Book Review: Military and Scientific Affairs: Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads
| DOI | 10.1177/002070206502000418 |
| Published date | 01 December 1965 |
| Date | 01 December 1965 |
| Subject Matter | Book Review |
546
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
which
occur
from
sacrifices of
time
and
quality,
and
the
effect
of
short-run
efficiency
measures
which
may inhibit
his
potential
to
under-
take
future
programmes.
Cost
reduction
incentives
are
more
apparent
in
the
production phase with
the
employment
of
such
devices
as
com-
petitive
bidding,
breakout
and
second
sourcing.
The
author
recommends
as an
alternative
to
the
present
incentive
approach
the
use
of
after-the-fact evaluation
of
performance,
whereby
the
contractor
with
a
good
performance
record
is
permitted
growth
in
sales
volume
and
the
poor
contractor
disappears.
Performance
be-
comes
the
basis
for
source
selection,
and
the
firm's
future
level
of
effort
is
correlated
to
past
performance.
This keeps
high
performance
firms
in
business.
The incentive
to
perform
well
on
current
contracts
in
order
to enhance
the
possibility
of
winning
future
programmes
is
strong.
In
the
past,
little
emphasis
has
been
placed
on
past
performance
in
the
selection
of
contractors.
In this
book
the author
has
given a
detailed
critical
review
of
the
various
types
of
incentives
employed.
He
has
undertaken
this
work
in
a
courageous
fashion
and has
given
a
clear
appreciation
of
the
basic
issues
involved
and
the alternatives
available.
He
makes
a
reasoned
and
judicious
case
for
alternative
incentive
methods
rather
than the
imposition
of
additional
control
over
contractor
operations
to
overcome
the
short-comings
of
the
present
system.
Ottawa
C.
F.
POUND
SOVIET
STRATEGY
AT
THE
CROSSROADS.
By
Thomas
W.
Wolfe.
1964.
(Cam-
bridge:
Harvard
University
Press.
Toronto:
Saunders.
x,
342pp.
$5.95)
Les
premiere
et
deuxi~me
editions
de
l'oeuvre
du
g~nLral
Sokolov-
ski,
"Military
Strategy",
livraient
pour
la
premiere
fois
au
public
occidental
une
importante
documentation
sovi~tique
sur
les
probl~mes
militaires.
L'oeuvre
de
Thomas
W.
Wolfe
vient
completer
ce
pr~cieux
recueil.
L'auteur
entreprend
de
dresser
un
bilan
des
controverses
strat&-
giques,
essentiellement
depuis
la
crise
cubaine.
Une
premiere
conclu-
sion,
qui
n'6tonne
guere
le
lecteur,
insiste
sur
l'absence
d'un
mono-
lithisme
strat~gique
au
sein
des
experts
militaires.
"In
fact
there has
been
a
continuous
tributary
stream
of
debate
within
the
military
itself,
with 'modernist'
and
'traditionalist'
outlooks
at
each
end
of
the
spectrum
and
a body
of
'centrist'
opinion
in
the
middle".
(p.
30-
31)
I1
ressort
que
les
"modernistes" ont
6pousL
avec
plus
ou
moins
de
sympathie
les
vues
de
M.
Khroutchev,
que
le
mar6chal
Malinovski
s'est
efforc6
d'adopter
une
attitude
mod~r~e
(p.
33),
et
que l'Arm~e
se
situe
vraisemblablement parmi
les
"traditionalistes".
Ces
conclusions
sont particuli~rement justes
si
nous
tenons
compte
du
fait
que l'Arm~e
sovi~tique
eft
partiellement
gain
de
cause,
du
moins
en
ce
qui concerne
son
organisation
et sa
structure,
apres
l'6viction
au
pouvoir
de
Khrout-
chev.
I1
est
vraisemblable
que
l'Union
sovistique
poursuivra
le
d~veloppe-
ment
de
ses
engins
t&1guidss
A
une
allure
accOl~r~e,
malgr6
les
oppo-
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