Book Review: The Necessity for Choice
| Date | 01 June 1962 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070206201700215 |
| Published date | 01 June 1962 |
| Author | H. B. Mayo |
| Subject Matter | Book Review |
170
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
THE
NEcEssrrY
FOR
CHOICE.
Prospects
of
American
Foreign
Policy.
By
Henry
A.
Kissinger.
1961.
(New
York:
Harper
&
Bros.
Toronto:
The
Musson
Book
Co.
xii,
370pp.
$6.50.)
The
military
analyst
is
a
type
of
writer
that
the
cold
war
has
pro-
duced
in
large
numbers.
His
focus,
though
not
his exclusive
attention,
is
upon
the
use
of
weapons,
largely
one
supposes because
of
the
in-
vention
of
nuclear
weapons
and
the
consequent
nature
of possible
future
war.
Often he
plays
elaborate
games:
if
the
enemy
has
this
weapon
and
we
have
that,
and
he
does
so
and
so,
what
should
our
side
do?
And
vice
versa.
These games
of chess
are
played
for
the
very
highest stakes,
and
the
layman
is
often
repelled
by
the
cold-blooded
manipulation
of
nations
and
the
sacrifice
of
people, even
though
it
is
all
done
on
paper.
Nevertheless,
we
must
be
realists:
governments
and
their
advisers
must
and
do
make these
calculations,
and
in
a
democracy
it
is
probably a
good
thing
that
they
should
be
published
and
debated.
Mr.
Kissinger
is
one of
the
very best
of
the
military
analysts.
Though weapons
dominate
his chess,
other
pieces
and
players
are
in
the
game
too.
In a
nutshell
his
chief
argument
is
this:
The
West
is in
a
desperate
condition,
since
the
United
States
has
no
invulnerable
retalia-
tory
force,
and
the
missile
gap
in
favour
of
the
Soviet
Union
cannot
be
closed
until
1965.
The
Western
powers
appear
then
to
be
at
the
mercy
of
the
Soviet
Union,
and
thus
liable
to
"blackmail".
In
order
to
meet
the
wide
range
of
Soviet
challenges,
including
that
of "limited
aggression",
there
is
a
desperate
need
for
"limited
arms",
both conventional
and
nuclear.
Thus
prepared with
a
"spectrum
of
military
possibilities",
and
by
working
closely
with
its
NATO
allies,
the
United
States
can
hope
to
ride
out
the danger
period.
And,
paradoxical as
it
may
seem,
"the
best
road
to
nuclear
arms
control
may
be
conventional
re-armament".
In
arguing
at
length for
conventional
arms
Mr.
Kissinger
seems
to
have
shifted
his
opinions
somewhat.
He
had,
in
his
earlier
writing,
put
more
emphasis
on
limited
nuclear
weapons.
Events have
overtaken
the
author,
who
is
presumably
happy
with
President
Kennedy's
current
rearmament
programme.
Few.
can.
quarrel
with
h
general
proposition
that
the
West
must
have
all
kinds
of
arms,
so
long
as
a
potential
enemy
has
them.
It
is
no
use
to
have conventional
arms
if
it
is
not
possible
to
keep
a
war
limited,
should
one
unhappily
break
out
that
involves
the
major
powers.
On
the
whole
the
author
makes
out
a
very powerful
case
that
war
may
be
limited;
true, it
may
bring
disaster,
but
the alternative-
use
of
the
great
deterrent-is
disaster.
On
other
subjects-such
as
the
strengthening
of
Europe
for
local
defence,
the
defects
of
personal
diplomacy
and
"summits",
the terribly
complex
problems
of
arms
control,
the
place of
the intellectual
in
policy-
making-the
author
is
never
vague,
often
stimulating,
and
always
sensible.
Two
criticisms
may
be
made,
that
do
not
however
touch
the
sub-
stance
of
his
arguments.
The
first
concerns
the
analysis
of
possible
Soviet
actions
and reactions
under
various
assumptions.
This
is
frankly
an
exercise
in mind-reading.
Who
really
knows
what
the
Kremlin
thinks
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