Book Review: Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin
| Published date | 01 March 1963 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070206301800124 |
| Author | John Greer Nicholson |
| Date | 01 March 1963 |
| Subject Matter | Book Review |
112
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
SOVIET
FOREIGN
POLIcY
AFTER
STALIN.
By
David
J.
Dallin.
1961.
(New
York:
Lippincott.
Toronto:
McClelland
&
Stewart.
xii,
543pp.
$9.00.)
In
his
preface
David
Dallin
defines
his
aim as
follows:
to
review
the "constants
and
variables"
of Soviet
foreign
policy since
Stalin.
In
his
view
Khrushchev
has
"taken
over
Stalin's
main
ideas
and
goals
in
foreign
affairs."
The
author
has
built
up
a
very coherent
edifice.
The
whole
work
moves
logically
toward
its
"Conclusion,"
in
which
Dallin
expresses
his belief
that
"in
the
course
of
time
Russia
will
have
to
return
to
her
own
shores"
since
empires as
large
as
Stalin's
Russia
"are
bound
to fall."
Dallin
has
been
particularly
successful
in
considering
the
genesis
and growth
of
centrifugal
tendencies
within
the
"socialist
camp."
Recent
events
have
tended
to
confirm
the
strength
of
these centrifugal
tendencies.
(His
book
was
largely
completed
by
the
end
of
1960.)
The
principal
sources
on
which
the author
relies
are
the
newspapers
and
journals
of
East
and
West.
He
also
makes
fairly
heavy
use
of
sources
whose
identity
he
prefers
not
to
reveal
at
present.
These
are
labelled
"D
papers"
in
the
footnotes.
Dallin
promises
access
to
them
to
anyone who
can prove his
legitimate
interest.
Much
of
the
"D"
evidence
seems
to
originate
with
defectors
and
a
fairly
large
number
of
the
references
concern
Poland
and
Korea.
It
should
be
pointed
out
in
all
fairness
that
there
is
nothing
inherently
improbable
or
suspect
in
this
testimony
of
undisclosed
origin.
Although
in
recounting
the
events
of
recent
history
it
is
perhaps
impossible
to
be
original, Dallin's
merit
is
in his
common-sense
selection
of
the
most
probable
hypothesis
in
many
cases.
Thus,
in
discussing
the
Hungarian
uprising
of
1956
he
discards
as
inaccurate
the
theory
that
the
USSR
wished
to
deceive
Imre
Nagy
and
gain
time
from
the
very
beginning.
As
confirmation
of
Soviet
policy
vacillation
at
that
time
Dallin
cites
Soviet
domestic
news
media
as
late
as
November
1
and
2,
1956,
when
some
optimism
about
the
situation
under
Nagy was
still
being
expressed.
Dallin
believes
the
decision
to
intervene
with
military
force
was
taken
on
or
about
November
1,
after
Nagy's
decision
to
leave
the
Warsaw
Pact
and
declare
neutrality.
Dallin
adduces
the
interesting
view
that
Anastas
Mikoyan
was to
the
end
opposed
to
military
intervention
in
Hungary.
In
his conclusion
the author
emphasizes
Khrushchev's
disappoint-
ment
with
the
behaviour
of
the
neutrals
and
notes
that
Moscow
had
greatly
overestimated
the
value
of
financial
assistance
as
a
political
lever. Dallin
feels
that
Soviet
adventures
in Africa
and
the
Caribbean
cannot
change
the
essentially
continental
nature
of
Soviet
national
growth.
For
the
USSR,
he
asserts,
the
rebirth
of
France
and
Germany
as
European
powers
is
the "overriding
development
of
the
current
era."
He
is
clearly
sound
when
he emphasizes
that
the
USSR
con-
sistently
underestimates
France
as
a
great
power
and
overestimates
Germany.
The
latter
aberration
is
in
part
traceable
to
Marxist
tradi-
tions
and
in
part
to
the
devastation
wrought
by
Hitler
in
Russia.
To continue reading
Request your trial