Book Review: Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan (eds), British Generals in Blair’s Wars and Christopher L Elliott, High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
| Author | Tim Oliver |
| Published date | 01 August 2016 |
| Date | 01 August 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1478929916644550 |
| Subject Matter | Book ReviewsBritain and Ireland |
464 Political Studies Review 14 (3)
British Generals in Blair’s Wars by Jonathan
Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan (eds).
Farnham: Ashgate, 2013. 385pp., £19.95 (p/b), ISBN
9781409437369
High Command: British Military Leadership
in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars by
Christopher L Elliott. London: C Hurst & Co,
2015. 288pp., £25.00 (h/b), ISBN 9781849044608
In the time that Britain has been awaiting the
outcome of the Chilcot Inquiry, a plethora of
books has emerged to serve as primers to the
report into Britain’s role in the Iraq War. High
Command and British Generals in Blair’s Wars
are two members of this growing collection of
works written by the former soldiers, politi-
cians and civil servants who played a part in
Britain’s involvement in the post-9/11 con-
flicts. Linking the books, both products of
Oxford University’s ‘Changing Character of
War programme’, is an attempt to get to grips
with how Britain, and in particular the British
Army, found themselves in the mess they did in
both Iraq and Afghanistan. In neither conflict
were Britain’s strategic ends, ways and means
clearly defined nor adequately provided for. As
both books argue, this was not simply the result
of failings by Prime Minister Tony Blair or
other individuals such as senior officers and
civil servants. Their failings were part of a dys-
functional relationship within and between the
political and operational levels of these con-
flicts. The result was that on a good day, all that
Britain and her military could do was muddle
through. On the bad days – of which there were
many – it led to unnecessary deaths and strate-
gic defeat.
High Command: British Military
Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
takes us into the inner workings of the
Ministry of Defence (MoD) and British mili-
tary. By exploring such issues as poor man-
agement, difficult career structures, laughable
procurement systems, sloppy training, doc-
trine and thinking, long-running funding
inadequacies, strained relations with the rest
of Whitehall and so forth, the book not only
gives an insight into the MoD (one familiar to
anybody with knowledge of UK defence mat-
ters) but also in doing so picks over a politi-
cal-bureaucratic-military system that was
destined to fail in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Christopher Elliott’s analysis is of an institu-
tion where nobody seems to have been in
charge and where senior officers can today
claim to have been in the dark over major stra-
tegic decisions. While a great deal of blame
can be and is directed at Blair, as Elliot points
out, senior officers tolerated a dysfunctional
MoD that made things worse. These officers
receive some analysis, but Elliot doesn’t stick
the bayonet into whoever he thinks is most to
blame. Instead, he sets out each officer’s
strengths and weaknesses, mistakes and sound
decisions. This is despite him rightly pointing
out that no senior officer (or civil servant or
politician) has been demoted, sacked, disci-
plined, charged or faced any other form of
official punishment for failings in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Sadly, the book’s recommenda-
tions for changes have been overtaken by
actual reforms, some of which happened long
before the book was published.
British Generals in Blair’s Wars provides
us with more detailed mini autobiographies of
recent senior officers. Drawing on their experi-
ences of conflicts since 1990, albeit with a
focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, the book offers
insights from 23 senior officers with a few
pieces from others. The chapters vary in qual-
ity, some better written and more cerebral than
others. Given the breadth of experience on
offer, it comes as no surprise that each chap-
ter’s conclusions can often be more wide-rang-
ing than the narrow focus of the case study
presented within the preceding pages. The
result is a book that can be read as a series of
pleas to future commanders to learn the lessons
from an exceptional time for the British Army;
exceptional in no small part because as junior
officers these authors prepared to play a bit
part in a global nuclear war and not the con-
flicts that defined the culmination of their
careers. Officer education (or lack of it), learn-
ing from past mistakes and the challenge of
adapting to the changing character of war arise
throughout the book. Learning requires open
and frank discussion, which is not easy when
the MoD appears hostile to investing in train-
ing or allowing open discussion. It is no sur-
prise that the MoD refused to allow six
contributions from serving officers to be pub-
lished in the volume.
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