
even
if
the
lessons
of
history
can-
not
be reduced
to
anything
more
specific
than
a
commitment
to
inter-
vention of
a
highly
eclectic
and
discriminating kind.
There
is
no
formula,
only
the vigilant
playing
of
the
game of
international
politics.
The
book,
it
should
be
recognized,
is
not,
as
the
title
might
suggest,
a
study in
international
organization.
It
is
a
study in American
foreign
To continue reading
Request your trial