Book Review: Vulnerable Adults and the Law
| Published date | 01 April 2018 |
| Date | 01 April 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0964663917748045b |
| Subject Matter | Book Reviews |
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JONATHAN HERRING, Vulnerable Adults and the Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016,
pp. 304, ISBN 9780198737278, £70 (hbk).
We should rejoice in our vulnerability says Jonathan Herring at the start of this book
(p. 1). Similar to arguments made about caring relationships (Herring, 2013), Herring
emphasizes how vulnerability is central to human existence. He reiterates this through-
out and shows the diversity of contexts within which vulnerability discourse operates,
from mental capacity law to human rights, public authority liability, criminal justice and
contract law. His assertion of vulnerability as a normal part of being human is an
important response to those who see vulnerability as weakness, and the book is a
significant contribution to the positive case for a vulnerability analysis in law.
Herring’s aim in this book is to ‘explore how the current law responds to the notion of
vulnerability’ (p. 2). He starts with a theoretical analysis of vulnerability and explores
different understandings of the term and its relevance for law (Chapters 1 and 2). The
substance of the book considers how vulnerability operates within specific areas of law
and how a vulnerability analysis might improve our understanding of those areas (Chap-
ters 3–8). He initially explores how the concept is used in the mental capacity (Chapter 3)
and inherent jurisdiction (Chapter 4) contexts. These are areas where vulnerability
theory is most developed. However, he also considers the state’s role in relation to
vulnerable adults in human rights law (Chapter 5) and under the Care Act 2014 (Chapter
6), before analyzing the relationship between vulnerable adults and the criminal law
(chapter 7) and contract law (chapter 8), finally bringing the different strands together in
Chapter 9.
Chapter 1 introduces the concept of vulnerability and why it is important. Herring
reiterates that our legal system must take account of our vulnerable, relational natures
and carefully sketches out what such a legal system might look like. Chapter 2 maps out a
definition of vulnerability; a concept notoriously difficult to define, Herring clearly
outlines the different approaches. They include ‘official definitions’ from adult social
care and safeguarding, as well as academic conceptions such as Martha Fineman’s
account of universal vulnerability (pp. 16–17), approaches from care and dependency
theory (pp. 13–16) and situational (and other) accounts which particularize vulnerability
(pp. 22–27). He argues for a ‘middle path’ (p. 2), accepting Fineman’s account that
vulnerability is universal but recognizing the especial vulnerability of particular groups
and individuals. He does this persuasively...
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