Book Review: Military and Scientific Affairs: Prelude to Pearl Harbor
| DOI | 10.1177/002070206401900117 |
| Published date | 01 March 1964 |
| Date | 01 March 1964 |
| Author | John P. Campbell |
| Subject Matter | Book Review |
92
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
state
"it
is conceivable
that
a
war
of
the
size
of
World
War
II
would
be
fought without
its
expanding
or
exploding
into
central
war".
This
is
a
measure
of
the
escalation
in
analytical
thinking
which
has
occurred
in
recent
years.
The
book
should
prove
particularly
valuable
for
its
analysis
of
the
policies
and
concepts of
both
the
Americans
and the
Sino-Soviet
bloc
with
respect
to
the
use
of force
and
of
the
effect
of
interaction
between
adversaries.
The
Korean
War
is examined
in
some
detail
to
support
this analysis.
While
this
is
interesting,
it
is
outdated
and
the
conclu-
sions
may
be
a
little
misleading.
As
the
author
himself
notes,
the
Korean
War
predated
the
era
of
intercontinental
ballistic
missiles
and
thermonuclear
weapons.
He
even
suggests
that
the
American
decision
not
to
use
atomic weapons was
a
conservative
measure,
rather
than
one
taken
out
of
regard for the
enemy.
The
last
two
chapters
consider
possible
limitations
in
central
war
and a
strategy
for
Americans.
These
are
disappointing.
Lacking
any
discussion
of
the
circumstances
which
might
lead
to
a
war
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States,
it
is
difficult
to
accept
some
of
the
proposed
limitations
as
realistic.
Mr.
Halperin
cannot
be
blamed
for
all
of
this,
as
some is
a
reflection
of
policy
statements
by
senior
American
government
officials.
One
senses
a
policy
of
despair
in
sen-
tences
such
as "unless
the
proper
steps
are
taken
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet Union
may
be
forced
into
an
unrestrained
central
war
because
that
is
the
only
way
they
can
use
their
strategic
forces."
Mr.
Halperin's
theories
appear
to
favour stalemates
rather
than
winners
and
losers.
This
seems
a
doubtful
conclusion
for
a
direct
confrontation
with
national
prestige
at
stake.
If
a
distinction
had
been
made
between
Congo-type
limited
wars
and
a
clash
between
Americans
and Russians,
his
arguments
would
be
valid
in the
former.
However,
more
attention
should
have
been
paid
to
deterrence
in
discussing
the
latter.
There
is
an excellent
annotated
bibliography
of
343
references
up
to
the
middle of
1962.
This
in
itself
makes
the
book
useful
to
the
student
of
future
conflict.
Department
of
National
Defence,
Ottawa
J.
C.
ARNELL
PaRLUDE
To
PEARL
HARBOR.
The
United
States
Navy and
the
Far
East,
1921-1931.
By
Gerald
E.
Wheeler.
1963.
(Columbia,
Missouri:
University
of
Missouri
Press.
xii,
21
2
pp.
$5.95)
As
its
subtitle
suggests,
this
study
hardly
belongs
on
those
shelves
of
the
Pearl
Harbor
library
where
demonology
masquerades
as
history.
It
is in
fact
an
investigation,
meticulously
documented,
of
the
problems
raised
for the
U.S.
Navy
in
the
'twenties by
an
anticipated
head-on
collision
between
Japanese
expansionism
and
American
material inter-
ests
in
the
Philippines
and spiritual
devotion
to the
Open
Door.
Despite
the
crippling
limitations
on
the
Navy's
effectiveness
west
of
Hawaii
written
into
the
Washington
treaties,
American
naval leaders
concen-
trated
their
power
after
1922
in
the
Pacific,
only
to
have
the
menace
of
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