Book Reviews : Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M. E. Lambert. Second Series, Vol. XIV. The Italo-Ethiopian Dispute, March 1934-October 1935. H.M.S.O. £16.50
| Date | 01 October 1976 |
| Published date | 01 October 1976 |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711787600500410 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
1155
on
the
former
Portuguese
Colonies
together
with
the
Comoro
Islands,
Surinam
and
Papua
New
Guinea,
as
well
as
on
rhe
former
Gilbert
and
Ellice
Islands
Colony
now
divided
into
Gilbert
Islands
and
Tuoalu.
For
the
rest,
every
conceivable
form
of
information
is
here.
An
invaluable
aid
whatever
your
particular
sphere
of
activity
may
be.
Documents
on
British
Foreign
Policy,
1919-1939.
Edited
by
W.
N.
Medlicott,
Douglas
Dakin
and
M.
E.
Lambert.
Second
Series,
Vol.
XIV.
The
Italo-Ethiopian
Dispute,
March
1934-October
1935.
H.M.S.O.
£16.50.
This
is
the
first
of
three
volumes
in
the
series
which
will
be
concerned
with
British
policy
in
the
Italo-Ethiopian
dispute
and
takes
the
story
down
to
she
outbreak
of
the
Italo-Ethiopian
War
on
October
3
1935.
It
is
obvious,
therefore,
that
there
is
scope
for
creating
developments
in
considerable
depth.
The
background
is
amply
filled
out
by
the
Maffey
Report;
the
full
text
of
which
is
printed
for
the
first
time
as
Appendix
II,
dealing
with
the
whole
complex
of
British
interests
&dquo;as
they
were
more
likely
to
be
affected
by
an
Italian
conques.t
of
Ethiopia&dquo;,
and
with
the
internal
politics
and
economics
of
that
country.
One
of
the
main
preoccupations
of
the
Government
was
to
retain
the
co-operation
of
Italy
with
France
and
the
United
Kingdom
against
German
expansionism
-
an
aim
that
was
at
variance
with
the
tide
of
British
public
opinion,
hot
for
strong
action
by
the
League
of
Nations
against
Italian
aggression.
Moreover,
the
French
were
mainly
concerned
to
maintain
Franco-Italian
friendship
and
so
most
reluctant
to
agree
to
the
imposition
of
any
form
of
League
of
Nations
sanctions
upon
the
Italians.
What
is
clearly
demonstrated
is
that
at
no
point
was
there
any
hope
of
deflecting
the
Italian
plan
for the
conquest
of
Ethiopia,
if
not
by
diplomatic
means
then
by
outright
invasion.
In
so
far
as
they
were
prepared
to
make
concessions,
it
was
only
to
the
extent
of
guaranteeing
what
were
seen
as
the
&dquo;legitimate
interests&dquo;
of
third
parties.
This
fascinating
and
saddening
collection
of
documents
ends
with
the
speech
of
Sir
Samuel
Hoare
at
the
League
Assembly
on
September
llth
1935.
One
point
that
is
worth
emphasising
since
it
is
equally
applicable
today
is
that,
as
stated
by
Sir
Robert
Vansittart
(No.
662
p725)
Great
Britain
in
her
then
&dquo;unarmed
conditions&dquo;
was
in
no
position
to
bring
any
effective
pressure
to
bear
upon
Italy
or
any
other
country.
We
were,
virtually,
helpless
and
&dquo;in
no
condition
for
any
adventure&dquo;.
The
price
of
security
remains
real
preparedness
for
war.
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