Book Review: Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 205 pp., no price given pbk.)
| Published date | 01 December 2000 |
| Date | 01 December 2000 |
| DOI | 10.1177/03058298000290030922 |
| Author | Petr Drulak |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Millennium
966
Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration : Europe and Beyond
(Cambridge: Ca mbridge Unive rsity Press, 1999, 205 pp., no price giv en pbk.).
A quarter ce ntury ago Ernst Haas p roclaimed regional integr ation theory dead. This
theory has since been resurrecte d and, given that none of the recent books on
European integration remind one of an autopsy, its health appears to be sound.
Most of the books focus on Europe without considering integration efforts in other
parts o f the world. Indeed, for many observers regional integ ration is synon ymous
with the EU. Ev en though Walter Mattli dedicat es a conside rable part of his boo k to
the EU, he g oes ‘be yond Eu rope’ as well, includin g discussio ns of the German
Customs Union and other Europea n integration pro jects of th e nineteenth c entury,
Latin Ameri can integratio n attempts of t he 1960s, an d contemporary pro jects such
as MERCOSUR, ASEAN, APEC, a nd NAFTA.
Mattli does not claim to be able to ex plain ev ery impo rtant iss ue co ncerning
regional inte gration. He clearly states tha t the question of why co untries start
integratin g at all is out of his ran ge. His p arsimonious analytic al framework de als
with the dyn amics of the process once it beg ins, raising two specific quest ions: why
do some integration attempts succeed while others do not, and how do outsiders
react to the creat ion of a successful regional integrat ion (p. 12)?
The framework developed in the third chapter is thought provoking and worth
studying. The success of regio nal int egration is d ependent upon two groups of
factors: de mand for integratio n and its supply. The de mand for integratio n is
generated by business which is keen on profiting from new technologies which
‘increase the scope of mar kets be yond the bound aries of a single state’ (p . 46).
Business d emands integratio n to re duce h igh tran saction costs impo sed b y
sovereign states. Economic b enefits play an important rol e on the sup ply side as
well. Poli tical leaders, as sup pliers of integratio n, are expe cted to favour the partial
abandon of n ational sovereignty especia lly during times of econo mic troubles whe n
integratio n offers economic g ains to bolster t heir shaken posit ions. But willingne ss
to i ntegrate on the part of leaders is not enough, as they may fail to agree among
themselves on ho w to integrate.
Mattli disting uishes two kin ds of coll ective-action problems: the Prisoners’
Dilemma a nd a Coordi nation game. The former is chara cterised by mutu al distrust
driving players into an inefficient equilibrium, while the latt er has multiple
equilibria with a different distribution o f pay-offs. T he Prisone rs’ Dilemma
situation can be ma naged by ‘commitment institutions’ t hat will overc ome mutual
distrust throug h the repeti tion of t he g ame and rules enforcement (p. 54). The
dilemmas of the Coordination game, which Mattli deems more important to the
success of integration , can be solved by an ‘undisputed leader’, the policies of
which serve as a focal point when choosing between multiple equilibria and which
can se rve as a paymaster easing distrib utional tensions (p. 56). To sum u p, Mattli
proposes three c onditions under which integ ration is likely to succeed. Two of t hem
are strong in the sense that ‘no integration sche me that sa tisfies [them]…has ever
failed’ (p. 6 5). The regional group sho uld get both economic gains from integration
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