Book Review: Military and Scientific Affairs: Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic
| Author | Michael Sherman |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070206602100319 |
| Date | 01 September 1966 |
| Published date | 01 September 1966 |
| Subject Matter | Book Review |
382
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
using
aircraft-carrers
to
pursue
raiders
and
thus
helped
blind
British
sailors
to
the
value and
effectiveness of
carrier
task
forces.
Having
said
all
this,
it
is
with
some
reluctance
that
this
notice
must
end
on
a
slightly
sour note.
There
are
a
number
of
places
m
which
sentences
are
not
clear, and
there
are
a
few
awkward
phrases
such
as
"the
general
French-English
struggle"
(p.
132.
Why
not
Angio-
French')
and
"Grenville's
magniflcant
but
futile
death
fight"
(p.
157),
which
might
have
been
more
skilfully
edited.
Nevertheless,
we
stand
indebted
to
Schurman
for
this
work.
Kansas
State
Unsversity
ROBIN
HIGHAM
ATOMIC
ENERGY
POLICY
IN
FRANCE
UNDER
THE
FOURTH
REPUBLIC.
By
Lawrence Schemman.
1965.
(Princeton:
Princeton
Umversity
Press.
Toronto:
Saunders.
xxiv
259pp.
$6.50)
Amid
the current
concern
over
the
prospect
of
nuclear
proliferation,
analysts
have
a
tendency
to
concentrate
on
the
policy
problems
of
the
moment.
All
energies
are
focused
on
those non-nuclear countries
which
appear
to
be
nearing
the
nuclear
threshold.
But
this
approach
ignores
the
fact
that
even
after
a nation
has
"gone
nuclear,
those
worried
about
nuclear
spread
may still
want
to
ask
several
questions
about
it.
First,
by
what
process
did
the
nation
decide
to
enter
the
nuclear
club
Secondly
can
we
learn
anything
about
the
general
problem
of
prolifera-
tion
from
this
particular
experience.
Thirdly,
does
the
background
of
the
nation's nuclear
programme
suggest
anything
about
how
it
is
likely
to
use
(whether
militarily
diplomatically
etc.)
its
atomic
weapons
9
On
all
these
questions, Mr.
Schemman
has
many
interesting things
to
say
He
lays
to
rest
the
theory
born
of
North
America's
irritation
with
President
de
Gaulle,
that
the
French
nuclear
programme
is
the
enterprise
of one
wilful political
leader
obsessed
by
a
mistaken
notion
of
grandeur
That
programme
antedates
the
General
and
will
survive
him:
it
reflects
a
great
deal more
about
France-her
aspirations,
inten-
tions
and
political
processes-than
the
will
of
a
single
man.
At
once
the
most intriguing
and
disturbing
aspect
of
Mr.
Schein-
man's
study
is
a
conclusion epitomized
in
the
distinction
between
the
French
bomb
effort
on
the
one
hand,
and
those
of
the
United
States
and
Great
Britain
on
the
other.
In
the
latter
two
cases,
the
decision
to
embark
on
a
nuclear
weapons
programme
was
taken,
"after
some
urging
by
scientists,
by
the
responsible political
authorities as
a
matter
of
positive
public
policy.
From this
decision,
flowed
action
by
the
appropriate
executory
agencies.
But
in
France,
"the situation
was
re-
versed. The
action
of
responsible
political leadership
was the
last
in
a
long
chain
of
events.
Long
before
de Gaulle's
return
to
power,
the
Commissariat
A
l'Energie
Atomique
(Atomic
Energy
Commission)
was
prodding
indifferent
Parliaments
and
drifting
governments
toward
the
door
of
the
nuclear
bomb
club.
Carleton University
MICHAEL
SHERMAN
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