Book Review: Military and Scientific Affairs: Civilian Nuclear Power
| Author | J. W. Hilborn |
| Published date | 01 March 1964 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070206401900119 |
| Date | 01 March 1964 |
| Subject Matter | Book Review |
94
INTERNATIoNAL
JounwAL
might
have
given
...
or
the Emperor
in
Rome
...
but
the
American
republic
had
no
legions."
Fehrenbach has
assumed
the
role
of
spokesman
for
a
professional
army
that
had
bowed
to
public
clamour
after
the
Second
World
War
and
"democratized"
itself,
returning
"to
the
bosom
of
a
permissive
society". His
thesis
is
that
citizen
armies,
when
raised
to
protect
the
homeland or
to
engage
in
a
great
cause,
can
perform
adequately,
but
that
distant
frontiers
with
their
limited
wars
are
no
place
for
them.
The
"far
frontier"
can
only
be
garrisoned
successfully
by
professionals
with
their
own
special
traditions
of
discipline. He proves
his
point,
although
it
should
not
have
been
necessary
to
do
so
at
such
length.
Chapter
after
chapter
deals
with the
battlefield
blunders,
the
tragic
lack
of
training
and
physical
fitness
and
the
initial
inadequacy
of
the
American
weapons.
But
there
is so
much
of
it! It
goes
on
and
on
and
on,
in
one-
and
two-sentence
paragraphs
with
no
let-up,
no
relief,
and
little
change
of
pace.
The
book
becomes
in
time a
vast,
indigestible
dish
of
excitement
and indignation.
On
the
level
of
policy
and
strategy
this
style
is
particularly
inappro-
priate.
Here
the
history
is
oversimplified
and,
as
a
result,
some
of
it
is
incorrect.
In
one
of
his
rare
references
to
Canadians,
the
author
says
(with
reference
to
the
Koje
Island
scandal)
"the
sending
of
Common-
wealth
troops raised a stink;
Van
Fleet
caught
hell
for
ordering
them
to
Koje
and
the Canadian
Brigadier,
whose
Nation
had never
accepted
the
enmity
of
Red
China, was
relieved."
Quite
aside
from
the
literary
merit
of
this
passage,
it
is
totally
incorrect.
It
was
Mark Clark,
not
Van
Fleet,
who
ordered
the
Commonwealth
troops
to
Koje,
the
Canadian
Brigadier
was
not
relieved
of
his command,
and
it
is
preposterous
to
state
that
Canada,
whose soldiers
were
being
killed
along
the parallel,
had refused
to believe
in
the
enmity
of Red
China. This tendency
towards
hyperbole
leads
him
into
stating:
"Misguided
officials
...
had
mistakenly thought
that
Communists
were
human
beings."
The
result
of
all
this
is
an
uneven
book,
that
overstates its
thesis
and
oversimplifies
its
politics.
Nevertheless,
Fehrenbach
has
performed
a
useful
task.
Canada was
able
to
escape
the
consequences
of
unpre-
paredness
in
both
world
wars
and
in Korea,
thanks
to
great
allies
that
took
the
initial
brunt
of
it
upon
themselves.
It
would
be
optimistic,
if
not
dishonest,
to
hope
that
this
could
ever happen
to
Canada
again.
"Being
prepared"
in
the
missile
age
is
a
far
more
complex
problem
than
it
was
in
1950,
but
Fehrenbach's
warning
is
still
uncomfortably
valid.
Army
Historical
Section,
Ottawa
H.
F.
WOOD
CVjIvfLAN
NUCLEAR
PowER.
Economic
Issues
and
Policy
Formation.
By
Phillip
Mullenbach.
1963.
(New
York:
Twentieth
Century
Fund.
xiv,
406pp.
$8.50)
This
study
of
civilian
nuclear
power
in
the
United
States
Is
"intended
to
provide
an
evaluation
of
policy
formation
that
is
based
on
an
economic
analysis
of
the
issues
underlying
power
reactor
develop-
To continue reading
Request your trial