Book Reviews
| Published date | 01 September 2004 |
| Date | 01 September 2004 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2004.00297.x |
Book Reviews
RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT by CASS
R. SUNSTEIN
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 352 pp., £25.00 (hbk)
£15.99 (pbk))
In this book Sunstein explores problems in how people think about and
respond to risk, and connects these problems to issues of risk regulation. He
argues that people have cognitive limitations which impair rational responses
to risk. Instead of assessing a risk scientifically ± measuring its frequency
and severity, costs and benefits ± people typically rely on intuition,
emotions, social persuasion, and other non-scientific forms of reasoning.
Sunstein views any decision about risk that fails to include scientific facts
and expertise as wrongheaded and as likely to have pernicious consequences.
Research literature on risk perception is used to document problems with
`ordinary thinking' about risk. A few examples indicate the nature of the
problems. `Intuitive toxicology' occurs when people view a risky situation in
all-or-nothing terms, as either safe or unsafe, without regard to probabilistic
reasoning or cost-benefit analysis. When the situation is deemed unsafe, they
become too risk-averse and precautionary. There is a tendency to exaggerate
the imagined severe consequences of a risk, and to give insufficient
consideration to risk frequency and the possible gains of risk taking. Much of
this tendency is driven by `social cascades', informational and reputational
sources of belief about risks. In an `informational cascade', people base their
beliefs about a risk on the beliefs of others without searching for independent
sources of knowledge. In a `reputational cascade', people base their beliefs
about a risk on earning social approval or avoiding disapproval rather than
on scientific reason.
Sunstein argues that such `ordinary thinking' also characterizes decisions
of policymakers and regulators. He uses the early development of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the United States as a case in
point. In Sunstein's view, the legislative and regulatory response to 1970s
environmentalism was lacking on a number of counts. The focus was on the
sheer existence of environmental risks rather than their relative magnitude.
This focus resulted in a failure to establish priorities for regulation. Large-
scale regulation forged ahead, with a sense of immediacy trumping reasoned
assessment of risks. A command-and-control style of regulation enforced
strict emissions standards and technological requirements that had costly
consequences for various parties. All of these tendencies were underpinned
by what Sunstein regards as improper moral indignation against those
408
ßBlackwell Publishing Ltd 2004, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
deemed responsible for pollution risk, and by an emphasis on distributional
goals such as worker safety at the expense of economic growth and
prosperity.
Sunstein acknowledges that over time, EPA regulation has enhanced
many environments. However, he points to annual compliance costs
estimated at $400 billion, with consequences for higher prices, lower wages,
fewer jobs, and greater poverty. Too much reliance on `ordinary thinking'
rather than expert assessments of risk has contributed to these costs.
The EPA itself acknowledges that EPA policies are responsive not to expert
judgments but to lay assessments of risks. EPA policies track ordinary
judgments extremely well . . . The government currently allocates its limited
resources poorly, and it does so partly because it is responsive to ordinary
judgments about the magnitude of risks. A government that could insulate
itself from misinformed judgments could save thousands of lives and billions
of dollars annually (p. 33).
The primary remedy, in a word, is SCIENCE. Sunstein refers to this book
as a `celebration' of the centrality of science and technical expertise to the
regulation of risk. He declares that scientific cost-benefit analysis ± a
thorough accounting of the consequences of alternative courses of action in
dealing with a risk ± should infuse every decision about a risk. Particular
regard should be given to the question of whether the benefits of regulation
justify the costs, including the costs of significant new risks that may be
posed by regulation itself.
A number of case studies, for example regarding arsenic in drinking water
(chapter 7) and clean air (cha pter 9), are used to demonstrate the
complexities of cost-benefit analysis when it is applied to hard cases of
risk regulation. In presenting these case studies, Sunstein remains sensitive
to some of the limitations of cost-benefit analysis, which he sees as
necessary but not sufficient for value judgments about risk. He warns of the
`illusion of certainty' that hard data about costs and benefits can convey.
Different assumptions built into cost-benefit analysis can yield dramatically
different data, and data are open to discrepant interpretations in legal and
policy contexts. In practice, regulatory agencies operate `in the midst of
considerable scientific uncertainty and on the basis of judgments of value on
which reasonable people can differ' (p. 155).
While he points to such limitations of cost-benefit analysis and leaves
room for other rationalities, especially human values about the significance
and priority of particular risks, Sunstein sees scientific rationality as
paramount. He strongly criticizes approaches such as pollution prevention,
the precautionary principle, and sustainable development that are too
`populi st' for his li king with in sufficie nt refere nce to cost- benefit
considerations. He criticizes scholars such as Slovic
1
whose research shows
that ordinary people have a `richer rationality' with which to address risk
409
1 P. Slovic, The Perception of Risk (2000).
ßBlackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
To continue reading
Request your trial