Book Review: Military and Scientific Affairs, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939–1945
| Author | G. C. Laurence |
| Date | 01 June 1965 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070206502000215 |
| Published date | 01 June 1965 |
| Subject Matter | Book Review |
BOOK
REVIEWS
255
The
total
economic
cost
of
the
operation
to
Britain
alone
was
close
to
£300
million,
on
top
of
a
heavy
political
price:
Britain
ceased
to
be
regarded
in
the
Middle
East
as
a
viable
power-state;
it
suffered
a
domestic
upheaval, and
witnessed
the
pitiful self-destruction
of
a
statesman,
whose
inadequacy
few
could
forgive.
Colonel
Barker's
account
is
disturbing
when
one
considers
that
"Musketeer"
was
the
product
of
an
ostensibly
deliberate planning
process involving two
major
NATO
powers
of
the
day.
They
waged
war
for
seven
days.
That
Was
Some
Week
That
Was.
Toronto
H.
PAUL
SIMON
BRITAIN
AND
ATOMIC
ENERGY
1939-1945.
By
Margaret
Gowing.
1964.
(London:
Toronto: Macmillan.
xvi,
464pp.
$11.00)
Margaret
Gowing,
a careful
historian,
recounts
in
this
book
the
events,
as
seen
by
British
eyes,
that
led
falteringly
to
Hiroshima
and
thrust
us
into a
different world.
An
introductory
chapter
by
Kenneth
Jay
provides
some
scientific
background
in
simple
language. Enormous
effort would
be
needed
to
develop
an
atomic
bomb.
With
the
difficulties
in
Britain
under
the
blitz
it
was
felt
that
the
atomic
energy
scientists
there
should
be
transferred
to America
to
participate
in
the
growing
programme
in
the
United
States.
Eventually
this
was
done
and
British
scientists
made
important
contributions
in
a
joint research
effort,
but
there
was
nearly
three years
of
frustrating
negotiation
before limited
collaboration
of
Britain
and
the
United
States
in
nuclear
research
was
established.
The Americans
felt
that
it
would
be
too
great
a
security
risk to
have
the
atomic scientists
in
England participate
in
their
programme.
They
were
chiefly
refugee
scientists from
countries
in
Europe
that
were
overrun
by
the
Nazis;
nearly all
British
scientists
were
occupied
with
other
war
research.
By
the
time
the
British
had
finally
decided
that
the
scientists
should
move,
the
American
programme
was
organized
and
advanced.
There
appeared
to
be
no
unsurmountable
obstacles
to
final
success
without
assistance
by
European
scientists.
The
scientists
in
Britain
considered
it
unjust
that
they
should
not
be
allowed
to
take
part.
Their
efforts
and
their
research
had
awakened
the
United
States
to
the
importance
of
the
atomic
bomb
and had
con-
vinced
them
that
success
was
possible.
The group
in
England
also
had
doubts
about
some
of
the
American
plans
and
they
felt
that
their
help
was
needed.
Beginning
December
1942
the
British-Canadian atomic
energy
labo-
ratory
was established
in
Montreal
in
anticipation
of
close
collaboration
with
the
United
States.
Eight
months
later
at
the
Quebec
Conference
Churchill
and
Roosevelt
agreed
on
co-operation
between
their
countries
with
Canadian
participation.
Another
eight
months passed before
the
Americans
moved
to
fulfill
the
agreement.
The
British
felt
that
the
Americans
were
failing
to
keep
their
bargain.
A
tactless
letter
from
a
leading
American
scientist
stating
their
position severely
tested
British
cool-headedness.
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