Book Reviews : Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union. R. Amann and J. M. Cooper. Yale University Press. £30. Soviet Risk Taking & Crisis Behaviour: A Theoretical & Empirical Analysis. Hannes Adomit. Foreword by Marshall D. Shulman. GeorgeAllen & Unwin. £27.50 Russia at the Crossroads: The 26th Congress of the CPU. Edited by Seweryn Bailer and Thane Gustafson
| DOI | 10.1177/004711788200700409 |
| Date | 01 October 1982 |
| Published date | 01 October 1982 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
2243
government.
But
he
argues
that the
world’s
growing
interdependence
has
increased
rather
than
lessened
the
scope
of
diplomacy,
and
that
it
is
largely
illusory
to
think
that
technological
developments
have
destroyed
the
need
for
this
age-old
phenom-
enon.
For
&dquo;organised
diplomacy
answers
an
imperative
need
in
any
system
of
independent
states&dquo;
(p
93),
and
thus
has
always
occuried,
in
essentially
the
same
form,
wherever
state
systems
have
existed.
This
key
theme
could
perhaps
have
had
a
heavier
emphasis,
as
it
is
surrounded
by
so
many
good
things
that
it
may
slip
from
the
sight
of
the
less-alert
reader.
In
this
connection
it
is
surprising
that
Mr
Watson
has
nothing
to
say
about
the
significance
of
accreditation.
The
dialogue
between
states
can
only
take
place
on
the
assumption
that
some
specified
individuals
are
the
official
representatives
of
the
national
entities
they
serve,
and
it
is
the
device
of
accreditation
which
enables
them
to
be
so
designated.
Another
possible
criticism
is
that
Mr
Watson
appears
to
see
diplomacy
as
having
a
civilizing
purpose
of
its
own,
separate
from
the
purposes
of states.
Certainly,
practitioners
usually
think
in
terms
of
negotiation
and
compromise.
But,
as
Mr
Watson
also
says,
&dquo;diplomacy
is
an
instrument
of
governments&dquo;
(p
226).
Accordingly,
it
is
up
to
them
to
use
this
instrument
as
they
see
fit.
If they
care
to
employ
diplomats
to
prepare
the
ground
forconfrontation
or
war,
this
may
be
thought
to
be
an
undesirable
use
of
diplomacy,
but
there
is
no
ground
for
thinking
that
it
somehow
goes
against
the
’natural’
diplomatic
grain.
Dialogue
is
a
tool,
a
means
of communication.
What
it
is
used
for
is
up
to
the
communicators.
However,
this
is
a
splendid
book
which
throws
much
valuable
light
on
one
of
the
necessary
conditions
for
sovereign
states
to
coexist
in
an
international
society.
It
is
most
welcome.
-Alan James
Industrial
Innovation
in
the
Soviet
Union.
R.
Amann
and
J.
M.
Cooper.
Yale
University
Press.
£30.
Soviet
Risk
Taking
&
Crisis
Behaviour:
A
Theoretical
&
Empirical
Analysis.
Hannes Adomit.
Foreword
by
Marshall D.
Shulman.
GeorgeAllen &
Unwin.
£27.50
Russia
at
the
Crossroads:
The
26th
Congress
of
the
CPU.
Edited
by
Seweryn
Bailer
and
Thane
Gustafson.
Taken
together
these
three
books
give
as
wide
a
perspective
on
the
current
Soviet
scene
as
it
is
possible
to
attain
from
outside
the
enclosed
system.
Industrial
Innovation
in
the
Soviet
Union
surveys
the
entire
field
of
Soviet
industry
including
defense
and
political
direction,
and
evaluates
the
major
failings
of
central
planning
seen
as
a
serious
constraint
on
the
necessary
industrial-and
indeed
agricultural--innovation.
The
authors
point
out
that
political
direction
of
industry
as
far
as
innovation
is
concerned,
which
works
by
concentrating
resources
on
priority
projects,
may
be
inherently
limited
in
its
application.
This
work
by
members
of the
Centre
for
Russian
and
East
European
Studies
at
the
University
of
Birmingham,
is
an
invaluable
collection
of
a
vast
array
of
facts
and
opinions.
In
the
Introduction
to
Soviet
Ri.sk
Taking
and
Crisis
Behaviour
the
author
sets
out
the
object
of
his
study
&dquo;For
what
purposes
and
under
what
conditions
are
the
Soviet
leaders
prepared
to
take
roles
in
international
relations’?
...
The
topic
is
obviously
not
mainly
of
historical
interest.
Whereas
it
may
be
correct
that
politically
and
economically
the
global
distribution
of
power
has
become
more
ambiguous
and
diffuse,
the
basic
pattern
of bipolarity
nevertheless
has
remained
unaltered
in
the
military
and
strategic
and
security
spheres.
If anything,
it
has
even
deepened,
given
the
huge
costs
of
modern
strategic
weapons
and
their
delivery
systems
and
the
rapid
advances
in
military
technology.
Unchanged
also
are
the
basic
adversary
relationships
between
the
two
super-powers,
notwithstanding
the
necessary
epithet
of &dquo;limited&dquo;
and
the
obvious
mixture
of elements
of co-operation
and
confrontation
and
the
erratic
shifts
in
the
geographical
centre
of
conflict.
Cuba,
Berlin,
the
Middle
East,
Vietnam,
Angola,
the
Horn
of
Africa,
Afghanistan
or
the
Persian
Gulf’.
The
factor
that
now
plays
a
large
part
in
the
conf7ict-both
in
ideology
and
intentions-between
both
the
super-powers
and
NATO
is
the
achievement
by
the
USSR
of
nuclear
parity
with
the
United
States
and
of
superiority
in
conventional
forces
over
the
combined
NATO
Alliance.
But
these
facts
would
not
seem
to
add
to
the
possibility
of
the
USSR
&dquo;chancing
its
arm&dquo;
either
in
Europe
or
in
areas
where
it
could
expect
an
immediate
response
from
the
United
States
in
defence
of &dquo;vital
interests&dquo;.
So
far
its
risk-taking
has
been
extremely
cleverly
controlled.
What
might.
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